The Discourse of Tionghoa Muslim Identity in Indonesia After the Reform Order: A Critical Discourse Analysis of ‘Komunitas’ - ‘Cheng Hoo’ Magazine

Ahmad Alwajih

Sekolah Tinggi Babasa Arab dan Dakwah Masjid Agung Sunan Ampel
ahmad.alwajih@stibadamasa.ac.id

Abstract

The discourse of Indonesian Chinese Muslim identity has been shaped through long historical processes. Since the colonialism era to the Reform Order, this discourse has changed due to the economic and political transformation, which in turn give an impact to the structure of the identity itself. The Reform Era is one of social ruptures in Indonesia that become interesting historical context to examine how the discourse of Indonesian Chinese Muslim has been developed. This study has examined the notions of identity through a critical discourse analysis model as proposed by Norman Fairclough, which emphasizes both sociocultural practice of discourse and micro level of discourse. Taking Komunitas - Cheng Hoo magazine as a case study, this study aims to outline the discourse on Chinese Muslim identity in Indonesia in the post-New Order context. As one of the results of political reform in Indonesia which has opened up the opportunity for the Chinese communities to express their identity, this magazine emphasizes various positive representations of Chinese communities and their cultures. However, such positive representations also entail dynamic tensions of Chinese identities, i.e., tension between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Tionghoa’ terms, between nationalism and discrimination issues, and tension of being apolitical or political subject. This study also finds that the representation of Chinese Muslim is not singular, but plural, fluid and constantly in contestation with the others. Most importantly, Chinese Muslims are represented as inclusive-rational groups and as true nationalist people.

Keywords: critical discourse analysis, Indonesian Chinese Muslim, identity, Reform Order.

Introduction

After the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, only a handful of the Chinese press existed, which mostly spoke Mandarin. In Jakarta, there were only 5 Indonesian-language Chinese press publications: Suar 168, SIMPATIK, Sinergi Bangsa, Sinar Glodok, and Suara Baru. Unfortunately, none of them were published regularly and lasted for a long time for various reasons, such as market share and declining of reading culture even among Chinese. The birth of these media was a form of Chinese ethnic euphoria in expressing their cultural identity after a long silence during the New Order regime (Hoon 2012: 143).
Interestingly, one of these magazines, i.e. ‘The Chinese Muslim Magazine – Cheng Hoo’, which is under auspices of the Haji Muhammad Cheng Hoo Indonesia Foundation and the Trustees of the Islamic Tauhid Faith (Pembina Iman Tauhid Islam - PITI), has survived until now. It was first published three years after the 1998 riot with the name ‘Komunitas’, and was distributed free of charge to its member networks throughout Indonesia. In 2011, it has changed its name into ‘Cheng Hoo’. This magazine does not only carry a Chinese taste, but also embeds a ‘Muslim’ label. It seems to mix the ideas of Chinese culture, Islamism, and locality.

However, this magazine is not independent of various constellations, even within the Chinese Muslim society itself. During the New Order, the politics of assimilation has divided them into poles that supported and rejected the assimilation for their respective reasons. For example, Junus Jabja (1995) advocates Chinese people to embrace Islam to make them easier to be publicly accepted, while Hembing Wijayakusuma (in Afif 2012: 102) does not see Islam as the only solution. This indicates that Chinese Muslims do not contain homogeneous knowledge and identities.

This study is important for some reasons. First, talking about Chinese Muslims in Indonesia means talking about minority group within the minority. However, historically the role of this minority cannot be ignored, especially when considering the spread of Islam and the economic development, especially in Java (Aziz 2014; De Graaf and Pigeaud 1997). Second, the post-New Order social transformation has significant implications for the shifting of Chinese ethnic identity, which is nowadays beginning to be reexamined, with the presumption that identity is not fixed and static, but always fluid and dynamic. Every identity construction embeds political, cultural, historical, and various interrelated aspects (Heryanto 2008; Hoon 2012). Third, after the trauma of May 1998, in the efforts to find their identity (Afif 2012), Chinese Muslims were also positioned as subjects who constructed their own identity with various media. At this point, previous studies have not discussed yet the discursive transformation of Chinese Muslim identity in their own media (Hoon 2012; Wibowo et al. 2010; Dawis 2010).

Taking Komunitas - Cheng Hoo magazine as a case study, this article aims to outline the discourse on Chinese Muslim identity in Indonesia in the post-New Order context. The research questions of this paper are: how the discourse of Chinese Muslim identity in Indonesia constructed in the Komunitas - Cheng Hoo magazine? what kind of Chinese Muslim identity is negotiated in the presence of various other identities?

**Theoretical Perspective: Understanding Identity as Discourse**

The basic premise of the theoretical perspective of this research is ‘power goes through the production of knowledge’. Knowledge is distributed massively through a social practice called discourse (Titscher et al. 2009: 237). For Foucault, discourse is understood as the field of all the statements, as individualization group of statements, and sometimes as regulatory practices viewed from a number of statements (Eriyanto 2009: 2). Discourse is regulatory because it organizes reality. If this regulation is maintained through continuous production and reproduction of discourse, it will get the predicate of ‘norms’ (Subono et al. 2012: 11).

For Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2008), the investigation of discourse should not stop at knowing only the dominant discourse, as the marginal social classes also develop their own discourse, called counter discourse. The
discourse practices of minorities group are often far from the revolutionary movement such as Laclau and Mouffe’s studies on the discourse of revolution in some fascist countries such as Italy or France. The discourse practices of minority classes can also include the notion of dislocation, threshold, or fracture. There is no fully established discourse because it is always in conflict with other discourses which define reality differently and set certain guidelines for social action. Totally naturalized discourse will never be established, so there may be special moments for the articulation of new social identities (Laclau and Mouffe 2008; Jorgensen and Louise 2007).

Identity as the focus of this study can be defined as who and what the subject is like in the society (Bloomlaert 2005: 203). Identity is related to the subjective reality that is dialectically related to society. Identity is forged by social processes so that they crystallize, but can be rearranged and even reconstructed by social relations (Berger and Luckman 1991: 194; Matheson 2005: 58). Chang Yao Hoon (2012) argues that identity can no longer be understood through mere geographical boundaries. Within identity constructions, there are politics, culture, history, globalization, and various interrelated variables. The production of identity is very complex as it is mediated through certain symbols or languages (Real 1996: 12). Investigating identity would inevitably trace back historical archives, through which changes or continuities in the identity construction can be revealed (Mills 2007: 47).

**Method**

This study applies a discourse analysis model of Norman Fairclough (2010: 62), which consists of three main elements as a complete discourse unity, namely: texts (micro elements), discourse practices (meso elements), and sociocultural practices (macro elements). All of these elements are related to one another (intertextuality). Applying Fairclough model (1995: 58), this study will focus on two textual practices of identity reproduction, namely representation and relationship. The object of this study is 14 articles in Komunitas – Cheng Hoo Magazine, including: 9 articles from Komunitas Magazine (2002-2011) and 5 articles from Cheng Hoo Magazine (2011-2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical category</th>
<th>Focus of analysis</th>
<th>Observed objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>How Chinese Muslims are presented in the text along with certain events, people, groups, situations.</td>
<td>Words, sentences, or concepts that refer or relate to the representations of Chinese Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>How the relationships between Chinese Muslims and other text participants are presented in the text.</td>
<td>Relations between Chinese Muslims and other participants in the text.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sociocultural Practices: Chinese Muslim Discourses in a Brief History

Chinese Muslim identity as a discourse has begun to emerge since centuries ago when Ma Huan recorded Admiral Cheng Hoo's journey to various regions in Sumatra and Java. Meanwhile, the mediation of Chinese Muslim identity began to develop in the Dutch colonial era. There were two newspapers run by a handful of Chinese elites in the early 20th century, such as Sin Po and Perniagaan. Sin Po was an opposition to the Dutch East Indies Government, while Perniagaan was a newspaper that supported the colonial government policies (Suryadinata 1986: 23). Even though the political views of the two were different, they were obviously in the discourse contestations of their identity as Chinese nationalists and Dutch colony in the Dutch East Indies mainland.

When Japan occupied Indonesia, all political activities carried out by the indigenous, as well as the Chinese people, had to be silenced because they were considered to be dangerous to the Japanese government. All must fully support Japanese politics as the ‘elder brother’ of Asia. In accordance with Article 16 of the Japanese Government Law governing the press at that time, publishing activities, including Chinese media such as Sin Po, were strictly intervened as they were included into the category of political activities which must follow the Japanese political agendas (Suryadinata 1984: 55). Since the national independence, from the leadership of Soekarno to the era of Suharto, the government always tried to Indonesianize them through assimilationist politics, including: receiving Indonesian education (1957), prohibition of retail trading in rural areas (1959), facilitating naturalization (1969), regulations of the changes of name (1961, 1967), and the closure of Chinese language schools (1966) (Suryadinata 1984: 203).

Every media related to China or Chinese was totally prohibited under the New Order regime, except ‘Harian Indonesia’ (Yindunuxia Ribao) as the government’s official media for the Chinese communities, especially Chinese people who are not able to read the Indonesian-language print media. According to Chang Yao Hoon (2012), the Chinese people did not have any choice except following the information controlled by the government. After the riot of May 1998, the repressive New Order regime ended. President Abdurrahman Wahid issued Decree No. 6/2000 concerning the revocation of Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967 regarding the prohibition of Chinese religions, beliefs and customs. In 2001, this new regulation was followed by the lifting of the ban on the use of Chinese names for Chinese citizens in Indonesia. It resulted in the adoption of the Chinese New Year as a facultative holiday (applies to those who celebrate it) and continued to the lifting of the ban on the use of Chinese both spoken and written (Afif 2012: 124).

These policies have opened a way for the Chinese to be an integral part of Indonesia, no longer considered outsiders (Wahid 1990). They have also opened up the opportunity for the Chinese communities to dialogue their identities and cultures publicly in media. It is characterized by the emergence of various positive representations of Chinese ethnicity in the media, which - to borrow Umar Kayam’s terms (in Jahja 1991) - do not follow mainstream labels, such as: apolitical, homo economicus, stingy, communist, and China nationalist. Ariel Heryanto (2008) discusses this change through analyzing the films Ca Ban Kan (released in 2002) and Gie (released in 2005), which were produced after the New Order regime period. In these films, the Chinese figures have the same ways of thinking as well as the routines with the indigenous people.
Power Relations Behind the Discourse Practices of Cheng Hoo Magazine

Cheng Hoo Magazine is supported by the strong network of Chinese conglomerates and businessmen in Indonesia. Not only the economic structure, it is also supported by the political structure of the government and various community organizations. It can be clearly known from its editorial composition.

This powerful backup from economic structure is also shown from its news. We may find examples from the news entitled ‘Cheng Hoo A Plus wins two titles – Cheng Hoo A Plus sabet dua gelar’ (Cheng Hoo, December 2012) and a profile news titled ‘HM Jos Soetomo: I borrow the name of Jos Soedarso-Bung Tomo – HM Soetomo: saya pinjam nama Jos Soedarso-Bung Tomo’ (Cheng Hoo, December 2011). Abdurrahman Djoko Widjaja is a businessman as well as one of the founding boards of the Haji Mohammad Cheng Hoo Indonesia Foundation, the institution that publishes Cheng Hoo Magazine. Not only that, Djoko Widjaja is also familiar to mass media in Surabaya. The Surabaya Post Online (16 June 2013) published a news column about him, entitled ‘Abdurrahman Djoko Widjaja: healthy due to acupuncture - Abdurrahman Djoko Widjaja: sehat berkat akupuntur’.

Meanwhile, political supports, especially from the government institutions, are also represented in the magazine. For example, a column entitled ‘Law enforcement without discrimination’ covers the statement made by Inspector General Pol Hadiamtoko as the Head of East Java Regional Police (Cheng Hoo, August 2011). This column was a report of the gathering between YHMCHI-PITI with the East Java Regional Police Office during the handover ceremony of Hadiamtoko’s position as a new Chief of East Java Regional Police.

Dismantling Komunitas - Cheng Hoo Texts

This chapter discusses two main issues in the texts of Komunitas - Cheng Hoo Magazine, i.e., the representation of Chinese Muslims and their relationships with other subjects in the texts.

1. Chinese identity between nationalism and discrimination

Four years after the collapse of the New Order, the magazine began to define the Chinese as part of the Indonesian nation by ignoring their physical characteristics. It is shown in an article entitled ‘The Chinese ethnic group is also part of the Indonesian nation – Suku Tionghoa juga bagian dari bangsa Indonesia’ (Komunitas, Sept 2002). The Chinese is framed in the text with historical characteristic, that they have lived for hundreds of years in Indonesia. Therefore, this ethnic group is considered to naturally blend in with the local people. Thus, Chinese is not a nationhood, but an ethnic, just as other ethnicities such as Java, Madura, and etc.

This article emphasizes that being part of the Indonesian nation for the Chinese is ironic due to a lot of discrimination to this ethnic group. One of important discriminations criticized in this article is concerned about the law and citizenship rights, illustrated with the story about the complicated problems often faced by Chinese people in applying ID cards, passports, and various other civil permits. It disputes the presumption that Chinese people do not have a sense of Indonesian nationalism.

This article also counters a stereotype that all Chinese people are rich. A lot of Chinese people in Singkawang, Madura, Tangerang, or Banten are laborers. Until the mid of 2000s, it was believed that the Chinese had been exploited economically, but weakened politically. Another irony is that even though they have made a lot of contributions to Indonesia, they
are still in doubts about their loyalty to national identity. So, here is a kind of criticism, that being a good citizen in Indonesia is very difficult for Chinese people (Komunitas, April 2008).

2. *Not an apolitical subject*

Being Chinese does not mean being apolitical and anti-nationalism, but rather becoming a part of democratic processes in Indonesia. This idea is represented through important Chinese figures, such as Basuki Tjahaja Purnama who had been Deputy Governor and then Governor of DKI Jakarta.

This magazine also supports the ratification of the Presidential Decree No. 12/2014 by President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Cheng Hoo 2014) which has formally shifted the official calling from ‘China’ toward ‘Tiongkok’. Despite being political, this new regulation has long been awaited by the Chinese community. They argue that the old regulation is considered to have violated the constitution, so the president was totally correct to revoke it.

As a result, after this new regulation, the Chinese communities have developed a more mature of Chinese identity, especially in the differences between ‘China’ and ‘Tionghoa’. China refers to the state, also to the taunts from the Japan towards the China, as was also performed by the New Order regime. Again, a criticism is directed towards the New Order regime who has imposed the term ‘China’ rather than ‘Tionghoa’. In fact, Indonesian Chinese people actually prefer the term ‘Tionghoa’ as it is more cultural rather than political (Cheng Hoo 2014).

The General Chairman of the PITI emphasized that there should not be any pejorative cynicism anymore to the calling of ‘Tiongkok’ or ‘Chinese’, and that any citizens should be respected regardless their ethnicities (Cheng Hoo, April-June 2014). While the chairman of the Bekasi City Chinese Society (Pancaran Trihardma Foundation) Ronny Hermawan welcomed the new regulation, reinforcing that the Indonesian Chinese community has always been Indonesian citizens. Many of them have joined the military and fought for the Indonesian independence. He also asks that the Chinese community should be given the same opportunities as other ethnic groups (Cheng Hoo 2014).

3. *Unifying Islamic, Indonesian and Chinese identities*

The Komunitas - Cheng Hoo Magazine also discusses the idea of ‘Chinese Muslim’, even though it is not clearly identified who and how Chinese Muslim was. In the early editions, especially in 2002, the term ‘Chinese Muslim’ does not appear explicitly in the text. Chinese Muslims are considered as just ‘Chinese’, along with other Chinese believers (Komunitas, September 2002).

After the New Order regime, there still existed fear and doubt to present the Chinese and Islamic ideas simultaneously in the text as a single unified identity. These feelings were directly related to the traumatic events in 1998 which has victimized a lot of Chinese people. Such events were still deeply implanted in the social memory of Chinese communities in Indonesia. At this time, Islamic and Chinese codes seem to have never met.

The ‘Chinese Muslim’ phrase was first presented in the January 2003 edition of the Komunitas Magazine entitled ‘Never represented – Tak pernah diwakilkan’. The Chinese Muslim as a subject was represented by H.M. Lukminto, a well-known Muslim businessman in Java, particularly in Solo. The article emphasizes the popularity of H.M. Lukminto, his obedience in practicing Islam, his tawadhu or humble personality, and his trustful
attitude as an entrepreneur which is honest and always committed to every business agreement that has been taken. Another highlighted aspect in the text is the Chinese name H.M. Lukminto. With this addition of a Chinese name to his identity as a Muslim businessman, the text has represented H.M. Lukminto as an ideal figure of a Chinese Muslim.

Another ideal figure presented in the magazine is H. Sibro who is described as having a big role in building mosques, giving donations to orphans and Islamic boarding schools. The text also recounts his active role in various socio-religious organizations such as NU and Baiturrohman Mosque Management. In addition, he has also served as Chairman of the PITI Pasuruan.

However, the representation of Chinese Muslim culture is not singular. The magazine also describes that Chinese Muslims in Indonesia themselves also vary after coming into contact with the local traditions. There is no difference between Chinese Muslims and non-Chinese Muslims, even Chinese Muslims can sing Madurese songs or perform Balinese dances. The text also describes how a cultural exhibition has combined Chinese and Middle Eastern clothes that could be adapted in Indonesia, even though the performer was a Chinese Muslim from Xinjiang Ningxia with a blend of European, Chinese and Middle Eastern faces. Through a large portion of the news photos, the text has visually described what and how Chinese Muslim cultures are. But it does mean that the cultural identity of Chinese Muslim in Indonesia is oriented towards China, although the text also seems ambivalent when it says that Xinjiang Ningxia culture can be adopted in Indonesia.

The interesting point is that the discourse of citizenship and Islamic identity is represented to transcend the Chinese Muslim cultural identity. In an article entitled ‘Wisdom to celebrate the independence in the holy month - Hikmah rayakan kemerdekaan di bulan suci’ (Cheng Hoo, August 2011), we may find interesting statements, i.e.: “We should pray for the heroes. Have we ever prayed for them? – Kita harus berdoa untuk para pahlawan. Apakah kita pernah berdoa untuk para almarhum tersebut?” (Cheng Hoo, August 2011). This article shows the cultural acculturations between their original Chinese culture and the local culture. Chinese people, especially Chinese Muslims, actively participate in the annual celebration of the Independence Day, such as performing social games, social charities, or community services. In short, an Indonesian Chinese Muslim is a true nationalist.

Indonesian Chinese Muslims are also represented as having high concern for the spread of Islam in Indonesia. It reports the coaching people who have just converted to Islam (Cheng Hoo, February 2012). In this sense, ‘Cheng Hoo’ as originally the name of an ancient Chinese hero, is considered as an icon of Chinese Muslim. The magazine, as well as the foundation who published it, are considered as important agencies in the Islamic da’wah in Indonesia. In doing this missionary role, the Chinese Muslims communities avoid to take sides in particular Islamic sects or groups, as well as avoid to take sides in politics. However, such neutral attitude is not static, but changes overtime, especially after 2013.

4. Ambivalence: Chinese Muslims in politics

Since the 2013 edition onwards, the discourse of Chinese Muslim identity has been ambivalence, especially the changes of the anti-politics position that has been emphasized in the previous editions. Its 68th edition (June-August 2013) reported a Chinese Muslim named Abah Anton who has succeeded in becoming the mayor of Malang. The representation of Abah Anton is a shift in the mode of representation which previously only focused on the economic
or socio-religious corpus, now starting to penetrate the political sphere. The success story of Abah Anton was represented with certain expressions and metaphors, i.e.: phenomenal, astonishing, miracle, and he is like an iceberg that cooling down the people of Malang. The Chinese Muslim figure, through Anton’s representation, is not only smooth in economic activities, but also in politics. He has become a new public idol just before the election was held and therefore defeated other mayor candidates who already had names (Cheng Hoo 2013).

The Anton’s success story is framed with identity discourse. Anton, as a representation of Chinese Muslim, admits his identity as an ‘arek Malang’, literally means Malang people. Anton as a representation of Chinese Muslim has a positive image in his changing professional identity, from a businessman to a ruler: his salary is for the poor, he will not use official car, and he is ready to bring Malang into better conditions. Although he is a Chinese, he commits not to give special treatments for certain groups, as Malang is a city for all its citizens, regardless of their ethnicities. It gives an impression that the Chinese Muslim leader is a pluralist.

5. The presence of ‘the other’

The formation of Chinese and Muslim Chinese identities certainly does not stand alone in the discursive field (c.f. Heryanto 2008). Chinese Muslims emerge because they could identify and differentiate themselves from the others. Here, the processes of othering are necessary to distinguish who is Chinese, Chinese Muslim, or others. Such processes happen through representation practices, especially when Chinese or Chinese Muslims are represented along with other representations, which often involving binary opposition, negotiation, connotation, labeling, or other kinds of representational practices. It shows that Chinese Muslim as an identity is not singular, but plural, fluid and constantly in contestation with the others.

In an article entitled ‘Chinese ethnic is also part of the Indonesian nation – Suku Tionghoa juga bagian Bangsa Indonesia’ (Komunitas, September 2002), the other appears in certain social relations with the self (Chinese). The topic of the article is the social activities of the Chinese communities in humanitarian events, in which the ‘other’ was constructed in some ways. The Chinese is represented as the subject who provides assistance, while those who get aids are called ‘their relatives from other ethnic who have been hit by the disaster – suadara-saudara mereka dari suku lain yang ditimpa musibah’. It shows an irony that giving aid is the practice of sincere, full of friendship, and brotherhood, but it still involves discourse of identity.

The native is represented in anonymous way, such as called ‘Paimin’ in an article entitled ‘Never (again) discrimination between us – Jangan ada (lagi) diskriminasi antara kita’ (Komunitas, December 2006). Paimin is an illustration of the flaws of law in Indonesia. It is not known exactly who Paimin is, but from the name itself, the reader should imagine that he is a Javanese. In general, Paimin is a representation of indigenous people, live in villages, are associated with weakness, are not law literate, and are easily oppressed. Explicitly, the others are also mentioned in the text, i.e., those who are Arabic, Javanese, and Sundanese. These others are distinguished with the self (Chinese), but at the same time are equalized with the Chinese since they are all Indonesians, therefore there is no reason to be discriminated, especially in the field of law and citizenship rights.

The others are not always represented by the indigenous people, but can also come from the Chinese fellow. In an article entitled ‘China-Indonesia Islamic culture expo and art show’ (Komunitas, 2010), the Indonesian Chinese and
Indonesian Chinese Muslims are both Chinese, but they are also different. The text also distinguishes between ‘Indonesian Chinese Muslim’ and ‘Tiongkok Chinese Muslim’. The latter is characterized by a physical code: the face is a mixture of Europe, China and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Indonesian Chinese Muslims are characterized by cultural codes: they can perform Balinese dance as well as Madurese folk songs.

6. Chinese Muslim relations and Chinese organizations in Indonesia

The representation of Chinese organizations in Indonesia is very important in the constructions of the self (Chinese) and the others, especially in the issues of humanitarian actions, culture, arts and education. In the humanitarian actions, the magazine emphasizes the involvement of Chinese organizations, such as PMTS (Pagguyuban Masyarakat Tionghoa Surabaya - Surabaya Chinese Community Association) in the emergency responses of flood disaster in East Java in 2002. These humanitarian actions are described as sincere and full of brotherhood. In February 2002, the Komunitas magazine published an article with the headline, ‘Chinese entrepreneurs help East Java flood victims’. Meanwhile in March 2002, it reported again with the headline, ‘PITI donates 1,000 packages for flood victims in Situbondo and Bondowoso’.

The relations also exist in the fields of culture, arts and education. In the article ‘China - Indonesia Islamic cultural expo and art show’ (Komunitas, 2010), PMTS is framed as one of the participants of the Chinese Islamic arts and cultural performances, as well as a souvenir recipient from the organizers. The article develops a discourse of the relationship between Indonesia and China in terms of freedom to express the Chinese cultures. In 2011, the Senopati Foundation and PMTS are reported to conduct a cultural event entitled ‘Chinese Community arts night – Malam kesenian Komunitas Tionghoa’ at SIBEC ITC Mega Grosir Surabaya. PMTS and Chinese Muslims who are represented by YHMCHI (Yayasan Haji Muhammad Cheng Hoo Indonesia) are presented together in the text as the organizers of the event. Through this activity, the cooperative relationship was increased to the education aspects with the opening of a Chinese language education institution called the ‘Confucius Center’ (Komunitas, 2011).

The self-other relations are also constructed in the issue of nationalism, in which Chinese Muslims fully support Indonesian nationalism and reject discriminations towards Chinese circles. In August 2007, Komunitas published an article entitled ‘We build Indonesia, not build China – Kami membangun Indonesia, bukan membangun China’. It emphasizes the position of Chinese Muslims regarding the national identity as part of ‘us’, a group of Chinese people who have mingled with the local communities to build the Indonesian nation in all sectors.

7. Inclusiveness of Indonesian Chinese Muslims

Islam in Indonesia is diverse. In this diversity, Chinese Muslim is positioned in an inclusive-rational group along with some other Islamic organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. The Komunitas – Cheng Hoo Magazine shows no opposition or conflictual relationship with these Islamic groups. Meanwhile, exclusive and radical Islamic groups were not mentioned as participants in the magazine. Likewise, liberal Islamic groups are also absent from the text.

Interestingly, the most prominent relationship between Chinese Muslims and Islamic organizations is their relationship with Nahdhatul Ulama (NU). Their relations are
mentioned several times on different topics. On the topic of social roles of a community leader and entrepreneur, especially about the roles of H. Sibro Mulisi, a Chinese Muslim as well as a NU member, NU is mentioned as a participant in the text (Komunitas, August 2004). Other NU figures are also mentioned in this edition (Komunitas, August 2004), including KH Mas Subadar, Gus Idris, KH. Hasan Abdullah, and KH Abdul Hamid Pasuruan. It shows that Chinese Muslims have the same Islamic vision as NU figures. Moreover, Chinese Muslims are represented as part of the pesantren (Islamic traditional boarding school) circles. Among the NU figures, the most noticed was KH Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur which has been reported in some editions (Cheng Hoo, Issue 64, Issue 67, and Issue 73).

8. Relationship between Chinese Muslims and economic-political structures

The early editions of the magazine very often report the Chinese entrepreneurs or economic actors. In February 2002, it covered a main topic entitled ‘Chinese entrepreneurs help flood victims’. Participants who appeared in the text include Alim Markus (PT Maspion), Bintoro Tandjung (Gudang Garam), Ted Sioeng (International Daily News), Liem Ou Yen (Coordinator of the Surabaya Chinese Community Association), Henry Gunawan (Surya Inti Permata), HM Lukminto (PT. Sritex), Dahlan Iskan (Jawa Pos), and Herman Djuhar (Bogasari). It represents the spontaneous empathy from Chinese businessmen to the flood victims in East Java, emphasizing that they are not only concerned about business, but also social affairs.

At certain editions, business or economic issues do not appear explicitly as the main topic, but are combined with other topics. For example, reporting Chinese Muslim relationships with China (Komunitas 2010), the magazine emphasizes that Indonesian Chinese Muslims and Xinjiang Ningxia people have strong cultural relationships, in addition to the economic relations which have already existed between them.

In the subsequent editions, especially after changing its name to Cheng Hoo Magazine, more participants from the political elites appeared in the text. There was a transformation of Chinese Muslim relations with the political issues along with the change of the magazine’s name. When its name was ‘Komunitas’, Chinese Muslim political participations appeared prominently when the text reported certain issues related to politics. For example, the main topic of its special issue No. 35 in October 2007 was ‘Cheng Hoo film involves high officials’. Actors who appear in the text include Admiral Cheng Hoo, Syafullah Yusuf (former Minister of Remote Area Development), and Yusril Ihza Mahendra (former Minister of State Secretary).

Conclusion

This research is intended to fill in the gaps in studies regarding Chinese identity in Indonesia, especially how Chinese communities construct their own identity through their own media. This study has analyzed 14 articles in Komunitas – Cheng Hoo Magazine from 2002 to 2014 period of publications.

This magazine has primary supports from Indonesian Chinese conglomerates. In addition, it is also supported by political actors and various society organizations. This magazine is one of the results of the political reform in Indonesia which has opened up the windows for the Chinese communities to express their identities and cultures publicly in media. Therefore, it emphasizes various positive representations of Chinese communities and their cultures.
However, such positive representations also entail dynamic tensions of Chinese identities. The very popular tension is about how to call them, ‘Chinese’ or ‘Tionghoa’, which is very closely related to their identity. At this point, they prefer to the term ‘Tionghoa’ as it is more cultural rather than political. The second tension is about nationalism and discrimination issues. Chinese people, on the one hand, is considered to naturally blend in with the local people. They are just one of the very diverse ethnics in Indonesia. But, on the other hand, they are still being discriminated in a lot of issues. The third tension is about being apolitical or political subject. At first, Chinese people prefer to be politically neutral or even apolitical. However, when a Chinese figure has succeeded in politics, they changed their anti-politics position.

The next tensions are related with the Islamic identity. In the earlier editions, the explicit term of ‘Chinese Muslim’ did not exist. It only appears in 2003 when the magazine published a profile of a success Chinese Muslim businessman. In general, the representation of Chinese Muslim is not singular. Moreover, after coming into contact with the local cultures, Chinese Muslims become more diverse. Interestingly, Chinese Muslims are represented as inclusive-rational groups along with some other Islamic organizations, especially NU. In addition, Chinese Muslims are framed as true nationalist people. Finally, Chinese Muslim as an identity is not singular, but plural, fluid and constantly in contestation with the others.

The main limitation of this study is the number of articles being studied that do not include all editions within the selected period of publications. It is due to the number of missing archives of the magazine, even in the archives of its publisher. This study suggests for further research to look at this issue of Chinese Muslims identity in Indonesia from other perspectives, such as the political economy of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. Some important questions should also be studied further, for example, why the discourse of mass rapes and Chinese victims of the May 1998 riot never appeared in this magazine? At this point, in-depth interviews with its producer should be conducted to complement the text analysis.

References


Komunitas - Cheng Hoo Magazine


Komunitas 34, August 2007. Apa Kata Mereka Tentang Berbangsa dan Bernegara: “Kami Membangun Indonesia, Bukan Membangun Tiongkok”.

Komunitas 34, August 2007. Semangat Kemerdekaan dengan Meningkatkan Nasionalisme.


Cheng Hoo 73, April - June 2014. Keppres Tionghoa Menyejukkan.