

Institutional Redesign to Strengthen the Presidential System and Government Effectiveness in Indonesia

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Abstract. The presidential system of government in Indonesia faces various challenges, particularly the fragmentation of power between the executive and legislative branches, which hampers the effectiveness of public policy implementation. This study aims to analyze the legal challenges confronting the presidential system and explore how institutional redesign can strengthen the checks and balances mechanism between these branches. The research method employed is qualitative, utilizing a literature study approach, where data is collected from various sources, including books, scientific journals, and official documents. The findings indicate that the existing power imbalance complicates the president's ability to implement government programs effectively, often leading to policy stagnation and inefficiency. Proposed institutional redesigns include clarifying the president's authority, reducing dependence on the House of Representatives (DPR) for approvals, and simplifying the structure of the presidential institution to enhance operational efficiency. The discussion emphasizes the importance of inter-institutional coordination and structured institutional reform to achieve greater government stability and effectiveness. By addressing these critical issues, the proposed reforms aim to create a more responsive and accountable government that prioritizes national interests. Ultimately, this study concludes that appropriate institutional reforms can significantly strengthen the presidential system and improve governance in Indonesia, ensuring adherence to democratic principles and enhancing public trust in government institutions.

Keywords: Presidential System, Fragmentation of Power, Institutional Redesign

Abstrak. Sistem pemerintahan presidensial di Indonesia menghadapi berbagai tantangan, terutama fragmentasi kekuasaan antara eksekutif dan legislatif yang menghambat efektivitas pelaksanaan kebijakan publik. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis tantangan hukum yang dihadapi oleh sistem presidensial dan mengeksplorasi bagaimana redesain kelembagaan dapat memperkuat mekanisme checks and balances antara kedua cabang tersebut. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi pustaka, di mana data dikumpulkan dari berbagai sumber, termasuk buku, jurnal ilmiah, dan dokumen resmi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa ketidakseimbangan kekuasaan menyulitkan presiden dalam melaksanakan program pemerintah secara efektif, sering kali mengakibatkan stagnasi kebijakan dan ketidakefisienan. Redesain kelembagaan yang diusulkan mencakup klarifikasi wewenang presiden, mengurangi ketergantungan pada persetujuan DPR, dan menyederhanakan struktur lembaga kepresidenan untuk meningkatkan efisiensi operasional. Pembahasan menekankan pentingnya koordinasi antar-lembaga dan reformasi kelembagaan yang terstruktur untuk mencapai stabilitas dan efektivitas pemerintahan. Dengan mengatasi isu-isu kritis ini, reformasi yang diusulkan bertujuan untuk menciptakan pemerintahan yang lebih responsif dan akuntabel yang memprioritaskan kepentingan nasional. Akhirnya, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa reformasi kelembagaan yang tepat dapat memperkuat sistem presidensial dan meningkatkan tata kelola di Indonesia, memastikan kepatuhan terhadap prinsip-prinsip demokrasi dan meningkatkan kepercayaan publik terhadap institusi pemerintah.

Kata Kunci: Sistem Presidensial, Fragmentasi Kekuasaan, Redesain Kelembagaan

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INTRODUCTION

The presidential system of government in Indonesia has experienced various institutional dynamics since the proclamation of independence. Although the 1945 Constitution declares that Indonesia adheres to a presidential system, the implementation of this system has not always aligned with its constitutional foundation. Practical realities often diverge from the normative structure, particularly in terms of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The distribution of power frequently leads to imbalance, causing the performance of the presidential institution to become less than optimal. Even after a series of constitutional amendments that were meant to clarify institutional functions and reinforce presidential authority, the expected stability and efficiency have not been fully achieved. These challenges suggest a pressing need to reassess how the presidential system functions within Indonesia's constitutional framework. Without such reassessment, the risk remains that constitutional principles may continue to be overshadowed by political and structural dysfunctions.¹

A central issue contributing to the fragility of Indonesia's presidential system is the fragmentation of power between the executive and the legislative. While the President is constitutionally granted full authority to administer the government, in practice, the multiparty political system obliges the executive to accommodate various interests in the House of Representatives. This condition often results in policy stagnation, as the President must compromise with political factions that do not necessarily share the same vision. Furthermore, the necessity for continuous political bargaining weakens the autonomy of presidential leadership, making it difficult to maintain consistent and stable governance. The over-politicization of legislative processes contributes to this dysfunction, as governmental programs may be obstructed or delayed due to partisan interests. Such circumstances not only limit the effectiveness of the executive but also reflect the broader structural weaknesses of Indonesia's political-constitutional order. Therefore, a rethinking of how presidential authority is structured in relation to the

¹ Songga Abadi dan Fitra Arsil, "Mekanisme Penetapan Ambang Batas (Threshold) terhadap Stabilitas Sistem Presidensial dan Sistem Multipartai Sederhana di Indonesia," *Jurnal Konstitusi & Demokrasi* 2, no. 1 (31 Mei 2022), <https://doi.org/10.7454/jkd.v2i1.1202>.

legislature becomes necessary to ensure institutional balance and government performance.²

Beyond power imbalance, the Indonesian presidential system also struggles with political stability and policy effectiveness due to the strong influence of parties in the legislature. In several periods of government, legislative dominance has disrupted the independence of the executive, resulting in delayed budget approvals, blocked policy initiatives, or forced revisions that dilute the President's vision. These obstacles demonstrate that the legislative branch, instead of playing a constructive oversight role, often becomes a center of political resistance. Such dynamics compromise public trust and create a governance system that is reactive and inefficient. A structural redesign of the presidential institution is therefore essential, particularly to clarify ambiguous constitutional provisions that allow for conflicting interpretations of power. Institutional reform must be aimed at improving inter-institutional coordination while preserving the constitutional principle of checks and balances. Without clear and enforceable mechanisms of interaction between branches, the potential for constitutional conflict and administrative inefficiency will continue to grow.

The constitutional doctrine in Indonesia has also undergone a significant transformation, particularly after the amendments to the 1945 Constitution. Prior to the amendments, Article 1 paragraph (2) stated that sovereignty rests with the people and is fully exercised by the People's Consultative Assembly.³ This arrangement placed the MPR at the top of the state hierarchy, granting it the authority to determine the Constitution, set national policy, and elect the President and Vice President. Other state institutions such as the DPR, the President, the Supreme Court, and the State Audit Board functioned as executors of the MPR's decisions. The distribution of power in this model reflected a parliamentary characteristic, with the MPR acting as the highest state organ. Furthermore, Articles 3 and 6 reinforced this supremacy by assigning critical constitutional functions to the MPR. The President, within this

² Sultoni Fikri, Muhammad Firmansyah, and Vina Sabina, "Penguatan Sistem Presidensial melalui Penerapan Ambang Batas Parlementary Threshold," *Jurnal Sosial Humaniora Sigli* 6, no. 2 (20 December 2023): 511–520, <https://doi.org/10.47647/jsh.v6i2.1685>.

³ Indonesia. Pasal 1 ayat (2) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945. Lembaran Negara RI Tahun 1945 Nomor 5, Tambahan Lembaran RI Nomor 4355. Sekretariat Negara. Jakarta.

framework, was accountable not to the people directly but to the legislative institution, thereby limiting the executive's independence and embedding parliamentary dominance into the governmental structure.⁴

Following the constitutional amendments, there was a foundational shift in Indonesia's conception of sovereignty and the structure of government. Article 1 paragraph (2) was revised to state that sovereignty belongs to the people and is exercised according to the Constitution. This change eliminated the hierarchical supremacy of the MPR and repositioned all state organs on an equal footing under the supremacy of the Constitution.⁵ Consequently, Indonesia adopted a more coherent model of the separation of powers, where executive, legislative, and judicial branches each hold independent authority within their respective domains. The new doctrine emphasizes constitutional supremacy over institutional supremacy, ensuring that all organs of the state are bound by and subject to constitutional limitations. This realignment underscores the characteristics of a true presidential system, where no institution dominates others, and each functions according to a clearly defined legal framework. Therefore, this study seeks to examine how these constitutional developments affect the performance and design of the presidential institution in Indonesia, and to propose reforms that reinforce legal certainty, institutional coordination, and democratic accountability in accordance with constitutional principles.

METHODOLOGY

The research method used in this study is a qualitative method with a library research approach. This research focuses on the collection and analysis of data from various written sources, such as books, scientific journals, laws and regulations, as well as official documents related to the presidential system of government and the redesign of the presidential institution in Indonesia. The collected data will be analyzed using

⁴"UUD No. 3," Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK, accessed 1 April 2025, <http://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/101646/uud-no-3>.

⁵Efriza Efriza, "Penguatan Sistem Presidensial dalam Pemilu Serentak 2019," *Jurnal Penelitian Politik* 16, no. 1 (28 June 2019): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v16i1.772>.

a descriptive-qualitative approach to understand the concept, urgency, and implications of the institutional redesign of the presidency in strengthening the presidential system. In addition, this study will also employ a normative approach to examine the legal and constitutional aspects related to executive authority, executive-legislative relations, and oversight mechanisms of the President within Indonesia's presidential system.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Presidential Institution and the Presidential System

The structuring of the presidential institution as one of the entities holding state power plays a crucial role in maintaining the continuity of national and state life. Changes within this institution are the result of the dynamics of the times and the evolving conditions of the nation and state. Nevertheless, reforms to the presidential institution are aimed at strengthening the presidential system.⁶ The goal is to ensure that this institution remains capable of performing its roles and functions optimally in realizing the ideals of the nation and state. This is pursued by shaping a presidential institution that is responsive, accommodative, and prioritizes national interests above all else in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations. Furthermore, a mechanism of checks and balances among the three branches of state power, executive, legislative, and judiciary, must be implemented to achieve national objectives.⁷

In a system of government, the balance and relationships among institutions are determined by the principle of Trias Politica, which divides duties and authorities among three branches of power. The executive acts as the implementer of government, the legislature is responsible for making laws and overseeing government operations, while the judiciary has the authority to resolve disputes and impose sanctions for legal violations.⁸ However, in the state administration, political balance depends not only

⁶ Firman Manan, "Relasi Eksekutif-Legislatif dalam Sistem Presidensial Multipartai di Indonesia," *JWP (Jurnal Wacana Politik)* 2, no. 2 (11 October 2017), <https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v2i2.14198>.

⁷ Ratna Herawati, Aditya Andela Pratama, and Fifiiana Wisnaeni, "Optimalisasi Lembaga Kepresidenan melalui Harmonisasi Peraturan," *Proceeding APHTN-HAN* 2, no. 1 (31 December 2024): 149–164.

⁸ Loso Judijanto et al., *Sistem Politik Indonesia* (PT. Green Pustaka Indonesia, 2025).

on the division of power but also on the balance among political institutions. The concept of balance of power here refers to efforts to maintain the proportion of power among various state institutions.

In theory, Indonesia adheres to the Trias Politica system as described by the French political philosopher Montesquieu in his book *The Spirit of Law*, which remains a key reference in legal and political studies. According to this theory, the relationship between the executive and legislature is based on role separation: the executive runs the government, while the legislature functions as a supervisor. To keep oversight objective, the legislative body should not be involved in executing executive policies. However, in practice in Indonesia, there is a tendency for the House of Representatives (DPR) to expand its power into the executive domain. Many government positions require DPR approval or must pass a fit and proper test conducted by the DPR.⁹ For example, the President must obtain DPR approval when appointing the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Panglima TNI) and the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Kapolri), even though both are part of the executive. In addition, ambassador candidates chosen by the President must undergo a feasibility test by the DPR, although their duty is to represent the government abroad. Similar procedures apply in the selection of leaders for the Financial Services Authority (OJK), the Audit Board (BPK), and the General Elections Commission (KPU), where the President submits twice the number of candidates needed, and the DPR then selects according to the available positions.¹⁰

In a clear division of duties, the President has the authority to directly appoint the Panglima TNI and Kapolri without needing DPR approval. However, if they fail to perform their duties properly or commit serious errors, the DPR has the right to demand accountability from the President.¹¹ The DPR's efforts to strengthen its position by expanding its authority and power are understandable, especially

⁹ Ubedilah Badrun, *Sistem Politik Indonesia* (Bumi Aksara, 2022).

¹⁰ Panggih Fadhillah Paramadina and M. Yasin Al Arif, "Pengangkatan Menteri dalam Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia Perspektif Imam Al-Mawardi," *As-Siyasi: Journal of Constitutional Law* 1, no. 2 (15 April 2022): 74–93, <https://doi.org/10.24042/as-siyasi.v1i2.11401>.

¹¹ Idul Rishan, "Risiko Koalisi Gemuk dalam Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia," *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum* 27, no. 2 (25 August 2020): 219–240, <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol27.iss2.art1>.

considering that the government system before the 1945 Constitution amendments was not fully presidential. Before the constitutional amendments, the presidential system had characteristics such as a parallel (*neben*) relationship between the House of Representatives (DPR) and the President, as well as a fixed term for the President. However, on the other hand, the existence of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) as the institution that elected, mandated, and could dismiss the President indicated features of a parliamentary system. At that time, the President was the MPR's mandatary and was directly accountable to the MPR, which held the authority to dismiss him.¹²

During the 1999 Annual MPR Session, one of the agreements in the amendment of the 1945 Constitution was to maintain the presidential system by refining it to better align with the fundamental principles of that system. One of the fundamental changes was to alter the position of the MPR so that it was no longer the highest state institution. To strengthen the presidential system, the balance between the executive and legislative branches, especially between the DPR and the President, was also improved. This was done through the mechanism of direct election of the President and Vice President by the people, as regulated in Articles 6, 6A, 7, 7A, and 8 of the 1945 Constitution. With direct elections, the President and Vice President gain strong legitimacy and cannot be easily removed except if proven to have committed legal violations.¹³ Furthermore, the process of dismissing the President and Vice President is no longer purely political but must go through legal procedures in the Constitutional Court, considering that the basis for dismissal must be related to legal violations. Other changes concerned the President's authority in drafting laws. Whereas previously Article 5 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution granted the President the right to make laws, after the amendments, this authority was changed to the right to propose draft laws, which are then submitted to the DPR as regulated

¹² Putu Eva Ditayani Antari, "Implementation of the Supervisory Function of the House of Representatives in Strengthening the Presidential System in Indonesia," *Refleksi Hukum: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 4, no. 2 (July 8, 2020): 217–238, <https://doi.org/10.24246/jrh.2020.v4.i2.p217-238>.

¹³ Dinoroy Marganda Artonang, "The Implementation of the Presidential System in Indonesia After the 1945 Constitution Amendments," *Jurnal Mimbar Hukum* 22, no. 2 (2010): 391–407, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jmh.16226>.

in Article 20 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.¹⁴¹⁵ Additionally, the President no longer has the authority to dissolve the DPR, as affirmed in Article 7C of the 1945 Constitution.¹⁶

The Dynamics of Ministerial Appointments After the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia

The development of ministerial appointments after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI) can be classified into four periods based on the presidential leadership from 2004 to 2024. Each period shows that the process of appointing ministers is heavily influenced by the prevailing political dynamics. Political factors play a significant role in determining the composition of the cabinet in each administration. The amendment of the 1945 Constitution brought significant changes to Indonesia's system of government, including the process of ministerial appointments. Before the amendments, ministerial appointments in Indonesia were more influenced by a centralized government structure. However, after the amendments, presidential power became stronger with a clearer division of authority between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The presidential system applied grants the president the prerogative to appoint and dismiss ministers, whereas previously this was more controlled by parliament. This change marked an important shift in the dynamics of ministerial appointments, which became more based on political considerations and party coalitions.¹⁷

After the constitutional amendments, the president not only has the power to appoint ministers but also determines the cabinet composition based on existing political considerations. Political party coalitions became very important in the cabinet

¹⁴ Indonesia. Undang-Undang Nomor Pasal 20 ayat (1) UUD 1945. Lembaran Negara RI Tahun 2003 Nomor 47, Tambahan Lembaran RI Nomor 4286. Sekretariat Negara. Jakarta.

¹⁵ Indonesia. Undang-Undang Nomor Pasal 5 ayat (1) UUD 1945. Lembaran Negara RI Tahun 2009 Nomor 112, Tambahan Lembaran RI Nomor 5038. Sekretariat Negara. Jakarta.

¹⁶ Ridwan Ridwan, "The Existence and Urgency of Ministerial Regulations in the Administration of the Presidential System," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 18, no. 4 (2021): 828–845, <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1845>.

¹⁷ Thimoty Pradhitya Isaliani and Sunny Ummul Firdaus, "Konsep Koalisi Partai Politik dalam Sistem Presidensial Indonesia," *Res Publica: Jurnal Hukum Kebijakan Publik* 4, no. 2 (23 December 2020): 221–232, <https://doi.org/10.20961/respublica.v4i2.45773>.

formation process, especially following elections that produced a majority supporting the elected president. These coalitions decide who will occupy strategic government positions, including ministerial posts.¹⁸ With this system, ministerial appointments became more dynamic, often involving political bargaining among coalition parties to secure advantageous positions. This dynamic frequently influences government decisions regarding ministerial appointments or dismissals. Moreover, the dynamics of ministerial appointments post-amendment were influenced by changes in Indonesia's political party structure. More democratic elections provided space for new parties to grow, which also affected cabinet composition. In some periods, the president required representation from various coalition parties to form a solid cabinet. This created challenges for the president in selecting the right individuals for ministerial positions because not only qualifications and competencies were considered, but also alignment with the political interests of supporting parties. Cabinet formation thus became a process heavily dependent on political balance.

Another emerging dynamic after the amendment was the role of professionals in the cabinet. Previously, ministers were mostly politicians from parties supporting the government. Over time, there was a push to involve more professionals with expertise in certain fields to fill strategic cabinet positions. This aimed to improve government performance and bring broader perspectives into decision-making. Nonetheless, finding the balance between politicians and professionals in the cabinet remained a challenge.¹⁹ Changes in ministerial appointments also reflected efforts to create a more effective and efficient government. With the presidential system granting extensive authority to the president, the dynamics of cabinet formation often focused on achieving the government's vision and mission. The president tended to select individuals capable of helping realize these goals, both from political parties and professionals. However, this also generated political tension, especially when ministerial appointments involved compromises not fully accepted by all coalition

¹⁸ Syauiid Alamsyah and Nurdin, "Lembaga Representatif Publik: Relasi Kekuasaan dalam Perspektif Perbandingan Sistem Presidensial Vs Sistem Parlemen Studi Kasus Indonesia dengan Inggris," *Jurnal Adhikari* 2, no. 3 (29 January 2023): 392–405, <https://doi.org/10.53968/ja.v2i3.78>.

¹⁹ Lutfil Ansori, "Pembentukan Kabinet Koalisi dalam Sistem Presidensial Multi Partai di Indonesia," *Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum Pidana Dan Ketatanegaraan* 12, no. 2 (25 December 2023): 316–334, <https://doi.org/10.24252/ad.vi.42086>.

parties.²⁰ Consequently, some governments experienced instability, particularly when coalition parties disagreed on presidential political decisions.

External factors such as social, economic, and political conditions in Indonesia also influenced ministerial appointments. Each government period faced different challenges domestically and internationally that affected cabinet composition. For example, during economic crises or natural disasters, the president might appoint ministers with backgrounds in economics or disaster management to handle these issues. This demonstrates that ministerial appointments are not only about political considerations but must also adapt to the country's prevailing conditions. Thus, post-amendment ministerial appointments became increasingly flexible and dynamic.²¹ Ultimately, the dynamics of ministerial appointments after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution reflect Indonesia's increasingly complex political development. The selection process is influenced not only by political factors but also by the need to establish a more efficient and responsive government. In some cases, appointments also show attempts to create a more inclusive government by involving various stakeholders, both from political parties and professional circles. Despite this, ministerial appointments remain highly dynamic and often provoke tensions among coalition parties. As a result, ministerial appointments are a crucial part of the president's political strategy in governing.

Problems of the Presidential System in Indonesia

The presidential system in Indonesia has faced numerous challenges since its implementation after independence and its strengthening through the amendments of the 1945 Constitution. Although this system aims to provide governmental stability by clearly separating the powers of the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, in practice, there are still various obstacles that reduce its effectiveness. These challenges arise from a combination of institutional design, political dynamics, and

²⁰ Fawzi Ali Akbar Rasfanjani, Jumadi, and Tri Suhendra Arbani, "Problematika Sistem Presidential Threshold dalam Pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden dalam Perspektif Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia," *Alauddin Law Development Journal* 5, no. 1 (7 March 2023): 24–32, <https://doi.org/10.24252/aldev.v5i1.20297>.

²¹ Lidya Christina Wardhani, "Pengaruh Koalisi Partai Politik terhadap Pelaksanaan Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia," *Justitia Jurnal Hukum* 3, no. 2 (28 October 2019), <https://doi.org/10.30651/justitia.v3i2.3375>.

the evolving political culture in Indonesia.²² The presidential system in Indonesia faces many issues that affect the effectiveness of governance. One of the main problems is the imbalance between the executive and legislative powers, which often leads to political tension. In Indonesia's presidential system, the president is expected to manage the country with considerable authority, but is frequently hindered by political dynamics in the parliament. The ever-changing coalitions of political parties further worsen this situation, as the president must rely on support from parties that may not fully endorse his policies. This dependency causes government policies to become unstable and more vulnerable to political conflicts.

In addition, the Indonesian presidential system also struggles with coordination among state institutions. Although the president holds significant authority in implementing policies, decisions often do not run smoothly due to misalignments between the executive and legislative branches. Differences in views and political interests among institutions often hamper the effectiveness of policy implementation. This problem is exacerbated by frequent changes in cabinet members, which disrupt the continuity of government programs. For instance, in several administrations, there were significant policy shifts simply due to changes in ministers or shifts in coalition parties that control the cabinet.²³ The reliance on political coalitions also creates problems regarding governmental stability. In Indonesia's presidential system, coalition stability is crucial for policy implementation. However, due to the large number of political parties involved, differences in interests frequently cause rifts within the government. This not only undermines political stability but also reduces public confidence in the government's ability to make consistent decisions. When coalitions are fragile, the resulting policies tend to be ineffective and hard for the public to accept.²⁴

²² Muhammad Mukhtarrija, I. Gusti Ayu Ketut Rachmi Handayani, and Agus Riwanto, "Inefektifitas Pengaturan Presidential Threshold dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 2017 tentang Pemilihan Umum," *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum* 24, no. 4 (2017): 644–662, <https://doi.org/10.20885/Iustum.Vol24.Iss4.Art7>.

²³ Alex Cahyono et al., "Analisis Kritis Terhadap Penerapan Presidential Threshold Dalam Pemilihan Umum 2024: Perspektif Hukum Normatif Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Supremasi* 13, no. 2 (13 September 2023): 1–14, <https://doi.org/10.35457/Supremasi.V13i2.3041>.

²⁴ Dwi Astrianti Defretes and Kristoforus Laga Kleden, "Efektivitas Pemilihan Umum Serentak Tahun 2024," *JHP17: Jurnal Hasil Penelitian* 8, no. 2 (1 April 2025): 49–58, <https://jurnal.untagsby.ac.id/index.php/jhp17/article/view/9348>.

The presidential system also faces challenges in ensuring inclusive and representative governance. In many cases, presidential administrations in Indonesia tend to be dominated by major political parties, often neglecting the representation of minority groups in the decision-making process. This risks reducing political participation and overlooking the broader public interest. Moreover, the concentration of power in the hands of the president often creates an impression of authoritarianism, which can harm democratic principles.²⁵ Therefore, it is essential for Indonesia's presidential system to find a balance between executive power and the strengthening of the roles of the legislature and civil society. Another serious issue is the matter of transparency and accountability in government under the presidential system. Although the president plays a central role in policymaking, oversight mechanisms for the executive are often ineffective. This limited oversight creates room for corruption and abuse of power. Transparency in budget management and public policy is often hindered by a lack of openness in the decision-making process. To enhance accountability, there is a need to strengthen supervisory institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and other state agencies that can ensure government policies truly serve the public interest.²⁶

The presidential system also faces difficulties in maintaining consistency in policy implementation. Each elected president brings different political agendas and visions, which can affect the direction of national policies. When a new president is elected, there is often a significant shift in foreign and economic policy, causing uncertainty. This is clearly detrimental to the country, as policy consistency is crucial for effective governance. Therefore, efforts are needed to strengthen the political system so that leadership transitions do not result in major disruptions in governance. Problems in Indonesia's presidential system also relate to the issue of power distribution between the central and regional governments. In a centralized presidential system, the president holds significant authority, but decisions made often fail to reflect local

²⁵ Ilham Nugroho, "Implikasi Koalisi Partai Politik dalam Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia" (Thesis, Fakultas Hukum Universitas Jember, 2019), <https://Repository.Unej.Ac.Id/Xmlui/Handle/123456789/98440>.

²⁶ Rahmadani et al., "Inkompatibilitas Kewenangan Legislasi Lembaga Eksekutif dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensial Indonesia," *Jurnal Kompilasi Hukum* 9, no. 2 (13 December 2024): 133–143, <https://doi.org/10.29303/jkh.v9i2.180>.

needs. The division of power between the central and regional governments frequently becomes a source of tension, as regions feel inadequately considered in decisions that directly affect their lives. Hence, it is important to adopt a more decentralized system, where regional governments play a greater role in formulating policies relevant to local needs. This way, Indonesia's presidential system can function more effectively and be more responsive to the needs of people across the country.²⁷

Legislative Dominance over the Executive in Indonesia

One of the main challenges in Indonesia's presidential system is the strong role of the House of Representatives (DPR) in supervising and even restricting the authority of the executive. In the theory of a pure presidential system, the president has full authority in running the government without needing legislative approval for appointing high-ranking officials. However, in Indonesia, the president must obtain the DPR's approval to appoint key officials such as the Commander of the Armed Forces (TNI), the Chief of Police, ambassadors, and heads of state institutions.²⁸ This has led to executive policies often being hindered by political bargaining in the parliament. The president becomes increasingly dependent on political parties in the DPR to gain support for strategic decisions. As a result, there is a tendency for the president to accommodate party interests in the political process, including in cabinet formation and the making of national policies. Legislative dominance over the executive is one of the central problems in Indonesia's system of governance. In a presidential system, the executive is supposed to have greater authority in administering government. However, in practice, the influence of the legislature on the executive often leads to interference in decision-making. This is evident in the legislative process, where laws are sometimes driven more by legislators' political interests than by executive considerations centered on development programs.²⁹

²⁷ Ni Wayan Mahatmi Arya Udayani, Nurianto Rahmat Soepadmo, and Ida Bagus Anggapurana Pidada, "Pengaturan Penerapan Sistem Dwi Partai dan Multi Partai Pada Calon Pasangan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden," *Ethics and Law Journal: Business and Notary* 2, no. 2 (13 June 2024): 126–147, <https://doi.org/10.61292/eljbn.186>.

²⁸ Celine Endang Patricia Sitanggang, "Mekanisme Presidential Threshold dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensial di Indonesia," *Proceeding Legal Symposium* 2, no. 1 (9 February 2024): 30–50, <https://doi.org/10.18196/pls.v2i1.119>.

²⁹ Efendi Ibnu Susilo, "Problematisasi Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah Secara Langsung atau Tidak Langsung dalam Perspektif Demokrasi," *UIR Law Review* 8, no. 2 (13 December 2024): 11–22, [https://doi.org/10.25299/uirlrev.2024.vol8\(2\).19473](https://doi.org/10.25299/uirlrev.2024.vol8(2).19473).

Consequently, the resulting policies often fail to reflect the real needs of the government and are more influenced by political agendas in the DPR.

Moreover, legislative dominance is also evident in the oversight role of the DPR over government policy. While such oversight is important for ensuring accountability and transparency, it often becomes more of a political arena than an effective control mechanism. Strong legislative intervention in executive decisions can result in stagnation and inefficiency. In several cases, legislative dominance has delayed planned government reforms, further worsening the dynamic between these two branches of power.³⁰ This dominance also reflects a weakness in the system of checks and balances. Ideally, a balance between the legislature and executive should prevent power concentration in one branch. However, in practice, the legislature often exerts greater influence in determining the direction of state policy. A clear example of this dominance is seen in the appointment of ministers, which is sometimes influenced by political coalitions in the DPR. This can lead to a cabinet shaped more by political interests than by professionalism. In a properly functioning presidential system, the president should have full authority to lead the cabinet and determine policy direction. However, due to pressure from the legislature, the president is often forced to adjust government policies to gain legislative support. This leads to a dependency on political parties that hold a majority in the legislature. As a result, it becomes more difficult for the government to implement planned programs because it must accommodate certain political interests.³¹

As an impact, this dominant political dynamic hampers reform efforts and the effectiveness of public policy. The government is often caught in political compromises that prioritize the short-term interests of parties in the legislature over long-term national solutions. Under such circumstances, public trust in the government can decline, as the resulting policies may not reflect what the public actually needs. Thus,

³⁰ Slamet Lukman Hakim, “Implikasi Pemilihan Umum Serentak terhadap Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 55/PUU-XVII/2019” (Thesis, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2023), <https://digilib.uin-suka.ac.id/id/eprint/61579/>.

³¹ Sherlock H. Lekipiouw and Andress D. Bakarbesy, “Problematisasi Tergeneralisirnya Saniri Negeri Menjadi Badan Permusyawaratan Desa,” *Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia* 5, no. 2 (31 May 2023): 265–284, <https://doi.org/10.14710/jphi.v5i2.265-284>.

even though the presidential system is expected to bring decisiveness to governance, legislative dominance often obstructs this goal. In this context, efforts are needed to restore the balance between the executive and legislative branches. One approach would be to strengthen the executive's function so it can operate without being overly hindered by legislative political interests. In doing so, a healthier relationship between the two branches can emerge, which would ultimately benefit the effectiveness of Indonesia's governance. The government must also strengthen its capacity to withstand political pressure in order to focus on national interests.³²

The Weakness of Ideal Separation of Powers

In an ideal presidential system, there should be a clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branches. However, in practice, Indonesia's relationship between these two branches of government is far from separate and instead characterized by close interaction. This situation arises because political parties that control the House of Representatives (DPR) often have significant interests in government. As a result, even though the president legally holds broad authority, there remains political pressure from the DPR that can hinder effective governance. This issue is further complicated by the practice of "power-sharing" in forming governing coalitions, which is often driven more by political interests than by administrative efficiency. An ideal separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a healthy democratic system, including in Indonesia. However, in practice, the separation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches remains weak. This is evident in the frequent interventions among branches of power, where the legislature often interferes with decisions made by the executive.³³ Moreover, the strong influence of political parties within the legislature also affects government policies that should be made independently. This condition further deteriorates the quality of decision-making at the governmental level.

³² Muh Cendekiawan Ainul Haq, Mohamad Rifan, and Resa Yuniarsa Hasan, "Dinamisasi Kabinet dan Upaya Konsistensi Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia," *Jurnal Hukum dan Kenotariatan* 5, no. 2 (27 May 2021): 327–352, <https://doi.org/10.33474/hukeno.v5i2.10756>.

³³ Gunawan Ryan, "Koalisi Partai Politik dan Presidential Threshold di Indonesia Pada Pemilu 2009–2019" (Diploma, UIN Raden Intan Lampung, 2024), <https://repository.radenintan.ac.id/34797/>.

One example of the weakness in separation of powers is the imbalance in the relationship between the president and the DPR. As the head of the executive branch, the president should have full authority to make policy decisions without legislative interference. However, in reality, the DPR often exercises considerable power to influence government performance, particularly through the use of inquiry rights (*hak angket*) and interpellation rights (*hak interpelasi*). Such interventions tend to result in policies shaped more by party interests than by national needs.³⁴ In addition, the weakness of separation of powers is also reflected in the relationship between the executive and the judiciary. Ideally, the judiciary should be free from political influence. In practice, however, political pressures often affect court rulings. This undermines the judiciary's ability to function as a check on the powers of the executive and legislative branches. For instance, court decisions involving high-ranking state officials are often susceptible to politicization.³⁵ Weak separation of powers also affects the law-making process in Indonesia. In an ideal system, the legislative branch holds the authority to make laws, with clear oversight from the executive and judiciary. However, the strong influence of political parties in the DPR often disrupts this process, resulting in legislation that serves short-term political interests rather than the public good. This leads to an ineffective legislative process that fails to meet the needs of the people.

In practice, overlapping powers among these institutions often create disorder in governance. For example, when the government issues a controversial policy, the DPR may pressure it to revise the policy in favor of certain political parties. Yet, executive decisions should be based on careful consideration of national interests, not on short-term political gains. As a result, decision-making at the governmental level becomes slow and inefficient.³⁶ To address this issue, steps must be taken to reinforce a clear

³⁴ Ahmad Bustomi Kamil, "Relavansi Pemilihan Umum Serentak Presiden dengan Legislatif terhadap Penguatan Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia (Analisis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Nomor 14/PUU-XI/2013)," 15 October 2015, <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/30097>.

³⁵ Hayat Hayat, "Korelasi Pemilu Serentak dengan Multi Partai Sederhana sebagai Penguatan Sistem Presidensial," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 11, no. 3 (2014): 468–491, <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1134>.

³⁶ Herlan Purnomo Syamsi, "Implikasi Keterlibatan Presiden dalam Pembentukan Undang-Undang terhadap Penguatan Presidensial di Indonesia" (Bachelor Thesis, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 2024), <https://doi.org/10/lampiran.pdf>.

separation of powers among the three branches of government. One such step is to clearly define the boundaries of authority between the executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. This would allow each branch to function optimally without interference or political pressure from the others, ultimately enhancing the quality of governance and the public policies produced.

The Absence of an Objective and Effective Impeachment Mechanism

The impeachment mechanism for the President in Indonesia has undergone changes following the amendments to the 1945 Constitution. Currently, the impeachment process must go through the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) to determine whether the President has committed a legal violation. Although this is a step forward in preventing arbitrary impeachment, the mechanism remains vulnerable to politicization.³⁷ In practice, impeachment may be used as a political tool by opposition parties or interest groups to weaken the President's position, especially if the President loses majority support in parliament and becomes more susceptible to political pressure.³⁸

Impeachment is an important feature of a presidential system, functioning as a tool to monitor and control the executive branch, particularly the President. However, in Indonesia, the impeachment mechanism does not operate objectively and effectively. One key factor contributing to this issue is the lack of clarity in the regulations governing impeachment. In reality, the process is often hindered by strong political interests, making it neither fair nor transparent. For instance, although the 1945 Constitution states that the President can be removed through impeachment, there is no detailed procedure that outlines how the process should be conducted. The House of Representatives (DPR) has the authority to propose impeachment, but no transparent process ensures that such actions are based on legitimate and objective grounds. As a result, impeachment proceedings are frequently influenced more by

³⁷ Ratnia Solihah, "Peluang dan Tantangan Pemilu Serentak 2019 dalam Perspektif Politik," *JHIP: Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pemerintahan* 3, no. 1 (9 October 2018): 73–88, <https://doi.org/10.14710/jiip.v3i1.3234>.

³⁸ Diana Fawzia et al., *Sistem Presidensial Indonesia Dari Soekarno Ke Jokowi* (Edisi Revisi) (Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2018).

political considerations than by objective legal and constitutional grounds, rendering impeachment ineffective as a presidential oversight mechanism.³⁹

Furthermore, the weakness of the impeachment system is also due to a lack of openness in Indonesia's political system. In many cases, the initiation of impeachment is more driven by political conflict between the President and the DPR, making it difficult to determine whether accusations against the President are genuinely well-founded. This lack of objectivity in the impeachment process creates legal uncertainty and diminishes its effectiveness in ensuring government accountability. Consequently, public trust in legal institutions that are supposed to uphold justice is undermined.⁴⁰ An ineffective impeachment process also contributes to political instability in Indonesia. During times of crisis or controversy, impeachment is often used as a political tool to overthrow the ruling government. This increases political tension, ultimately worsening the performance of government and hindering efforts to resolve existing problems.⁴¹ On the other hand, a transparent and objective impeachment process would promote political stability and strengthen the checks and balances within the government.

To improve the impeachment mechanism in Indonesia, it is necessary to revise existing regulations to make them clearer and free from political interference. One step that can be taken is to establish more detailed and transparent procedures for filing an impeachment against the President. In addition, DPR members proposing impeachment should be required to present clear and valid evidence to support their claims. This would enable impeachment to function as an effective and objective oversight tool, safeguarding presidential accountability.⁴² It is essential for Indonesia to have an impeachment mechanism that is based not only on political considerations

³⁹ Komarrudin, "Penguatan Sistem Presidensial dalam Pemerintahan yang Multi Partai di Indonesia Guna Mewujudkan Pemerintahan yang Demokratis," 12 October 2018, <https://dspace.uin.ac.id/handle/123456789/11685>.

⁴⁰ Matheus Bobby Adhie Nugroho and Asmak Ul Hosnah, "Problematisasi Oligarki dalam Partai Politik yang Memicu Lahirnya Tindak Pidana Korupsi," *Palar (Pakuan Law Review)* 10, no. 2 (27 April 2024): 31–42, <https://doi.org/10.33751/palar.v10i2.9978>.

⁴¹ Annisa Kencana Ningrum, "Penguatan Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia Melalui Aturan Presidential Threshold dalam Undang-Undang No. 7 Tahun 2017" (Bachelor thesis, Fakultas Syariah dan Hukum UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2023), <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/73047>.

⁴² Garuda Era Ruhpinesthi and Mochamad Adli Wafi, "Post-Legislative Scrutiny sebagai Fungsi Pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: Pengaturan, Praktik, dan Problematisasi," *Jurnal Rechts Vinding: Media Pembinaan Hukum Nasional* 13, no. 3 (30 December 2024): 461–487, <https://doi.org/10.33331/rechtsvinding.v13i3.1925>.

but also on strong legal principles. This would enhance public trust in the governmental system and ensure that national leaders can be held accountable if they commit serious legal violations. Therefore, efforts must be made to ensure that the impeachment mechanism is implemented fairly and in accordance with sound democratic principles.

Dualism of Legitimacy between the President and the DPR

Because both the President and the DPR are directly elected by the people, a dualism of legitimacy often occurs, which can lead to political deadlock. In situations where the President does not have majority support in the DPR, government policies frequently face serious obstacles in the legislative and budgeting processes.⁴³ For example, in a parliamentary system, the party holding the majority can easily implement government policies. However, in Indonesia's presidential system, when opposition parties control the DPR, an imbalance occurs that causes executive policies to be hindered or even rejected by the legislature. The dualism of legitimacy between the President and the DPR is a major problem in Indonesia's system of government. The President is directly elected by the people through general elections, while DPR members are also elected by the people, but through a regional representation system. These two institutions, which should support each other in running the government, often find themselves in opposing positions. Each institution holds a mandate from the people, causing them to feel they have the legitimate authority to govern independently.⁴⁴

The main issue in this dualism of legitimacy is the tension that frequently arises between the President and the DPR. In many cases, the President and the DPR come from different political parties, resulting in differing views and policies. When the President has policies that conflict with the DPR's wishes, legitimacy issues arise. The DPR feels entitled to oppose the President's policies, while the President believes the

⁴³ Anfal Kurniawan, "A Critical Legal Studies Paradigm of The Presidential Threshold Electoral System In Indonesia: Paradigma Critical Legal Studies tentang Sistem Pemilu Presidential Threshold di Indonesia," *Constitutional Law Society* 3, no. 2 (30 September 2024): 185–194, <https://doi.org/10.36448/cls.v3i2.88>.

⁴⁴ Ahmad Bustomi Kamil, "Relevansi Pemilihan Umum Serentak Presiden dengan Legislatif Terhadap Penguatan Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia," *Staatsrecht: Indonesian Constitutional Law Journal* 1, no. 2 (30 January 2017), <https://doi.org/10.15408/siclj.v1i2.4577>.

policies have been approved by the people through direct elections. This creates conflict that leads to political instability. This dualism of legitimacy also affects the effectiveness of governance. When the President and the DPR cannot work together harmoniously, the resulting policies become more difficult to implement. Decision-making processes slow down because each institution has different perspectives. The inability to reach consensus causes policies to be less effective and have less impact on society.⁴⁵ Moreover, conflicts between the President and the DPR often worsen political relations that should be cooperative. The tension between the President and the DPR caused by dualism of legitimacy also undermines the system of checks and balances in government. As an oversight institution, the DPR should ensure that executive policies serve the interests of the people. However, when disputes arise between these two institutions, executive oversight becomes biased and more driven by political interests. In other words, the existing checks and balances are used for mutual attacks rather than for improving governance.

To address this problem, it is important for both institutions to prioritize dialogue and cooperation. One way to do this is to build better consensus between the President and the DPR, so that the policies produced more accurately reflect the interests of the people. Additionally, the existing representation system needs improvement to create a better balance between the two institutions. This approach is expected to prevent the dualism of legitimacy from becoming a source of harmful conflict in governance.⁴⁶ By strengthening the relationship between the President and the DPR, Indonesia can reduce political tension and create a more stable government. This is crucial to allow decision-making processes to run more efficiently and for policies to be implemented more quickly. On the other hand, political parties must prioritize national interests over group interests, so that Indonesia's government can function better and more effectively.

Weakness of Government Effectiveness Due to Political Fragmentation

⁴⁵ Grimaldi Anugrah Putranto, "Problematisa Pengaturan Keanggotaan Dewan Perwakilan Daerah dari Kader dan Pengurus Partai Politik," 15 May 2018, <https://dspace.uui.ac.id/handle/123456789/8397>.

⁴⁶ Amraini Ma'ruf, "Problematisa Penambahan Kewenangan Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Republik Indonesia Mengawasi Produk Hukum Daerah," 17 February 2022, <https://dspace.uui.ac.id/handle/123456789/38042>.

Indonesia's multi-party system within the context of presidentialism often causes fragmentation of power in the parliament. This forces the President to build large coalitions to obtain sufficient political support to run the government. However, these coalitions are often pragmatic and not based on shared ideology or government vision. As a result, government coalitions tend to be vulnerable to splits when there are conflicting interests among the political parties involved. Political fragmentation is one of the problems that can hinder government effectiveness in Indonesia. When the political system is fragmented, many competing party interests make it difficult to create policies that are acceptable to all parties. In a multi-party system like Indonesia's, political fragmentation is very likely because no single party has enough dominance to run the government independently. Therefore, fragile and unstable political coalitions often form.

Political fragmentation causes difficulties in reaching consensus during decision-making processes. Each political party has different views and interests, often making the legislative process longer and less efficient. The inability to reach agreement among parties results in suboptimal policies that cannot be implemented quickly. Consequently, many national problems, such as poverty, social inequality, and unemployment, become increasingly difficult to solve.⁴⁷ Political fragmentation also makes it difficult for the government to implement development programs. Without solid political support from the DPR, government policies are frequently obstructed by competition among parties. This causes strategic programs that should support national progress to fail in implementation. The government becomes focused on political negotiations between parties rather than on solving more urgent issues for the people. Moreover, political fragmentation often creates uncertainty in governance. When different political parties compete for influence, the political situation becomes unstable. This uncertainty affects investment decisions and economic development, both of which require political stability. A country without stable government will struggle to attract investment and create a conducive business climate.

⁴⁷ M. Syahdega Pitra, "Problematika Pembentukan Undang-Undang di Indonesia (Studi Gagasan Hak Veto oleh Presiden dalam Pembentukan Undang-Undang)," 16 October 2018, <https://dspace.uui.ac.id/handle/123456789/11839>.

To address the issue of political fragmentation, efforts should be made to strengthen more solid coalitions among existing political parties. One way is to create a political system that accommodates diversity of opinion while prioritizing national interests. The government also needs to improve communication and coordination with the DPR to ensure that policies adopted truly benefit the people.⁴⁸ Through these measures, government effectiveness can be improved and the country can develop more rapidly. It is important for Indonesia to reduce political fragmentation so that the government can focus more on policies that solve urgent social and economic problems. Efforts to create stronger and more stable coalitions will positively impact the functioning of government and national development. Leadership capable of controlling this fragmentation and keeping the interests of the people as the main priority is essential.

Implications of Redesigning the Presidential Institution on Government Effectiveness

The redesign of the presidential institution aims to strengthen the presidential system in Indonesia to become more effective and efficient. The reform is carried out by reorganizing the institutional structure and the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The government is expected to become more stable without being caught in excessive political power struggles. Consequently, policies can be more focused and oriented toward national interests. This redesign is a strategic step to improve government effectiveness. One of the main aspects of redesigning the presidential institution is to strengthen the President's authority in making strategic decisions. Reducing the President's dependence on the approval of the House of Representatives (DPR) in appointing high-ranking state officials is an important step. With this policy, the executive can work more effectively without unnecessary political pressure. Simplifying the legislative process is also necessary to accelerate

⁴⁸ Rudi Achsoni, "Menggagas Titik Ekuilibrium Sistem Pemilihan dengan Sistem Pemerintahan," *De Jure Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Hukum* 1, no. 2 (23 July 2020): 116–130, <https://doi.org/10.33387/dejure.v1i2.1934>.

policy-making. The redesign aims to create a government that is more responsive to national challenges.⁴⁹

Currently, the role of the DPR in lawmaking is still very dominant, while the President only has the right to propose bills. Institutional redesign can provide more space for the executive in the legislative process. One mechanism that can be implemented is fast-track legislation for national priority policies. With this mechanism, important policies can be implemented immediately without excessive bureaucratic obstacles. This effort is expected to accelerate the development process and policy reforms in the country. Increasing political and governmental stability is also a primary goal of this redesign. Clarifying the limits of authority between the executive and legislative branches is an important step to prevent government instability. By reducing the President's dependence on weak political coalitions, the government can run more solidly. A stable government will facilitate the implementation of policies without unnecessary political obstacles. Therefore, improvements in the political coalition system are an inseparable part of this redesign.

Political coalitions need to be designed to be more program-based, not merely power-sharing. The redesign of the presidential system must include strict rules regarding the commitment of political parties to support the government. This way, the risk of fragile and unstable coalitions can be reduced. A program-based government will be more focused on carrying out the national development agenda. This change is expected to create stronger and more sustainable political stability.

Furthermore, institutional redesign must still ensure the existence of effective mechanisms for overseeing the President. Oversight can be conducted through the DPR and other independent institutions. Transparency in decision-making and budget use must be improved to maintain public trust. With proper oversight mechanisms, the abuse of power can be minimized. A transparent government will be more trusted by the public and other stakeholders. The impeachment mechanism

⁴⁹ Adif Rachmat Nugraha, "Memperkuat Presidensialisme: Redesain Lembaga Kepresidenan Republik Indonesia Berdasarkan Kerangka Center of Government," *Konferensi Nasional Ilmu Administrasi* 8, no. 1 (12 September 2024): 439–448.

against the President must be designed to be more objective and based on strong legal grounds. The Constitutional Court should have the primary role in assessing legal violations committed by the President. Before the DPR submits an impeachment motion, there must be clear legal grounds and strong evidence. With a more professional mechanism, impeachment will not be easily misused for certain political interests. The process must be conducted fairly and transparently according to the principles of the rule of law. Finally, the structure of the presidential institution also needs to be simplified to become more efficient. Optimizing the roles of the Vice President, ministers, and other presidential institutions is crucial. This simplification aims to improve government effectiveness and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy. With a more efficient structure, coordination among institutions can run better. This institutional redesign is expected to strengthen the presidential system and improve the quality of governance in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion regarding the presidential system in Indonesia shows that the main challenge is the instability in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, often caused by political fragmentation and party strength in parliament. This imbalance creates obstacles for the president in effectively implementing policies and government programs. Additionally, ambiguity in the constitutional mechanisms governing the authority of state institutions can lead to conflicts and reduce the executive's independence in decision-making. Therefore, structured institutional reforms are necessary to clarify the roles and authorities of each institution and restore balance between the executive and legislative branches.

Furthermore, redesigning the presidential institution is crucial to improving government effectiveness. By clarifying the president's authority and reducing dependence on the legislature, it is expected that the government can carry out its programs more responsively and efficiently. Simplifying the presidential institution's structure, including optimizing the roles of the vice president and ministries, is also an important step to strengthen coordination among institutions. With these reform

measures, Indonesia's presidential system is expected to achieve better stability and realize quality governance for the nation.

COMPETING INTEREST

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest in the publication of this article.

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