Hubungan Kebijakan Hutang, Insider Ownership dan Kebijakan Dividen dalam Mekanisme Pengawasan Masalah Agensi di Indonesia
This study investigates the substitution relationship (substitutability) among debt policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy as the agency problem control mechanism in Indonesia. If the substitution relationship exists among the agency control mechanisms, the agency problem can be reduced through this relationship. Reducing the agency problem as a result can increase the firm value proxied by Tobinâ€™s Q. This study employs 69 firms listed on Jakarta Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2004. The results of this study indicate that the substitutability among debt policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy as agency problem control mechanism does not exist effectively in Indonesia. Actually, there is substitutability relationship among the control mechanisms, but it is not effective.
Keywords: Insider ownership, debt policy, dividend policy, agency problem, substitutability
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JURNAL AKUNTANSI DAN AUDITING INDONESIA (JAAI)
ISSN 1410-2420 (print), 2528-6528 (online)
Published by Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics, Universitas Islam Indonesia
Supported by IAI-KAPd (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia - Kompartemen Akuntan Pendidik)
JAAI pada http://journal.uii.ac.id/index.php/JAAI/ terlisensi oleh Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.