

RELIGION, STATE, AND IDEOLOGY IN INDONESIA: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF PANCASILA AS THE BASIS OF THE INDONESIAN STATE

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Abstract

This paper discusses Muslims acceptance of Pancasila as national ideology in Indonesia. It first examines the initial idea of Pancasila as postulated by Soekarno on June 1, 1945, and then scrutinizes some important ideological debates in the aftermath of Indonesia independence. It argues that Pancasila as proposed by Soekarno represents the idea of Religiously Neutral Nationalists which contradicts that of Muslim Nationalists who advocated Islam as the basis of the Indonesian state. It will be shown, however, that after long and heated debates, the two factions achieved a political compromise and agreed to accept Pancasila as the basis of the state. While the debate on Pancasila reemerged during the Constituent Assembly, President Soekarno's decree on July 5, 1959 proclaiming a return to the 1945 Constitution further confirmed Pancasila as the basis of the state. Since that time, Pancasila has been permanently accepted as the basis of the state with a strong support from Muslim groups who consider it as an inspiring, guiding, integrating and unifying force which is able to bind and unite all segments of Indonesians as a nation, regardless of their religions, political, ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

Keywords: Islam, Pancasila, Ideology, Political Debates, Basis of State.

A. Introduction

Shortly before Indonesian independence, which came on August 17, 1945, the representatives of the Muslim Nationalists and the leaders of the Religiously Neutral Nationalists were confronted with several major ideological questions: What was the philosophical basis needed for a free State of Indonesia to satisfy the aspirations of its multi-religious groups and all the political trends existing within it? What kind of a national ideology was to be employed to maintain national unity, integrity and stability in an independent Indonesia? Secular nationalist ideology? Islamic ideology? Was Islam acceptable to the Religiously Neutral Nationalist group and could it be used as a basis of the state? Was Secular Nationalism acceptable to the Islamic faction and could it be employed as a national ideology? Was there any other alternative acceptable to both?

These ideological concerns were discussed in the sessions of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*) which had been founded under Japanese sponsorship as a realization of their promise to give independence to the Indonesian people. This promise had been made by the Japanese colonial rulers in an attempt to gain support from the Indonesian people, because they were in trouble, militarily, with the Allies in the Pacific War. The Japanese in Indonesia explored every avenue in their effort to win the war against the Allies, one of which was to mobilize Indonesian Muslims to take part in military training in line with what Harry J. Benda called "Nippon's Islamic grass-roots policy."¹ However, the Japanese were finally defeated by the Allies on August 15, 1945, without involving Indonesian Muslims in the war.

The Investigating Body held its sessions in two phases. The first ran from May 29 until June 1, 1945, and the second from July 10

1 Harry Jindrich Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 134.

until July 16, 1945.² The representatives of the Muslim Nationalists were, among others, K.H. Mas Mansur, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, K.H. Masjkur, K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, H. Agus Salim, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, K.H.A. Sanusi and K.H. Abdul Halim.³ Their educational backgrounds varied. Some, such as Agus Salim and Sukiman, were educated in the western school system and belonged to the Muslim Modernists, while others, such as Wahid Hasjim and Masjkur, were educated in the *pesantren*⁴ and brought up in the circle of the Muslim Traditionalists. As for the representatives of the Religiously Neutral Nationalists, these included Radjiman Wediodiningrat, Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Professor Soepomo, Wongsonegoro, Sartono, R.P. Soeroso, Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo and Muhammad Yamin.⁵ All of the latter had received a western education. The chairman and vice-chairman of the Investigating Body were Radjiman Wediodiningrat and R. P. Soeroso, a fact which shows that the leadership of the Body was no doubt in the hands of the Religiously Neutral Nationalists.

B. Soekarno's Ideas on Pancasila

Radjiman Wediodiningrat, in his capacity as the chairman of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence, put a vital question to its members: What was the philosophical basis to be used for a free Indonesia? In response to this issue, Soekarno⁶

2 Muhammad Yamin, *Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1960), p. 239.

3 Muhammad Yamin, ed., *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1959), pp. 60–61.

4 The *pesantren* is a traditional Islamic educational institution which uses books written by the 'ulamā' of the medieval period. The pesantrens are huge in number and scattered in many areas of Indonesian villages, especially in Java. For a discussion of the pesantren tradition, see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983).

5 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, pp. 60–61.

6 For detailed accounts of Soekarno, see Soekarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965); Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*, trans. Mary F. Somers Heidhues (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Solichin Salam, *Bung Karno Putra Fajar* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1982).

on June 1, 1945, delivered a speech in the session of the Investigating Body, in which he proposed five principles (known as Pancasila⁷) as follows:

- Nationalism
- Internationalism or Humanitarianism
- Deliberation or Democracy
- Social Welfare
- Belief in God.⁸

If we take a critical look at the order of the principles of Soekarno's Pancasila, we will find that he put the principle of Nationalism first. Soekarno defined nationalism not only as the conviction or the consciousness of a people that they are united in one group, one nation, but also as the unity between a people and its homeland.⁹ It was certainly not accidental that he placed Nationalism as the first of the principles of his Pancasila; rather it was intentional, on the grounds that Nationalism would become the backbone of Indonesian unity and integrity. The principle of Internationalism or Humanitarianism was placed by Soekarno second in the order of his principles of Pancasila. Again, this was a conscious decision, reflecting his deep concern over the matter. Soekarno placed his principle of Nationalism within the context of the inter-relationships, friendship and brotherhood with all nations of the world. This he termed Internationalism. He emphasized this position in view of the fact that Indonesia is only one of many nations in the world. Soekarno also, as we can see from his concept of Pancasila, equated the notion of Internationalism with that of Humanitarianism. In other words, Soekarno rejected all forms of chauvinistic nationalism and narrow-minded exclusivism which arose from sheer national arrogance, such as that of the Germans' claim of *Deutschland über Alles*,¹⁰ which led them to espouse anti-Semitism and

7 Pancasila is a Sanskrit word; *panca* means five, *sila* means principle.

8 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, 1:61–81; Soekarno, *Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press-Yayasan Pendidikan Soekarno, 1986).

9 Soekarno, *Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Negara*, pp. 144–45.

10 Soekarno, p. 148.

to persecute the Jews; more than this, it led them to launch an effort at world conquest.

In formulating his ideas of Nationalism and Internationalism, Soekarno acknowledged that he was partly influenced by Adolf Baars, a Dutch Socialist thinker, and by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the founder of the Republic of China. In 1917 Baars taught Soekarno not to believe in nationalism, but to fight for the common cause of humanity throughout the world.¹¹ In the following year, Soekarno read Sun Yat Sen's work, *San Min Chu I* (The Three People's Principles),¹² in which he learned about three principles, namely *Mintsu*, *Minchuan*, and *Min Sheng* (Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism) which awakened in him a different sense of nationalism, one which was more open or generous.¹³ Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy, as quoted by Soekarno, "For me, my love of my country is part of my love for all mankind. I am a patriot because I am a human being, and act as a human being. I do not exclude anyone,"¹⁴ also contributed to the shaping of Soekarno's beliefs in nationalism and humanitarianism. In making the principle of Democracy, the third principle of his Pancasila, Soekarno hoped to show that the establishment of a free Indonesian State was intended for all Indonesian people. It is obvious that unity and democracy were among the main themes of Soekarno's political thought.

Soekarno also states with confidence, "I believe that the vital condition for the strength of the State of Indonesia lies in deliberation and representation."¹⁵ Soekarno, therefore, believed in democracy, and this meant that he rejected dictatorship in any form in his political thinking. He did not propose, for example, such antiquated systems as autocracy, oligarchy, monarchy, or others which, in his opinion, were not suitable for a free and modern Indonesia. In short, Soekarno

11 Soekarno, p. 147.

12 Sun Yat-Sen, *San Min Chu I: Tiga Asas Pokok Rakyat*, trans. Anizar Ibrahim (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1961).

13 Soekarno, *Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Negara*, p. 147.

14 Soekarno, *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*, trans. Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1984), p. 40.

15 Soekarno, p. 149.

believed in the people's sovereignty upon which the democratic system should be based. As for the principle of Social Welfare, which he ranked fourth in the order of his Pancasila, Soekarno expressed his reasons for its inclusion by saying that "there shall be no poverty in a free Indonesia."¹⁶

The fifth and last principle of his Pancasila, Belief in God, was formulated by Soekarno in recognition of the reality that the Indonesian people were religious, no matter to which religion they belonged. This principle seems to have been intended by Soekarno as an acknowledgment of all the religions existing in the country. Apparently, he thought that all religious groups could cooperate and that religious tolerance could be achieved so that national unity and integrity would flourish in the atmosphere of an independent state. Having offered his five principles and having elaborated each of them according to his way of thinking, Soekarno then introduced a "theory of compression" by which he squeezed his five principles into three (*trisila*): Socio-nationalism (embracing Nationalism and Internationalism), Socio-democracy (consisting of the principles of Democracy and Social Welfare) and Belief in God.¹⁷ Soekarno went on to compress these three principles into one (*ekasila*) which he termed *Gotong Royong* (Mutual Cooperation).¹⁸

Soekarno, in his long intellectual journey, also absorbed the secularist ideas of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk (1881-1936), the founder of modern Turkey who was responsible for separating religion from the state. In Soekarno's mind, however, religion and state could be united, although the official constitution distinguished between the two. As he puts it:

We should accept [the idea of] the separation of state and religion, but we have to develop the life of the people with the quality of the teachings of Islam. Thus, [with the achievement

16 Soekarno, p. 151.

17 Soekarno, *Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Negara*, p. 154.

18 Soekarno, p. 155.

of this religious quality] the membership of the House of Representatives will be filled with many Muslims, and its decisions will be based on Islam.

If you really have a people with this quality, then you might say that their religion is a living, fertile and dynamic Islam, not a passive and stagnant Islam, which can only flourish under the protection and guardianship of the state. I like people who accept the challenge of modern democracy more than those who always lament, 'Do not separate Islam from the state.' People who are brave enough to face this [modern democracy] will be able to carry out the ideals of Islam through their own struggle, with their own aspirations, and with their own hard work...

Keep in mind my remarks! Indeed, this is my conviction regarding the real meaning of Islamic ideals: 'state is united with religion.' State can be united with religion, although its constitutional basis separates the two.¹⁹

From the above remarks of Soekarno, it can be understood that he basically did not promote a radical separation between state and religion since religion, according to his view of politics, still had a role in the state. Soekarno in fact urged Muslims to play a pivotal role in achieving their political aspirations and goals through a representative body of democratic deliberation. Thus, in Soekarno's conception of a free State of Indonesia, Islamic political aspirations would still have room, and Soekarno himself encouraged Muslims to fill the seats in the representative body to the greatest degree possible, as he likewise encouraged the Christians.²⁰ Soekarno addressed his appeal and encouragement directly to the Muslim representatives in the Investigating Body when offering his Pancasila as a basis for the state. He says:

19 Soekarno, *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi 1-II* (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbitan Buku Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), p. 453.

20 Soekarno, *Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Negara*, p. 150.

For the Muslim faction, this is the best place to uphold religion. ... What does not satisfy us we will discuss in deliberations. This Representative Body [we shall establish] is a place for us to promote Islamic demands. Here we propose to the people's representatives what we need for improvements. If we are a real Muslim people, let us work hard in order that the majority of the seats of the Representative Body be occupied by Muslim representatives. ... Should this Representative Body have 100 members, let us work hard in order that 60, 70, 80 or 90 representatives in that Body are Muslims. Thus, automatically, laws coming from the Representative Body are also Islamic.²¹

C. Ideological Battle

The ideological conflict between the Religiously Neutral Nationalists and Muslim Nationalists in the Investigating Body sessions could have been predicted from the very beginning. On May 31, 1945, Soepomo remarked that it was the intention of the Muslim Nationalists to establish an Islam-based state, whereas the Religiously Neutral Nationalists, encouraged by Mohammad Hatta, proposed the shaping of Indonesia as a national unitary state which would separate the state from religious affairs.²² Soepomo supported Hatta's idea that a national unitary state be established in Indonesia, arguing that

Creating an Islamic state in Indonesia would mean that we are not creating a unitary state. Creating an Islamic state in Indonesia would mean setting up a state that is going to link itself to the largest group, the Islamic group. If an Islamic state is created in Indonesia, then certainly the problem of minorities will arise, the problem of small religious groups, of Christians and others. Although an Islamic state will safeguard the interests of other groups as well as possible,

21 Soekarno, pp. 149–50.

22 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, p. 115.

these smaller religious groups will certainly not be able to feel involved in the state. Therefore the ideals of an Islamic state do not agree with the ideals of a unitary state which we all have so passionately looked forward to...²³

Soepomo nevertheless went on to emphasize that "a national unitary state does not mean a state with an a-religious character. No. This national unitary state ... will have a lofty moral base, such as is also advocated by Islam."²⁴ The Muslim Nationalists strongly opposed the idea of the Religiously Neutral Nationalists to establish a free Indonesia where religion and state would be separated. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo was one of the most outspoken representatives of the Muslim Nationalists in the Investigating Body who advocated Islam as the basis of the state²⁵. In rejecting the idea of the Religiously Neutral Nationalists, who would have separated state from religion, and in promoting Islam as its basis, Hadikusumo advanced his argument by saying:

Honorable gentlemen! If you wish to establish a just and wise government in our state based on noble moral conduct and democratic deliberations and tolerance without any compulsion in religion, then establish a government based on Islam, because Islam provides all of this.²⁶

He then firmly emphasized the point by stating that,

In order that Indonesia become a strong and stable state, I propose that the establishment of a free State of Indonesia be based on Islam, because this will be in conformity with the fundamental aspiration of the majority of people [who are Muslim]. ... Do not neglect the aspiration of 90 percent of the people [who are Muslim].²⁷

23 B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 20.

24 Boland, p. 21.

25 Djarnawi Hadikusuma, *Derita Seorang Pemimpin: Riwayat Hidup, Perjuangan Dan Buah Pikiran Ki Bagus Hadikusumo* (Yogyakarta: Persatuan, 1979).

26 Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara Dan Akhlak Pemimpin* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Rahaju, n.d.), p. 13.

27 Hadikusumo, pp. 21–22.

The Religiously Neutral Nationalists, on the other hand, repudiated the Muslim Nationalist call for the establishment of an Islam-based state in Indonesia. Soepomo, as mentioned above, firmly rejected the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state in free Indonesia, though he admitted the comprehensiveness of Islamic teachings. He argued that Indonesia was a country which was not the same as Islam-based states such as Saudi Arabia or Iran since the former had special characteristics in terms of population, cultures, traditions, historical experiences and geographical conditions.²⁸ In addition, this leading representative of the Religiously Neutral Nationalists, who was an expert in law, doubted whether the shari‘a could meet the demands and challenges of a modern nation.²⁹

D. Ideological Compromise: The Jakarta Charter

Following Soekarno’s historic speech, a Small Committee (also known as the Committee of Nine) was established whose membership consisted of nine leaders: Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Ahmad Soebardjo, A. A. Maramis and Muhammad Yamin who represented the Religiously Neutral Nationalists on the one hand, and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, H. Agus Salim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Abdul Wahid Hasjim who belonged to the Muslim Nationalists on the other. It is worth mentioning here that A. A. Maramis was the only Christian in the Religiously Neutral Nationalist group, while the others were Muslim. The representatives of the two groups, after long and tense debates, reached a historic political compromise, or a gentleman’s agreement, in the form of what Yamin called the Jakarta Charter.³⁰ In this Charter Soekarno’s Pancasila was reformulated to read as follows:

Belief in God with the obligation to practice the shari‘a for its adherents

28 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, p. 116.

29 Yamin, vol. 1, p. 116.

30 Yamin, vol. 1, pp. 709–10; Saifuddin Anshari, “The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman’s Agreement between the Islamic and the Religiously Neutral Nationalists in Modern Indonesia” (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1976).

Just and Civilized Humanity

The Unity of Indonesia

Democracy which is guided by inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives

Social Justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.³¹

Signed on June 22, 1945 by the nine leaders mentioned above, the Jakarta Charter was intended as a draft of the preamble to the constitution of the new state. From this formulation, it is clear that the order of the principles of the newly modified Pancasila had changed. The influence of the representatives of the Muslim faction in the Committee was obvious.³² This can be seen from the fact that its reformulation reflected the core of the spirit of Islamic doctrine. This newly formulated Pancasila certainly satisfied the Muslim Nationalists since the principle of Belief in God was placed first and was extended by a clause which read “with the obligation to practice the shari‘a for its adherents.” With this Islamic clause, the Indonesian Muslims gained a strategic position which would enable them to implement the shari‘a for their community in an independent Indonesia, even though they had to accept Pancasila rather than Islam as the basis and ideology of the state.

The expression “with the obligation to practice the shari‘a for its adherents” soon attracted rigorous objections, especially from the Christian side. On July 11, 1945, Latuharhary, a staunch Protestant and member of the Investigating Body, expressed his objection to that phrase saying that the consequence of the Islamic sentence would probably be great, notably in relation to other religions, and that it could result in difficulties in connection with customary law.³³ In response to Latuharhary’s objection, Agus Salim stated that the opinions about the differences between religious law and customary law were not a new phenomenon in the Indonesian context. This

31 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, p. 154.

32 Eka Darmaputera, *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), p. 152.

33 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, p. 259.

problem however had been solved already, since, according to Salim, the security of other religious groups did not depend on the power of the state, but rather on the tolerance and the *adat* (tradition) of the Muslim community.³⁴ Furthermore, Wongsonegoro was firmly of the opinion, as was Hoesein Djajadiningrat, that the clause would probably create "religious fanaticism", since it seemed to force the adherents of Islam to observe the shari'a.³⁵ In reaction to their objection, Abdul Wahid Hasjim raised his voice and reminded them that this sentence, achieved through difficult deliberations, might be too hard for some people, but not go far enough for others.³⁶

On July 16, 1945, the Jakarta Charter was unanimously approved by the Religiously Neutral Nationalists and the Muslim Nationalists to be used as a draft of the preamble of the constitution, along with a draft of the body of the latter which had been designed by another Committee made up of the following members: Soepomo, Wongsonegoro, Soebardjo, Maramis and Sukiman. It is worth mentioning here that the clause "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" was also recorded in article 29 of the draft of the body of the constitution.

E. The Omission of the Islamic Clause

The Japanese promise to give independence to the Indonesian people did not become a reality until the latter freed themselves. Soekarno and Hatta, on behalf of all the people of Indonesia, declared Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945. Following this historic event, the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*) established on August 7, 1945 and headed by Soekarno and Hatta, chairman and vice-chairman respectively, was to begin its task. The Committee had 21 members, including its chairman and vice chairman, and later six other members were added.³⁷ Shortly before the opening of its first formal meeting on August

34 Yamin, vol. 1, p. 259.

35 Yamin, vol. 1, p. 259.

36 Yamin, vol. 1, p. 259.

37 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, p. 399.

18, 1945, Hatta proposed changes to the draft of the preamble of the Constitution and its body, since he had received strenuous objections to the phrase "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" from the Christian circle living in the eastern parts of Indonesia. While the Christians admitted that such a clause applied exclusively to the Muslim community, they considered it discriminatory against all minority groups. They threatened to remain outside the Republic of Indonesia if the Islamic clause remained. In the face of this serious matter, Hatta took the initiative to invite

Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Wahid Hasjim, Kasman Singodimedjo and Teuku Hasan from Sumatera to attend an introductory meeting to discuss the above-mentioned problem. In order that we as a nation not be divided, we agree to remove the part of the sentence which hurt the feelings of the Christian faction and replace it with '*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*' (Belief in the One and Only God).³⁸

Their agreement resulted in the removal of the Islamic phrase as well as all Islamic sentences in both the preamble of the constitution and in its body. Fundamental changes in the body of the constitution were made. Article 6 now became "the president of the Republic of Indonesia should be a native-born Indonesian," without the requirement that he or she be "an adherent of Islam" as had been previously agreed, and article 29 came to read "the State based on Belief in the One and Only God" from which the previously agreed words "with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents" were removed.³⁹ Even the word *mukaddimah* (an Indonesian word derived from Arabic) in the preamble was substituted with the word *pembukaan* (an original Indonesian word), both of which in fact mean preamble. This too came as a result of pressure from the Religiously Neutral Nationalists, who could not understand why an Arabic word should be used in this

38 Mohammad Hatta, *Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945* (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1982), p. 60.

39 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, pp. 400–410.

context when a perfectly good Indonesian word already existed.

This modified constitution was finally approved and was henceforth known as the 1945 Constitution. Thus, the new version of the first principle of Pancasila read "Belief in the One and Only God" instead of "Belief in God with the obligation to practice the shari'a for its adherents." This change was also different from Soekarno's concept which simply ran, "Belief in God." The key words or vital attribute "the One and Only" used for God are in conformity with the beliefs of Muslims and reflect the basic view of *tawhîd* (unity of God). The Muslim representatives accepted these changes since, in their view, they were not contrary to the doctrine of Islam. Pancasila was then implemented as the basis of the state, for which reason Indonesia has become known as a national unitary state based on Pancasila. Pancasila however was to undergo various modifications with each new version of the Indonesian constitutions. In the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which was in effect from August 18, 1945 until December 27, 1949, Pancasila retained the five principles discussed above. In the preamble of the Constitution of the RIS (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*, or Republic of the United States of Indonesia) of 1949, in effect from December 27, 1949 until August 17, 1950, Pancasila as a whole was modified to a shorter and different formulation which read:

Belief in the One and Only God

Humanity

Nationalism

Democracy

Social Justice.⁴⁰

The RIS consisted of 16 states, the most important of which – in addition to the Republic of Indonesia which governed only some parts of Java and Sumatera, with Yogyakarta as its capital – were the States of East Sumatera, South Sumatera, Pasundan and East Indonesia. The new constitution, which instituted a parliamentary cabinet rather

⁴⁰ A. K. Pringgogidgo, *Tiga Undang-Undang Dasar* (Jakarta: PT Pembangunan, 1981), p. 19.

than a presidential one, came about as a result of negotiation between Indonesian and Dutch representatives attending the Round Table Conference held in The Hague from August 23 until November 2, 1949.⁴¹ The Dutch employed a political tactic which assumed that the establishment of the RIS would lead to Indonesia's quick break up. This political tactic, however, did not produce the desired results. In the preamble to the Provisional Constitution of 1950, in effect from August 17, 1950 until July 5, 1959, the formulation of Pancasila was maintained as it had been in the preamble to the Constitution of the RIS.⁴² Under the Provisional Constitution of 1950, the RIS was transformed into a national unitary state based on the parliamentary cabinet model of Western liberal democracies. The National Unitary State of Indonesia came into being after the Dutch formally recognized Indonesian sovereignty on December 27, 1949. This National Unitary State was established on the basis of an agreement between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the government of the RIS reached on May 19, 1950.⁴³

F. Darul Islam's Challenge to the Pancasila State

Late in 1949 the Pancasila-Based State of Indonesia was threatened by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo and his Darul Islam Military Movement. Calling his army "the Indonesian Islamic Army," Kartosuwirjo took up arms and led a violent revolt in West Java against the central government. On August 7, 1949, he formally proclaimed the foundation of what he called the Islamic State of Indonesia, of which he proclaimed himself to be *Imam*. Later Kartosuwirjo's revolt was joined by Kahar Muzakkar (1921-1965) in 1952 in South Sulawesi, where he also proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic State under

41 Prawoto Mangkusasmito, *Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara Dan Sebuah Refleksi* (Jakarta: Hudaya, 1970), pp. 41-42.

42 Pringgodigdo, *Tiga Undang-Undang Dasar*, p. 20.

43 Mangkusasmito, *Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara Dan Sebuah Refleksi*, p. 45; Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro, and Nugroho Notosusanto, eds., *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1984), vol. 6, p. 205.

Kartosuwirjo's command. Moreover, a similar revolt broke out in Aceh in 1953 under the leadership of Daud Beureueh (d. 1987) which also posed trouble for the central government. All these movements contributed to the spread of disturbances in those areas where the rebellions began. The central government's armed forces, in their attempts to persuade the rebels to rejoin peacefully the Republic of Indonesia, did not suppress them quickly. The sporadic military rebellion of the Darul Islam lasted for thirteen years and only ended in 1962 when the central government, after the limit of its patience had been reached, took military action and quelled the movement, capturing and executing Kartosuwirjo in September 1962.⁴⁴

At the beginning, Kartosuwirjo and his army sided with the Republic in their resistance against the Dutch aggressor. However, when the Renville Agreement between the Indonesian Government and the Dutch was ratified in 1948, according to which Republican troops had to be evacuated from the Dutch territories, Kartosuwirjo strongly opposed it. He and his troops refused to abandon West Java, which was considered Dutch territory according to the agreement. Consequently, conflicts broke out between him and the Indonesian Government as well as the Masyumi, which had recognized the agreement. Kartosuwirjo eventually broke with the Masyumi and operated independently with his Darul Islam Movement. It was in this year (1948) that Kartosuwirjo proposed establishing an Islamic State in West Java if the Indonesian central government in Yogyakarta were to be captured by the Dutch or if the Dutch were to establish a state in the region.⁴⁵ Indeed, the Indonesian Central Government in Yogyakarta surrendered to the Dutch following military action in December 1948. In the face of this situation, Kartosuwirjo established an Islamic State in West Java in the belief that his action was not a rebellion against the

44 C. Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1958).

45 Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam Di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965* (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1987), p. 181.

Republic, but rather a continuation of the struggle in support of the proclamation of free Indonesia made on August 17, 1945.⁴⁶

When the Republican Armed Forces issued a command for the evacuated troops to return to West Java following the Dutch violation of the Renville Agreement (by capturing the Indonesian central government in Yogyakarta), Kartosuwirjo opposed their return and saw it as aggression directed against his Islamic State. As a result, a triangular war erupted between the Darul Islam's troops, those of the Republic, and those of the Dutch (who still occupied the region).⁴⁷ Following Kartosuwirjo's defeat, Kahar Muzakkar's Movement faced a critical situation. Nevertheless, he too eluded capture for many years until he was finally killed in Southeast Sulawesi by the Indonesian national army in February 1965, and his revolt suppressed.⁴⁸ Like Kartosuwirjo and Kahar Muzakkar, Daud Beureueh vigorously struggled to defend the Islamic State which he had proclaimed in Aceh. He issued a political statement to the effect that the inclusion of the principle of Belief in One God in Pancasila was only a political maneuver designed by some Indonesian leaders to lead Muslims down the wrong path:

In the name of Allah we the people of Aceh have made new history, for we wish to set up an Islamic State here on our native soil. ... For many long years we have been hoping and yearning for a state based on Islam, but ... it has become increasingly evident ... that some Indonesian leaders are trying to steer us onto the wrong path. ... The basic principles of the Republican State do not guarantee freedom of religion, freedom to have a religion in the real sense of the word. ... [T]he Islamic religion which makes the life of society complete cannot be split up. For us, the mention of principle of Belief in One God [in

46 Noer, p. 181.

47 Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, pp. 90–91.

48 Barbara S. Harvey, "Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965" (Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1974).

Pancasila] is nothing more than a political maneuver. Belief in the One God is for us the very source of social life, and every single one of its directives must apply here on Indonesian soil. It is not possible for only some of these directives to apply while others do not, be this in criminal or civil affairs, in the question of religious worship, or in matters of everyday life. If the Law of God does not apply (in its entirety), this means we are deviating from Belief in the One God.⁴⁹

Due to the strong pressure exerted by the central government's armed forces, Daud Beureueh and his followers finally called a halt to their insurrection in May 1959.⁵⁰ The failure of the Darul Islam's rebellion resulted in the destruction of the so-called Islamic State which had been proclaimed. Anthony H. Johns notes that Daud Beureueh's revolt and those launched by Kartosuwirjo and Kahar Muzakkar give some idea of the strength of Muslim aspirations in Indonesia that were frustrated by the abandonment of the Jakarta Charter. ... These very serious uprisings, which threatened the integrity, not to say existence, of the state, were in the last resort put down by Muslim soldiers under a Muslim president who rejected the concept of a Muslim State. The experience of these rebellions and this bitterness, however, was sufficient to show the Religiously Neutral Nationalists that the security and stability of the state required an understanding of the sensitivities of Muslim political ideologues.⁵¹

As far as the Darul Islam was concerned, however, it should be kept in mind that its ideal of establishing an Islam-based state "by force of arms" simply reflected the political will of a minority group of Muslims in the circle of the Darul Islam itself, and did not represent

49 Herbert Feith and Castles, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 211.

50 M. Nur Ibrahimy, *Tgk. M. Daud Beureueh: Peranannya Dalam Pergolakan Di Aceh* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1986); Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, *The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).

51 Anthony H. Johns, "Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism," in *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 212.

the entire spectrum of Muslim political aspirations in Indonesia. Prime Minister Natsir (who served from September 1950 until March 1951 and was himself the outstanding leader of the Islamic Masyumi party) was charged with the task of acting as a mediator to intervene in the Darul Islam affair so that a political solution between its leader and the Republic could be reached. In his speech on November 14, 1950, in which he called the rebels "the warriors for independence who had not yet returned to normal life," Prime Minister Natsir appealed to them to abandon their violent ways of guerrilla war and invited them to devote themselves to building the new State of Indonesia. By doing so, Natsir said, they would have many opportunities to advocate their ideals in a peaceful manner.⁵²

G. General Election of 1955 and the Real Islamic Political Force

Following the 1955 general election, the crucial issue concerning the basis of the state once again became the focus of dispute between the Muslim Nationalists and the Religiously Neutral Nationalists, with the political battle still centering on whether Pancasila or Islam was to be employed for this purpose. This issue came to the surface because the 1950 Provisional Constitution, then currently in effect, had, like the two previous constitutions (the 1945 Constitution and the RIS Constitution), been agreed upon by the Religiously Neutral Nationalists and the Muslim Nationalists as being temporary. Logically, Pancasila as the basis of the state was also regarded as temporary, and a new and permanent constitution was envisioned following the first general election in 1955. Before, however, discussing the ideological battle between the two factions, it is first necessary to investigate how the Indonesian Muslim political leaders reorganized their political struggle by establishing a new political party called the Masyumi, a federative political body.

The Masyumi party was set up as a result of the Muslim Congress held from November 7-8, 1945 in Yogyakarta and was unanimously

52 Mohammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta*, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Pustaka Pendis, 1957), pp. 8–10.

agreed to be the only Islamic political party through which all Muslim political aspirations and goals should be channeled. This political unity of Indonesian Muslims was short-lived, however, since the *Syarikat Islam* and the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) split from the *Masyumi* party because of their political disagreement with the *Masyumi* leaders; the former in July 1947, and the latter in April 1952. These two Islamic organizations declared themselves to be political parties separate from the *Masyumi*.

In the wake of this political divorce, six Islamic parties zealously competed in the first general election held on September 29, 1955, with the following results: the *Masyumi* gained 57 seats (20.9 percent of the vote), the NU 45 seats (18.4 percent), the PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia*, or Indonesian Islamic Union Party) 8 seats (2.9 percent), the Perti (*Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah*, or Association of Islamic Education) 4 seats (1.3 percent), the PPTI (*Partai Persatuan Tharikat Islam*, or United Islamic Tharikat Party) 1 seat (0.2 percent) and the AKUI (*Aksi Kemenangan Umat Islam*, or Action for Muslim Victory) 1 seat (0.2 percent). The total number of seats gained by the six Islamic parties was 116 (45 percent) out of the 257 parliamentary seats contested. The two large non-Islamic parties, making up the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, or Indonesian National Party) won the same number of seats as the *Masyumi*, that is 57 seats (22.3 percent of the vote), whereas the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, or Indonesian Communist Party) acquired 39 seats (16.4 percent).⁵³ The Parkindo (*Partai Kristen Indonesia*, or Indonesian Christian Party) gained 8 seats (2.6 percent) and the *Partai Katholik* (Catholic Party) won 6 seats (2.0 percent), while many other small parties gained less than 6 seats each.⁵⁴ The average number of seats won by each party in the

53 Michael C. William, *Sickle and Crescent: The Communist Revolt of 1926 in Banten* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982); Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964); Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).

54 Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Election of 1955* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971), pp. 58–59; Ali Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on My Journey*, ed. C.L.M. Penders (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1979), pp. 320–21; Alfian, *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 Untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (Jakarta: Leknas, 1971), p. 1.

Constituent Assembly was doubled since there were twice as many seats to be acquired in the Assembly as in the parliament.

The general election of 1955 was held under the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet of the Masyumi in which 43,104,464 had the right to vote out of a total population of 77,987,879. Of those eligible to vote, 37,875,299 (87.65 percent) cast a ballot.⁵⁵ Based on the results of the 1955 general election, there was no political party which won a majority. Thus, the results of the general election of 1955 did not satisfy any single political party. As far as Islamic political fortunes were concerned, the results of the general election showed that Islam as a political force could not obtain half, let alone a majority, of the total number of parliamentary seats contested, even if the number of seats gained by the Masyumi, the NU, the PSII, the Perti, the PPTI and the AKUI were counted together.

The Constituent Assembly began its task on November 10, 1956 in Bandung, West Java, with the objective of drafting and legalizing a new and permanent constitution. The constitutional debates addressed issues such as the form of the government, the parliamentary system and the authority of the head of state. In fact, the Assembly was able to fulfill its role by completing many of its tasks. However, once the sensitive issue of the basis and ideology of the state was touched upon, a political compromise was too hard to achieve. To accommodate the ideas and views brought forward by the spokesmen of different political parties, the Assembly formed a Committee for Drafting the Constitution. Based on proposals put before the Committee, all political factions in the Assembly agreed upon the criteria which would be used in formulating the basis and ideology of the state. According to these agreed criteria, the formulation of the basis of the Indonesian state was to:

- (1) be in agreement with the Indonesian personality
- (2) be based on the spirit of the Indonesian revolution of August

⁵⁵ Dhaniel Dhakidae, "Pemilihan Umum Di Indonesia: Saksi Pasang Naik Dan Surut Partai Politik," *Prisma* 9 (September 1981): 17-40.

17, 1945

- (3) be based on deliberations in solving all matters of the state
- (4) guarantee religious freedom and practice
- (5) guarantee the basic values of humanity, broad nationality and social justice.⁵⁶

Despite this agreement, the opposing political groups in the Assembly were not able to achieve a political compromise regarding the basis of the state. From these ongoing discussions, we can see that there were three state ideologies competing in the Constituent Assembly, namely Social Economy, Pancasila and Islam. Unlike the Investigating Body in 1945, which had only discussed two proposals for the basis or ideology of the state, Pancasila and Islam, the Assembly in 1957 was faced with an additional one, that of Social Economy. In the Assembly the proposal to adopt Pancasila was advocated by the PNI (116 members), the PKI and the Republik Proklamasi faction (80), the Parkindo (16), the Partai Katholik (10), the PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, or Indonesian Socialist Party) (10), the IPKI (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, or Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence) (8), and many other small parties, totalling 273 representatives. The option of Islam was defended by the Masyumi (112 members), the NU (91), the PSII (16), the Perti (7) and four other small Islamic parties, with a total of 230 representatives.

H. Social Economy Versus Islam and Pancasila

In the Constituent Assembly, the Partai Murba (set up on November 7, 1949) advocated the principle of Social Economy to be used as the basis of the state. One of the leading spokespersons of this small party was Soedijono Djoprajitno who defined Social Economy as a system upon which the social and economic life in the country should be based, developed and implemented with the main objective being that of achieving social justice, social welfare and prosperity for the entire

⁵⁶ Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante* (Bandung: Konstituante, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 1–2; Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol.2, p. 9; Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 3, p. 166.

Indonesian people. To achieve this goal, according to Djojoprajitno, the bases of all political, social and economic power should be in the hands of the people, rather than in the hands of capitalists and bourgeois groups.⁵⁷ Thus, the goal of the Partai Murba with its proposal of Social Economy was to establish and develop socialism within the Indonesian context. To this purpose, Djojoprajitno put forward the fundamental principles of his politics of Social Economy as follows:

- (1) Democracy which is based on deliberation conducted by the elected representatives in the representative body which constitutes the highest institution in the Republic of Indonesia;
- (2) Humanity which is based on the recognition of the right to life and on freedom for individuals to achieve welfare, civilization and peace;
- (3) Nationalism which is based on the recognition of the right of self-determination characterized by anti-imperialism in any form; and
- (4) Social Welfare for the entire Indonesian people which is based on mutual cooperation in which vital sources of production should be in the hands of the people and should be dominated by the state.⁵⁸

According to Djojoprajitno, the Indonesian national and social revolution would concord with the ideals of the proclamation of Indonesian independence of August 17, 1945, if it were to adopt the principles he outlined. He was sharply criticized by, among others, Suwirjo of the PNI, Ir. Sakirman of the PKI and Asmara Hadi of the GPPS (*Gerakan Pembela Pancasila*, or Movement to defend Pancasila) for offering just four principles which seemed incomplete when compared with the five principles of Pancasila. After giving a brief outline of the basic principles of the party's proposal on the basis of Social Economy, Djojoprajitno said that he found Pancasila "a weak

⁵⁷ Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol.1, pp. 391–92.

⁵⁸ Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, pp. 392–93.

and vague ideology” because it had already been “castrated” (*dikebiri*) at the Round Table Conference in The Hague at which the Indonesian representatives agreed to accept the foundation of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia in 1949.⁵⁹ Djoprajitno asked the supporters of Pancasila: which version they would use? Pancasila as formulated in the 1945 constitution which reflected the goals of the Indonesian revolution, but which was incomplete? Or Pancasila as formulated in the RIS constitution of 1949 which was “castrated” in The Hague?

In the same breath, Djoprajitno and his party also rejected the Muslim Nationalists’ proposal of Islam as the basis of the state by virtue of the fact that Islam was only one part of the life of the Indonesian people. On the contrary, he believed that his party’s proposal of Social Economy as the basis of the state, through which it sought to establish social justice, or Indonesian socialism as it were, could accommodate the entirety of the Indonesian people’s aspirations and interests.⁶⁰ In Djoprajitno’s opinion, it was not an ideology that determined the form and the content of Social Economy, but rather Social Economy that determined the form and the content of an ideology. For that reason, he proposed Social Economy as the basis of the state, not as its ideology and philosophy.⁶¹ The solution to this endless ideological battle, in the view of Djoprajitno, was to accept the principle of Social Economy as the basis of the state as his party advocated. Neither the supporters of Islam nor the defenders of Pancasila accepted the Partai Murba’s proposal.

I. Muslim Nationalists Versus Communists

The PKI, through its leaders such as Sakirman, K.H. Ahmad Dasuki Siradj, Njoto and Wikana, also championed Pancasila as the philosophical basis and ideology of the state, rejecting both Islam and

⁵⁹ Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, p. 377; Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, p. 388.

⁶⁰ Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 1, p. 443.

⁶¹ Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, p. 389.

Social Economy for this purpose. In rejecting Social Economy, the Communists argued that Pancasila covered all principles contained in it, and in repudiating Islam they argued that this religion did not represent all the political currents and socio-religious groups existing in Indonesia. The Communist party agreed to accept Pancasila on the grounds that, in its view, Pancasila functioned as a common ideological basis and as a point of agreement among all the political currents flourishing in the country. Ahmad Dasuki Siradj, himself a Muslim, a *kiai* (learned and respected Muslim leader) and a *hajji*, said that the Communist party could accept Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state because it was in agreement with the historical development of the Indonesian struggle to achieve the goals of the revolution. Siradj even justified his party's acceptance of Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state by saying that Pancasila was in fact in line with religious doctrine.⁶²

The Muslim faction suspected the PKI of pretending to accept Pancasila for political purposes only, since Communism and Marxism traditionally rejected belief in God, or supernatural beings, and regarded religion as the opiate of society as well as something that had to be destroyed. In the view of Muslim political leaders, the Communists were in fact playing a game with Pancasila because the basic nature of Communism did not allow for belief in One God. This was why M. Rusjad Nurdin of the Masyumi questioned whether the Communists accepted Pancasila sincerely or with their tongues only. Nurdin pointed to chapter 3 of the Russian Communist Party's program stating that every member of Communist party had to reject any and all religious belief and had actively to take part in destroying it.⁶³

In the view of Nurdin, it was impossible for the Indonesian Communists to accept Pancasila wholeheartedly because the Communists did not believe in One God as taught by the doctrine of

62 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 2, p. 334.

63 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 2, p. 415.

Pancasila.⁶⁴ In short, the Muslims, especially the Masyumi leaders, saw Communism in Indonesia as a threat to Islam and to Muslims, which should be confronted, since, according to Natsir:

The goal [of Communism] is to seize a power. This is the core of the doctrine of Communism-Marxism-Leninism. This power should be seized by means of dictatorship. Those who oppose it should be kicked out and, if necessary, killed. Communism is an ideology which is against the idea of democracy.⁶⁵

Njoto of the PKI responded to the attacks of Nurdin and Natsir by saying that the Communists accepted Pancasila, not just as lip service, and not just as a political tactic in order to win power, but both in theory and in practice. Njoto said that many Islamic representatives in the Constituent Assembly expressed their surprise that the Communist party, as an atheist party, was prepared to accept Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state. They would be more surprised, he went on to say, when the Communists followed through on their desire to accept Islam as the basis of the state.⁶⁶ According to Njoto, Muslim hostility toward the Communists and atheists was more political than theological or doctrinal.⁶⁷ Njoto wondered why the Muslims were so anti-Communist and anti-atheist that they would launch an "Anti-Communist Movement", and why they did not show religious tolerance to the Communists. If the Muslims believed in democracy as their religion taught them – and they often promoted it in the Assembly –, Njoto continued, they should be brave enough to compete with the Communists in a fair political game, not just in propagating anti-Communism and anti-atheism. By launching a campaign of anti-Communism, Njoto said, the Muslims actually showed their lack of confidence to compete freely with the Communists, thus showing

64 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 2, p. 415.

65 Mohammad Natsir, "Membela Nikmat Yang Diberikan Demokrasi: Demokrasi Harus Ditebus Dengan Perjuangan Yang Besar," *Abadi*, March 4, 1957.

66 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 3, p. 94.

67 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 3, p. 96.

also that their Islamic faith was weak. "I would really feel ashamed," he continued, "if I demanded that the Islamic party of Masyumi be disbanded, because by doing so I would not be acting as a democrat." But "their newspapers," he said further "were very proud of their campaign of demanding that the PKI be dissolved."⁶⁸

After directing his retaliation against the above-mentioned opponents, Njoto in turn attacked Natsir of the Masyumi by stating that Pancasila was not neutral; rather it took the side of its defenders in the Assembly. Rejecting Natsir's view that Pancasila did not have deep roots in the life of Indonesian society, Njoto stated that Pancasila did indeed have such roots since it had already operated, though temporarily, for twelve years, from 1945 until 1957. According to Njoto, the status of Pancasila was also indicated by the fact that the parties supporting Pancasila in the general election of 1955 had gained more than 50 percent of the vote compared with 45 percent of the vote acquired by the Islamic parties.⁶⁹ Njoto continued to attack Natsir by saying that Natsir's acceptance of Pancasila in its twelve years of operation as the basis and ideology of the state was simply "lip service," since now in the Assembly he totally rejected Pancasila and instead proposed Islam as the basis of the state. In launching his bitter attack on Natsir's attitude toward Pancasila, Njoto referred to one of his opponent's articles:

In his writing entitled 'Is Pancasila Contrary to the Doctrine of the Qur'an?', Natsir writes: "Pancasila is a formulation of five ideals of virtues as the result of a consensus of our leaders at their stage of struggle nine years ago. As the formulation [of the five ideals of virtues], it is not contrary to the Qur'an, except that it is filled with something contradictory to the Qur'an." Natsir goes on to say: "In the eyes of a Muslim, the formulation of Pancasila does not show something strange which is in disagreement with Qur'anic teachings. ... Pancasila,

68 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 3, p. 102.

69 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 3, p. 90.

of course, contains Islamic ideals, but it is not identical with Islam itself.”⁷⁰

Feeling inadequate with the above statements, Natsir then emphasizes ”Pancasila is a manifestation of the intentions and ideals of goodness which we should make every effort to put into practice in our state and our environs.”⁷¹

According to Njoto, Natsir, who composed his article in 1373/1952 in the month of Ramadân, expressed in it his positive views of Pancasila. Njoto said it was not the month of Ramadân, a month full of blessing according to Islamic faith, that inspired Natsir to write approvingly of Pancasila, but rather his correct understanding of it. This was also indicated by the fact that in a speech, delivered before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs in 1952, Natsir expressed a positive view of Pancasila by saying that it functioned as ”the spiritual, moral and ethical basis of our nation and state.”⁷² After praising Natsir, Njoto attacked him by questioning why Natsir, now in 1957, in the sessions of the Assembly, took a ”cruel” attitude toward Pancasila by labeling it as neutral, baseless, empty and sterile and totally rejecting it as the basis of the state. Njoto then went on to question: Which Natsir should be followed and believed? Natsir in 1952 or Natsir in 1957? Or neither?⁷³ It seems that Njoto and those with similar views⁷⁴ in the Assembly failed to understand Natsir’s position vis-à-vis Pancasila. As a true democrat, Natsir had to accept Pancasila as the basis of the state as it was used from 1945 until the coming of the ideological debates in the Constituent Assembly in 1957. Constitutionally, it was completely legal that Natsir in 1957, in the Assembly, should propose Islam as the basis of the state and reexamine Pancasila according to his Islamic

70 Natsir, *Capita Selecta*, vol. 2, pp. 144–50.

71 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 3, p. 92.

72 Mohammad Natsir, *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, 1954), p. 1.

73 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 3, p. 93.

74 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, pp. 444–45.

understanding. His views at this later time might be different from his previous views of 1952.

Like other Indonesian citizens and political leaders, Natsir had the right to speak and propose his religion, not Pancasila, as the basis of the state since this was the time when a new and permanent basis of the state was to be established by the Assembly. This moment was used by Natsir to gain maximum political results by strenuously promoting Islam as the foundation of the Indonesian State in the ideological fight against the supporters of Pancasila in the Assembly. Seen in this political context, it is safe to say that Natsir held a self-contradictory view of Pancasila. Deliar Noer gives three reasons for this. *First*, the Constituent Assembly was an open forum for its members to put forward proposals for the state ideology which they believed to be the best and most suitable for Indonesia. Like the representatives of non-Islamic parties who promoted their own proposals, so Natsir advanced his own proposal of Islam as the basis of the state. *Second*, in the Assembly Natsir and his friends from the Islamic parties struggled to achieve the Muslim community's political aspirations; Natsir and his friends therefore took on the religious and political responsibility of promoting Islam as the basis of the state. *Third*, like the representatives of non-Islamic parties who argued the strength and superiority of their own proposals, so did Natsir and his friends argue their proposal that Islam be the basis of the state.⁷⁵

J. Muslim Nationalists Versus Religiously Neutral Nationalists

Through its leading figure, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, the PSI (established on February 12, 1948) basically accepted Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state because it could serve to unify all groups in the country, and could save the state from disunity in a critical situation.⁷⁶ Before expressing his acceptance, however,

⁷⁵ Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila Dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1964), p. 111; Noer, *Partai Islam Di Pentas Nasional 1945-1965*, p. 366.

⁷⁶ Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Konstituante*, vol. 2, p. 40.

Alisjahbana criticized Pancasila since it was depicted by its supporters as a complete philosophy of state. One sometimes got the impression that Pancasila had been raised to the status of a holy religion which considered other people who were brave enough to doubt it as infidels and traitors.⁷⁷ According to Alisjahbana, it was an exaggeration to reckon Pancasila, in its present form, as a philosophy of state since the principles contained in it were so diverse that they contradicted each other. In Pancasila there was no unity or totality of logic; rather, it suffered from incoherence and disunity.⁷⁸ Alisjahbana and his party, however, could accept Pancasila, even though his party might have different views about it than other groups.⁷⁹

The Partai Katholik (founded in Surakarta on December 8, 1945), through its spokesmen such as P. S. da Cunha, defended Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state and strongly rejected the Muslim proposal that Islam be its foundation. P. S. da Cunha explained the reason for not accepting Islam by saying that it was not that his group did not love the Muslims (as Hamka of the Masyumi claimed), but because of their belief in the absolute truth of Catholicism. "It would be a big blunder for us," he said, "if we accepted Islam as the basis of the state, since it would mean that our religion was not absolute and not true anymore."⁸⁰ P.S. da Cunha rejected Mohammad Natsir's criticism of the Masyumi who regarded Pancasila as secular by pointing to the expressions "Belief in the One and Only God" mentioned in the first principle of Pancasila, "thanks to the Mercy of God" recorded in the preamble of the constitution, and "the state is based on the belief in God" stated in its body which, in his view, showed obvious indications that Pancasila was not separated from the influence of religion.⁸¹

The PNI from the very beginning defended Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the State of Indonesia. Suwirjo, chairman of the PNI,

77 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 2, p. 39.

78 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 2, p. 40.

79 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 2, p. 40.

80 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 3, p. 127.

81 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 3, p. 129.

said that Social Economy and Islam were not bad options, but neither met some of the five ideological criteria mentioned above; therefore, both Social Economy and Islam were inadequate to serve as the basis of the state. Suwirjo saw Islam as not suiting two requirements, namely the Indonesian personality and the spirit of the Indonesian revolution of August 17, 1945.⁸² In Suwirjo's opinion, Pancasila was the only one of the proposed bases which met the five ideological criteria. Therefore, it should continue to be used as the basis and ideology of the state. He also argued that Pancasila should continue to be advocated, completed and implemented as the basis and ideology of the state, since it had already worked for twelve years. "If Pancasila were substituted with another basis," he stated further, "I am afraid it would result in disunity of the Indonesian nation, would lead to the breakup of the state of Indonesia."⁸³

All Islamic parties, namely the Masyumi, the Perti, the NU, the PSII, the AKUI and the PPTI, were united in the Constituent Assembly in promoting Islam as the basis of the state. The Masyumi on the one hand and the NU and the PSII on the other, seemed to forget their political divorce of 1947 and 1952, and stood together in this ideological fight. In rejecting Pancasila, the representatives of the Islamic parties referred either to Pancasila created by Soekarno or to Pancasila officially modified in the constitutions, rather than to Pancasila formulated in the Jakarta Charter. The representatives of the Muslim Nationalists justified their struggle for the establishment of an Islam-Based State in Indonesia by referring to the Qur'anic verses: "...whoever does not judge by what Allah revealed, those are they that are the unbelievers," and "... whoever does not judge by what Allah revealed, those are they that are the unjust," and "... whoever does not judge by what Allah revealed, those are they that are the transgressors."⁸⁴ The Muslims saw

82 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, p. 3.

83 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, p. 8.

84 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, p. 239, vol. 2, p. 175. Sûra V: 44, 45 and 47. Sjamisjah Abbas was among the Muslim representatives in the Assembly who quoted verse 44. Isa Anshary also referred to those three verses.

the Islam-based state which they wished to establish in Indonesia as similar to the Saba state mentioned in the Qur'an, which was, "a good Land and a Forgiving Lord!"⁸⁵ K.H. Masjkur, from the traditionalist NU circle, attacked Pancasila from a theological perspective:

Pancasila is an empty formula which still needs content. If "Belief in One God," the first principle of Pancasila, is filled in by people who consider a stone as God, the Lordship in Pancasila then will be filled in with a stone. If it is filled in by tree worshippers, it will be filled in with a tree.⁸⁶

In addition, Osman Raliby of the Masyumi also questioned and assessed the principle of "Belief in God" in Soekarno's Pancasila to which he had applied his typical theory of compression:

God in Pancasila is a dead God who does not have any influence on the other four principles. He does not make any judgment at all. If Pancasila is compressed, God himself is subject to compression and He then disappears in the principle of Mutual Cooperation, the *Ekasila*, that is, the main compression of Pancasila.⁸⁷

The implication of Raliby's assessment was that, unlike God in Pancasila who was obscure and "dead", God in Islam is a living God whose rules and laws coming from His revelation guide man's conduct and behaviour in both worldly and other-worldly affairs. If Raliby's view is to be followed, the Islamic belief in God has an impact on man's behaviour, and it is He who makes judgments on man's actions according to His Law. The representatives of the Islamic parties in the Constituent Assembly made every effort to show what they considered to be the "weaknesses" and "shortcomings" of Pancasila, and then came up with their own arguments to demonstrate what they considered to

85 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 1, p. 242. Sūra XXXIV: 15. Among the Muslim representatives who referred to this sūra in the Constituent Assembly debates was Sjam-sijah Abbas of the Perti.

86 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, vol. 3, p. 46.

87 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Risalah Perundingan*, (Jakarta: Masa Baru, 1958), vol. 1, p. 230.

be the "strength" and "superiority" of Islam over Pancasila, in order for Islam to be accepted as the basis and ideology of the state. However, the Muslims failed to convince the representatives of the non-Islamic parties in the Constituent Assembly as to the comprehensiveness, completeness, strength and superiority of Islam in a modern state. In the twentieth century, there was no Islamic state or Islam-based state to which they could easily refer as an indication of the superiority of Islam over any other ideology. Muslim states all over the world had for a long time belonged to the Third World whose social, economic and industrial conditions were underdeveloped or developing.

In contrast, the so-called "secular" states in the West were highly developed and had become modern industrial states. This reality did not, however, cause the Indonesian Muslims to give up their constitutional struggle to promote Islam as the basis and ideology of the state. In their view, Islam was a true ideology as well as a political system which should be established in their societies. In his speech before the Constituent Assembly on November 12, 1957, Mohammad Natsir⁸⁸ began to assess Pancasila and was of the opinion that Pancasila was vague and obscure. In fact, Natsir acknowledged that there were good ideas contained in Pancasila, but that the explanations and arguments put forward by its supporters were insufficient to convince him and his Muslim friends in the Constituent Assembly to accept it as the basis of the state:

Of course, nobody denies that there are good ideas in Pancasila. Yet the arguments given by its supporters demonstrate that they themselves cannot explain what are its true contents, its proper sequence, its source, its nucleus, and the interdependence of its components. Because these are not clear, the difficulties then gradually arise. Since the foundation of our state needs to be clear and distinct so as

88 G Roeder and Mahidin Mahmud, *Who's Who in Indonesia* (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1980), p. 192; Endang Saifuddin Anshari and Amien Rais, eds., *Pak Natsir 80 Tahun* (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1988).

not to confuse the nation, it is difficult for our group to accept something which is vague.⁸⁹

Natsir then compared Pancasila with Islam, and came to the conclusion that the former was a neutral, abstract and secular (*lâ dîniyyah*) concept.⁹⁰ After advancing all his Islamic arguments, Natsir made an appeal to the defenders of Pancasila and the supporters of Social Economy in the Constituent Assembly to accept Islam as the basis and ideology of the state:

The [five] principles that you wish also exist in Islam, not as sterile concepts but as living values which have clear and concrete substance. By accepting Islam as the philosophy of the state, the defenders of Pancasila will not lose anything at all. Both the advocates of Pancasila and the followers of religion will have a living philosophy with a distinct, firm and strong power. Not one of the five principles formulated in Pancasila will be neglected or lost, if you accept Islam as the basis of the state. Certain norms are found in Islam in which the purely conceptual five principles have real substance and motivating spirit. To the supporters of Social Economy I also appeal that you will find in Islam the progressive concept of Social Economy.⁹¹

However, Natsir's proposal, like those of his Muslim friends in the Constituent Assembly, was turned down by the advocates of Pancasila and by the upholders of Social Economy. The defenders of Pancasila and the supporters of Social Economy were not convinced by the Islamic arguments put forward by Natsir and other Muslim representatives.

The tense and heated ideological battle between the representatives of the Islamic political parties and those of the non-Islamic political parties in the Constituent Assembly did not produce a political

89 Mohammad Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Bandung: Fraksi Masjumi dalam Konstituante, 1957), p. 5.

90 Natsir, p. 24.

91 Natsir, p. 28.

compromise since both sides were adamant in promoting their own proposals. Because of this critical situation, President Soekarno, in consultation with his cabinet and strongly encouraged and supported by the Indonesian army under the leadership of General Abdul Haris Nasution, took the initiative of promoting his proposed return to the 1945 Constitution as formulated on August 18, 1945, in an attempt to break the political deadlock that had seized the Assembly.

Three times the Constituent Assembly voted on the president's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution, on May 30, June 1 and June 2, 1959, with the following results: 269, 264 and 263 in favour of the proposal and 199, 204 and 203 (mostly votes cast by the Muslim Nationalist faction) against, respectively.⁹² The Muslim Nationalists voted against the proposal because they felt the Islamic clause of the Jakarta Charter (with the obligation to practice the sharī'a for its adherents) had to be included in the 1945 Constitution. Neither the defenders of Pancasila nor the supporters of Islam won the required two-thirds of the vote, that is, 312 out of the total membership of the Assembly.⁹³

Soekarno saw this situation as a danger to national unity and therefore issued a presidential decree on July 5, 1959, proclaiming a return to the 1945 Constitution. Since the issuance of this decree, Pancasila has been permanently and effectively applied as the basis and ideology of the state up to the present. To appease the injured feelings of the Muslims, Soekarno said that the Jakarta Charter of June 22, 1945 was the soul of the 1945 Constitution. It gave life to the 1945 Constitution and could not be separated from it. With Pancasila as its basis, Indonesia is neither a secular nor a theocratic state. As good and loyal citizens, the Muslims have accepted and defended Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the Indonesian State. For example, their loyalty to Pancasila was proved in September 1965, when the Muslims, in strong cooperation with the Indonesian Army and other New Order forces

92 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 3, p. 618.

93 Yamin, vol. 3, p. 618.

in the country, came to the fore and spiritedly advocated Pancasila against the Communist uprising which attempted to replace it with Communist ideology. This was the second Communist rebellion against the Republic that occurred in Jakarta and the first one had taken place in 1948 in Madiun.

K. Conclusion

Muslim understanding of Pancasila developed in which they saw it as being in line with the teachings of Islam. Their acceptance of Pancasila was not surprising if we compare this to events that had occurred in history, for example, in Islamic history. In Islamic history, ‘Umar ibn Khattab, for instance, initially strongly rejected Islam and attempted to assassinate the Prophet Muhammad, the preacher of the new religion. However, ‘Umar finally accepted Islam and became its staunchest defender.

One might say that it is not an exaggeration for the ‘Umar phenomenon to be used as an analogy for the Indonesian Muslim acceptance of Pancasila. Their loyalty to it was proved in 1965, when the Muslims, in cooperation with the Indonesian Army and other New Order forces, came to the fore and spiritedly defended Pancasila against the Communist rebellion which attempted to replace it with Communist ideology.

Throughout history, Pancasila has proven itself to have the capacity to function as an inspiring, guiding, integrating and unifying force which is able to accommodate people’s various aspirations flourishing in the country, as well as to bind and unite all segments of Indonesians as a nation, regardless of their religions, political, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In short, Pancasila serves as a common platform allowing all segments of Indonesian society to coexist and work together in building their country and in struggling to achieve their national goals and ideals.

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