

Indonesia's Diplomacy Jihad for Palestine at the United Nations Post-October 2023: A Critical Examination

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Abstract

Historical ties between Indonesia and Palestine underpin Indonesia's steadfast commitment to supporting Palestine's right to independence. The Al-Aqsa Flood incident on October 7, 2023, followed by Israel's massive invasion of Palestine, escalated the conflict in Palestine exponentially. This conflict has drawn the attention of the world, including Indonesia, to drastically intensify its diplomacy in supporting Palestine's independence. Indonesia has undertaken a "Diplomacy Jihad" by actively defending Palestinian rights through various United Nations forums such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and others. This normative-empirical research critically evaluates the effectiveness of Indonesia's diplomatic efforts and the obstacles it faces in advocating for Palestinian independence within the UN framework post-October 7, 2023. Our hypothesis is that Indonesia's diplomacy at the UN generally represents an effective form of advocacy in this "Diplomacy Jihad," although critical challenges hinder the potential for an even stronger performance, a trend that is worsening in 2026.

Keywords: *Diplomacy, Palestine, Indonesia.*



INTRODUCTION

The historical ties between Indonesia and Palestine¹ have given rise to Indonesia's consistent efforts to advocate for Palestine's independence and humanitarian dignity. The Indonesian people have not forgotten that the recognition of Indonesia's independence began with Arab nations, initiated by the Grand Mufti of Palestine. Various concrete measures have been implemented to support Palestine, including humanitarian aid, education, and political support in international forums. This study examines Indonesia's concrete actions in support of Palestine, highlighting Indonesia's tangible efforts in international forums and the obstacles hindering those efforts. The study analyzes both the substantive measures undertaken by Indonesia and the various barriers that have emerged in these diplomatic initiatives, with particular attention paid to the challenges faced following the October 2023 conflict.

The October 2023 conflict resulted in significant casualties and a humanitarian crisis, drawing extensive international attention. Consequently, nations worldwide, including Indonesia, have condemned and denounced Israel's actions. The conflict between Hamas and Israel had led to a total of 67,200 Palestinian casualties from successive Israeli attacks as of October 8, 2025.²

This study examines "Diplomacy Jihad," a term the authors have coined to describe the subject. The term "jihad" originates from Islamic international relations and law (*siyar*), where *fuqaha* traditionally define it as physical warfare conducted by Muslims following the Sharia. However, linguistically (*lughawi*), the term "jihad" carries a broader meaning, referring to any effort or endeavor to the fullest extent.³ Meanwhile, the term "diplomacy," aside from the discourse in how to define it,⁴ refers to "The mechanism of representation, communication, and negotiation used by states and

¹ Sayyid Muhammad Amin Al-Husaini, in his speech on German radio: Muhammad Zein Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia Di Luar Negeri: (Perjuangan Pemuda/Mahasiswa Indonesia Di Timur Tengah)*, 1 (Bulan Bintang, 1980)40.

² Betül Yılmaz, "Gaza Death Toll Approaches 67,200 as Israel Continues Genocidal War on Palestinians," Anadolu Ajansı, Anadolu Agency (AA), October 8, 2025, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/gaza-death-toll-approaches-67-200-as-israel-continues-genocidal-war-on-palestinians/3711296>.

³ Muḥammad ibn Mukarram ibn `Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān Al-`Arab*, vol. I (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1993), p. 212.

⁴ Dan Hart and Asaf Siniver, "The Meaning of Diplomacy," *International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice* 26, no. 2 (2021): 159–83, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10003>;

other international actors in conducting their affairs.”⁵ Thus, the authors define Diplomacy Jihad as the strenuous efforts undertaken by Indonesia through diplomatic channels to achieve specific objectives.

More specifically, Indonesia's Diplomacy Jihad examined in this study pertains to its efforts to advocate for Palestinian independence, particularly within United Nations forums, including, but not limited to, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Additionally, this study evaluates the obstacles to Indonesia's "Diplomacy Jihad." The research addresses gaps in the existing literature concerning the genocide in Palestine. The analysis assesses the effectiveness of Indonesia's efforts and the extent to which they contribute to amplifying Palestinian rights on the international stage.

As of 2026, Google Scholar indicates that there is around seventy thousand scholarly publications on Indonesia's role in the struggle for Palestinian independence. Some focus on Indonesia's diplomacy in general,⁶ while others are limited to specific governmental regimes⁷ or events,⁸ among other perspectives. However, the *Tawfan al-Aqsa* military operation on October 7, 2023, followed by Israel's ruthless military invasion, has brought significant changes to the international political and diplomatic landscape. For instance, although Israel continues to carry out extraordinary levels of destruction, its previously strong international support has now significantly eroded.⁹ This shift has also drastically intensified the diplomatic processes concerning Palestine in international forums.

⁵ Jan Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (Macmillan Press, 1999) xxii.

⁶ For example: Muh Prasetya and Aulia Srifauzi, "Diplomasi Politik Indonesia Terhadap Kemerdekaan Palestina," *Jurnal PIR: Power in International Relations* (Medan, Indonesia) 2 (December 2018): 179, <https://doi.org/10.22303/pir.2.2.2018.179-193>; Syarif Bahaudin Mudore, "Peran Diplomasi Indonesia dalam Konflik Israel-Palestina," *Center of Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) Journal* 12, no. 2 (2019): 170–81, <https://doi.org/10.20961/cmcs.12.2.37891>.

⁷ Hendra Maujana Saragih, "Kebijakan luar Negeri Indonesia dalam Mendukung Palestina sebagai Negara Merdeka pada Masa Pemerintahan Jokowi," *Fokus Jurnal Kajian Keislaman dan Kemasyarakatan* 3 (February 2019): 133, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jf.v3i2.601>; Masyrofah, "Kebijakan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia (studi Diplomasi Pemerintahan Era Reformasi 1998-2018 dalam Upaya Penyelesaian Konflik Israel-Palestina)" (Doctoral Thesis, 2019).

⁸ Rezki Satris, "Peranan Politik luar Negeri Indonesia terhadap Palestina Pasca Pengakuan Jerusalem sebagai Ibu Kota Israel," *Politea: Jurnal Politik Islam* 2, no. 2 (2019): 161, <https://doi.org/10.21043/politea.v2i2.5884>.

⁹ Kham, "Israeli Delegation Face Massive Walk Out During Speech to Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly," Jerusalem Post, JPost.com, Hanoi, Vietnam, October 14, 2024, <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-news/article-824586>; Damien Cave, "Isolated and Defiant, Israel Vows to 'Stand Alone' in War on Hamas," World, *The New York Times*, May 11, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/11/world/middleeast/isolated-Israel-war-hamas.html>.

Given the drastic changes mentioned above, it is only fitting that political and international relations studies on Palestine post-October 7, 2023, take a new approach. By 2024, several other studies will have already addressed Indonesia's role in Palestinian diplomacy, considering the significant shifts in the diplomatic stage following *Tawfan al-Aqsa*. Some focus specifically on Indonesia's role,¹⁰ while others analyze it within the broader diplomatic efforts of Islamic countries.¹¹ However, none of these studies has yet to provide a focused, comprehensive examination of Indonesia's role in the United Nations, the primary subject of this research.

METHODOLOGY

This study employs a normative-empirical approach. The normative approach examines international law doctrines, provisions of the UN Charter, articles of the ICJ Statute, human rights instruments, and diplomatic practices relevant to Indonesia's advocacy for Palestine. This includes analysis of written and oral statements at the ICJ, resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, and Indonesia's positions within the UN framework.

The empirical approach seeks to capture how Indonesia's Diplomacy Jihad is implemented in practice at the UN. Data collection was carried out through an in-depth interview with Jhendra Ageng Samodra, an Indonesian diplomat serving as the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN in Geneva. We primarily inquired about Indonesia's foreign policy and how it translated into its diplomatic efforts and practices at the UN, generally, and on the Palestine issue specifically, through the lens of his experience as a diplomat at the forefront.

Several limitations should be acknowledged. Our empirical analysis relies heavily on a diplomat who is part of the mission spearheading Indonesia's diplomacy at the UN in Geneva, with firsthand experience. However, we did not conduct interviews with

¹⁰ Ibnu Asakir and Hikmat Zakky Almubaroq, "The Indonesian Defense Management Concept in Resolving the Israel-Palestine Conflict," *International Journal of Humanities Education and Social Sciences (IJHESS)* 3, no. 6 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.55227/ijhess.v3i6.1111>.

¹¹ Rudi Candra and Sofi Mubarak, "Islamic Diplomacy and the Palestinian Quest for Peace and Independence: An Analytical Perspective," *Mediasi Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 1 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.21111/mediasi.v7i1.12543>.

other important actors: the (central) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesian Permanent Representative for the UN in Washington. Additionally, access to confidential negotiation records and closed-door UN deliberations was also restricted, necessitating reliance on publicly available documents and media reports.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Indonesia's Diplomacy Efforts at United Nations Forums

In the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas conflict on October 7, 2023, Indonesia has undertaken various diplomatic initiatives and actively participated in peace efforts between Israel and Palestine. Indonesia has focused its Diplomacy Jihad on addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Indonesian diplomacy has been conducted through communication and interaction at United Nations forums, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as well as with member states of the United Nations Security Council.

a. International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Indonesia has undertaken two forms of Diplomacy Jihad at the International Court of Justice (ICJ): a written statement and an oral statement. The written statement, submitted by Indonesia in 2023, asserted that Israeli policies—such as annexation and occupation of Palestinian territories, alteration of Palestinian demographic composition, changes to the status of Jerusalem, and discrimination against the Palestinian people—constitute violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.¹² This input served as the basis for Indonesia's written arguments in the ICJ's advisory opinion process,

¹² Republic of Indonesia, *Written Statement of the Republic of Indonesia on the Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem* (2023).

emphasizing that Israel must annul all regulations and laws that contravene international law.¹³

Subsequently, on February 23, 2024, Indonesia delivered an oral statement at the ICJ, reaffirming the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.¹⁴ In its statement, Indonesia condemned Israel for its occupation of Palestinian territories, denounced Israel's illegal settlements, demanded an end to the Israeli occupation, called for the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and accused Israel of implementing apartheid policies.¹⁵ Indonesia emphasized the importance of international law as the foundation for efforts to address the humanitarian crisis faced by the Palestinian people.

b. United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)

During Indonesia's membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council for the 2024–2026 term, Indonesia has prioritized issues concerning discrimination against the Palestinian people. The Indonesian Foreign Minister carried out Diplomacy Jihad through the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council to advocate for justice for the Palestinian people. Indonesia also highlighted the double standards in the enforcement of Human Rights globally and the violations occurring in Gaza.¹⁶ The Foreign Minister of Indonesia proposed three recommendations to the UN Human Rights Council: strengthening human rights enforcement, resolving humanitarian issues, and eliminating discrimination in the global enforcement of Human Rights.¹⁷ Additionally, Indonesia's Foreign Minister called for countries worldwide to commit to upholding human rights without discrimination.¹⁸

¹³ Ferinda K. Fachri, "Kemlu Minta Masukan Pakar Hukum Internasional untuk Bela Palestina di ICJ," *hukumonline.com*, January 16, 2024, <https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/kemlu-minta-masukan-pakar-hukum-internasional-untuk-bela-palestina-di-icj-lt65a63e2adddea/>.

¹⁴ Retno Marsudi, *Speech at the International Court of Justice* (2024).

¹⁵ Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem (International Court of Justice 2024).

¹⁶ Yashinta Difa Pramudyani, "Retno: Dewan HAM PBB Harus Tangani Pelanggaran Israel Atas Palestina," *Antara News*, February 27, 2024, <https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/3984213/retno-dewan-ham-pbb-harus-tangani-pelanggaran-israel-atas-palestina>.

¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Menlu RI Perjuangkan Hak Rakyat Palestina*.

¹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Menlu RI Perjuangkan Hak Rakyat Palestina*.

c. International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

Indonesia also carried out Diplomacy Jihad at the ITU Council Forum in June 2024 to rebuild telecommunications infrastructure in Palestine, particularly in the Gaza Strip.¹⁹ In this forum, Indonesia played a significant role as the leader and frontrunner in negotiations to develop telecommunications infrastructure in the Palestinian territories.²⁰ Previously, ITU's support was limited to providing internet connectivity to 76 schools in the West Bank through the ITU-UNICEF Giga Accelerate program.²¹

The ITU also provided specialized technical assistance, including developing a national strategy for transitioning to IPv6 and forming a national IPv6 task force in Palestine. Additionally, the ITU supported drafting a National Emergency Telecommunications Plan, facilitated the establishment of a Palestinian Computer Incident Response Team, and allocated radio frequencies for modern telecommunications networks. This resolution resulted from prolonged efforts by the sponsoring nations, including Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Algeria, and Palestine, over approximately two weeks of negotiations in Geneva.²²

However, the negotiations faced challenges from several countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Argentina, which opposed the resolutions. These countries argued that the resolution was too heavily pressing on a political issue (i.e., Israel-Palestine conflict), which is supposedly beyond the ITU's mandate of being a technical organization. Despite this, Indonesia successfully advocated for the development of telecommunications infrastructure and supported the activation of 4G and 5G services in Gaza, fulfilling the Palestinian people's right

¹⁹ Jhendra Ageng Samodra, "Developing Telecommunications Infrastructure in Palestinian Territories," September 21, 2024, Personal Communication.

²⁰ Samodra, "Developing Telecommunications Infrastructure in Palestinian Territories."

²¹ International Telecommunication Union, *Assistance and Support to Palestine for Rebuilding Their Telecommunication Sector* (Resolution, June 13, 2024).

²² Samodra, "Developing Telecommunications Infrastructure."

to communication.²³ Consequently, the resolution was adopted, generating political impact by demonstrating solidarity with Palestine against Israel's invasion. Furthermore, it had significant technical implications, including the development of telecommunications networks in Palestine, coordinated and supported by the ITU.²⁴

d. United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

In addition to diplomatic efforts within UN forums, Indonesia engaged in shuttle diplomacy by visiting member states of the UN Security Council. Shuttle diplomacy involves the negotiator traveling between disputing parties to facilitate communication and achieve solutions, particularly when direct communication between them is not feasible.²⁵ The effectiveness of shuttle diplomacy can be observed from the diplomacy conducted by Henry Kissinger in the Middle East.²⁶ His approach was grounded in a cautious, realistic, incremental strategy.²⁷ Moreover, its primary objective was to establish order rather than immediately achieve peace.²⁸ Kissinger recognized that comprehensive and enduring peace is often unattainable in the short term, especially in complex regions like the Middle East.²⁹ Consequently, he focused on maintaining a balance of power in the region as a preliminary step toward building a more stable order.³⁰

Indonesia conducted shuttle diplomacy aimed at ending the violence in Gaza, securing a ceasefire, and halting the war between Israel and Hamas. As part of this effort, Indonesia reached out to the United States to advocate for these

²³ *Report on Assistance and Support to Palestine* (International Telecommunication Union, 2025), <https://www.itu.int/md/S25-CL-C-0071/en>.

²⁴ *Report on Assistance and Support to Palestine*.

²⁵ Piero Gottardi and Claudio Mezzetti, "Shuttle Diplomacy," *Journal of Economic Theory* 216 (March 2024): 105794, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105794>.

²⁶ Iryna Zubarenko, "Shuttle Diplomacy," in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Retrospect and Realities*, July 1, 2020, <https://ukraine-analytica.org/shuttle-diplomacy-in-the-arab-israeli-conflict-retrospect-and-realities/>.

²⁷ Zubarenko, *Shuttle Diplomacy*.

²⁸ David Hoffman, "Mediation and the Art of Shuttle Diplomacy," *Negotiation Journal* 27 (July 2011): 263–309, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2011.00309.x>.

²⁹ Hoffman, "Mediation."

³⁰ Hoffman, "Mediation."

goals.³¹ Beyond the U.S., Indonesia extended its shuttle diplomacy to China, seeking support for peace between Israel and Hamas and advocating for the facilitation of humanitarian aid to Gaza.³² Additionally, Indonesia visited Russia to condemn Israel's attacks on Gaza and stressed the need for concrete actions to end the violence.³³ Similarly, shuttle diplomacy was carried out with the United Kingdom to expedite a ceasefire and promote the implementation of all international resolutions related to the Israel-Hamas conflict.³⁴ Finally, Indonesia approached France, seeking its support to achieve peace in Gaza, hoping France could help secure a ceasefire in Palestine.³⁵

Challenges to Indonesia's Efforts at United Nations Forums

Despite Indonesia's demonstrated commitment through various "Jihad Diplomacy" initiatives at the United Nations, the effectiveness of these initiatives remains constrained by structural weaknesses and legal limitations. Indonesia's non-permanent status in the UN Security Council limits its strategic influence, while its failure to ratify the 1948 Genocide Convention weakens its capacity to pursue legal action against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). At the same time, its non-recognition of Israel creates a legal paradox that undermines its position in international litigation, and its continued support for the Two-State Solution is increasingly questioned for potentially legitimizing prolonged occupation and conflicting with Indonesia's anti-colonial principles. These challenges culminated in a critical misstep in 2026, when Indonesia joined the Board of Peace (BoP) and deployed troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) institutions widely perceived as

³¹ Evan Vucci, "Israel-Gaza: Jokowi Desak Biden untuk Dorong Israel Hentikan Serangan ke Gaza, Tapi 'Tidak Ditanggapi,'" BBC News Indonesia, November 14, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cz92n6mv2njo>.

³² Yew Lun Tian and Laurie Chen, "In Beijing, Arab and Muslim Ministers Urge End to Gaza War," Middle East, *Reuters*, November 20, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/beijing-arab-muslim-ministers-urge-end-gaza-war-2023-11-20/>.

³³ Nabila Azzahra, "OIC Foreign Ministers Visit Russia to Discuss Gaza," Tempo English, November 22, 2023, <https://en.tempo.co/read/1800011/oic-foreign-ministers-visit-russia-to-discuss-gaza>.

³⁴ "UK Foreign Secretary Cameron Hosts Arab, Islamic Ministers to Discuss Israel-Hamas Conflict," Arab News, November 22, 2023, <https://arab.news/4nxqm>.

³⁵ Basuki Eka Purnama, "Menlu OKI Desak Prancis Dukung Penyelesaian Krisis di Jalur Gaza," November 23, 2023, <https://mediaindonesia.com/internasional/632120/menlu-ok-desak-prancis-dukung-penyelesaian-krisis-di-jalur-gaza>.

dominated by the United States under Donald Trump, a decision that risks undermining Indonesia's diplomatic consistency and implicating it in actions that could weaken Palestinian resistance, thereby contradicting its long-standing support for Palestinian independence.

a. Indonesia's Position Is Not Always Strategic

The United Nations (UN), as an international organization, can create and shape international legal norms that can apply internally to its members and universally through specific processes.³⁶ The legal norms produced, such as decisions or resolutions, bind members and subordinate bodies.³⁷ However, the nature of these decisions or resolutions can vary depending on the UN membership's position.³⁸ Decisions of the UN Security Council (UNSC) differ in nature from those of other principal bodies such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Trusteeship Council. The decisions of these three principal bodies are generally limited to non-binding resolutions (*interna corporis*) rather than to mandatory ones.³⁹

The UN Security Council (UNSC) has a limited membership and can make swift, effective decisions, particularly on matters of international peace and security.⁴⁰ The UNSC's membership carries three primary responsibilities: recommending peaceful dispute resolutions, taking action against activities that threaten peace or constitute aggression, and playing a crucial role in the development of peacekeeping operations.⁴¹ According to Article 25 of the UN Charter, UN members are obligated to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council following the Charter."⁴² Consequently, the UNSC's authority, which surpasses that of other principal bodies, can significantly

³⁶ Leovaldi Tirta, "Kekuatan Resolusi Majelis Umum PBB (UNGA) dan Dewan Keamanan PBB (UNSC) sebagai Sumber Hukum Internasional," *Jurnal Yustika: Media Hukum dan Keadilan* 14, no. 1 (2021): 93–107, <https://journal.ubaya.ac.id/index.php/yustika/article/view/1450>.

³⁷ Tirta, "Kekuatan Resolusi Majelis Umum PBB."

³⁸ James Barros, *PBB: Dulu, Kini dan Esok (Diterjemahkan oleh D.H. Gulo)*, 2nd ed. (Bumi Aksara, 1990)103.

³⁹ James Barros, *PBB: Dulu, Kini dan Esok*.

⁴⁰ D. W. Bowet, *Hukum Organisasi Internasional (alih Babasa Bambang Iriana Djajaatmaja)* (Sinar Grafika, 1992).

⁴¹ Ade Maman Suherman, *Organisasi Internasional dan Integrasi Ekonomi Regional dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Globalisasi* (Ghalia Indonesia, 2003), <https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=6300260971647925851&hl=en&oi=scholar>.

⁴² United Nation Charter (1945) Art.25.

impact countries involved in conflicts or disputes, compelling them to comply with and implement the Council's decisions.⁴³

The structure of the UN Security Council consists of five permanent members and non-permanent members who are elected by the UN General Assembly for a two-year term.⁴⁴ The five permanent members of the Security Council possess a special privilege, namely the right to veto decisions, resolutions, or draft resolutions proposed by other Security Council members.⁴⁵ According to Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, decisions of the UN Security Council must be made with the agreement of the five permanent members.⁴⁶ This right is a privilege that supports the Security Council's role in maintaining international peace and security, and it serves as a benchmark for the difference in authority between the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council.⁴⁷ However, it is difficult for Indonesia to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, since the allocation of permanent membership is closely tied to the history of the UN after World War II in 1945, when it was established as the principal decision-making body.⁴⁸

Due to several factors, Indonesia still has the potential to run for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC).⁴⁹ These factors include the contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations, representation of demographic groups, experience in international leadership, financial contributions to the UN budget, the security situation within the country, and the status of not actively campaigning for a seat on other bodies.⁵⁰ After a series of diplomatic efforts, Indonesia officially completed its term as a non-

⁴³ Tirta, "Kekuatan Resolusi Majelis Umum PBB."

⁴⁴ Yosua Saut Marulitua Gultom et al., "Mengapa Reformasi Dewan Keamanan PBB Sulit Dilakukan? Telaah Realisme pada Kasus Perang Rusia-Ukraina," *Jurnal Al Azhar Indonesia Seri Ilmu Sosial* 5, no. 2 (2024): 80–90, <https://doi.org/10.36722/jaiss.v5i2.2601>.

⁴⁵ Savira Dhanika Hardianti, "Akibat Penggunaan Hak Veto oleh Amerika Serikat terhadap Kasus Agresi Israel di Gaza," in *Jurnal Mahasiswa Fakultas Hukum Universitas Brawijaya* (Brawijaya University, 2015), <https://www.neliti.com/publications/35417/>.

⁴⁶ Bowet, *Hukum Organisasi Internasional (alih Babasa Bambang Iriana Djajaatmaja)*.

⁴⁷ Dag Hammarskjöld, "How Are Members of the Security Council Elected?," United Nations, 2024, <https://ask.un.org/faq/269232>.

⁴⁸ Sri Setianingsih Suwardi, *Pengantar Hukum Organisasi Internasional* (Universitas Indonesia Press, 2004), 29-35.

⁴⁹ Hammarskjöld, "How Are Members of the Security Council Elected?"

⁵⁰ Hammarskjöld, "How Are Members of the Security Council Elected?"

permanent member of the UNSC for the fourth time, with a two-year tenure from January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2020.⁵¹ During this time, Indonesia was involved in various diplomatic efforts, including assisting with the Rohingya refugee crisis, participating in resolving the US-China trade war, and, notably, efforts to de-escalate the conflict in Palestine, including condemning Israeli attacks.⁵² If Indonesia were to secure another seat on the UNSC, there would be both juridical and non-juridical efforts to leverage its position. Legal efforts Indonesia could undertake as a non-permanent member of the UNSC to advocate for Diplomacy Jihad include calling for resolutions, issuing presidential statements, urging the convening of UNSC meetings to discuss the Palestinian issue, and issuing statements to clarify the UNSC's stance in defense of Palestine.⁵³ Meanwhile, non-juridical efforts would involve maximizing its role as a non-permanent UNSC member by acting as an agent of change, seizing opportunities, enhancing adaptability, and building coalitions with other members.⁵⁴

b. Limitations on Legal Efforts for Indonesia

One potential avenue in the pursuit of Diplomacy Jihad could be the International Court of Justice (ICJ), suing Israel directly or indirectly. South Africa has already undertaken this approach on December 23, 2023, when it filed a case against Israel for alleged genocide in the Gaza Strip, Palestine.⁵⁵ The outcome of South Africa's legal action at the ICJ was a provisional order, which

⁵¹ Jabinson Purba and Boy Anugerah, "Mendefinisikan (Kembali) Peran Indonesia di Dewan Keamanan PBB: Penjelajahan Teoretikal dan Praktikal dalam Mewujudkan Perdamaian," *Jurnal Lembannas RI* 7, no. 1 (2020): 25–48, <https://doi.org/10.55960/jlri.v7i1.48>.

⁵² Hino Samuel Jose, "Quo Vadis Diplomasi Multilateral Middle Power: Eksplorasi Restrukturisasi Kebijakan luar Negeri Indonesia sebagai Bridge-Builder di Dewan Keamanan PBB Era Presiden Joko Widodo" (skripsi, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta, 2022), 1–22, <https://repository.upnvj.ac.id/20105/>.

⁵³ Fedora Esperanza and Sukri Sukri, "Kebijakan luar Negeri Indonesia dalam Mendukung Upaya Kemerdekaan Palestina," *Kajian Hubungan Internasional* 2, no. 2 (2023): 93–102, <https://doi.org/10.31942/khi.2023.2.2.10192>.

⁵⁴ Eduards Gailišs, "Small Powers as Non-Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council: A Case Study of the Baltic States," *Security and Defence Quarterly*, ahead of print, October 22, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/172983>.

⁵⁵ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) (International Court of Justice 2023), 6–8 General List No. 192. According to the Application, Israel has committed acts including "killing Palestinians in Gaza, causing them serious bodily and mental harm, and inflicting on them conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction" (para. 1). South Africa argues that these acts are genocidal in character and committed with the specific intent (*dolus specialis*) to destroy the Palestinian group in Gaza (para. 1–4).

is binding and non-appealable, directing Israel to take all necessary steps to halt the genocide in Gaza.⁵⁶

The legal action initiated by South Africa has received support from various actors, both morally and politically. Although Indonesia is not a state party to the 1948 Genocide Convention, it has expressed its support through alternative mechanisms, including the presentation of arguments and positions before the United Nations General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).⁵⁷ Not only South Africa but also Nicaragua joined the efforts by filing a case two months after South Africa's lawsuit, resulting in two provisional rulings.⁵⁸ However, there is a slight difference between the lawsuits filed by South Africa and Nicaragua. South Africa directly sued Israel, while Nicaragua filed a case against Germany at the ICJ, accusing it of facilitating genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza due to its military and political support for Israel.⁵⁹ Indonesia does not yet have the right and authority to file a lawsuit with the ICJ, as South Africa and Nicaragua have done, due to Indonesia's failure to ratify the Genocide Convention.⁶⁰ The lengthy process and careful considerations are some of the reasons why Indonesia has not ratified the Genocide Convention.⁶¹ Despite the potential legal implications of South

⁵⁶ *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)*, 29 General List No. 192. The outcome of South Africa's legal action at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was a provisional order issued on January 26, 2024. This order, which is binding and non-appealable, directed Israel to take all necessary steps to prevent acts of genocide in Gaza and ensure that its military forces do not commit genocidal acts against the Palestinian population. .

⁵⁷ Ferinda K. Fachri, "Hari Ini! Mahkamah Internasional Dengarkan Argumen Afrika Selatan Atas Tudingan Genosida Israel," *hukumonline.com*, HukumOnline, 2024, <https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/hari-ini-mahkamah-internasional-dengarkan-argumen-afrika-selatan-atas-tudingan-genosida-israel-lt659ececab1d2a/>.

⁵⁸ *Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in Respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany)* (International Court of Justice 2024).

⁵⁹ *Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in Respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany)*.

⁶⁰ *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1950)* According to the United Nations Treaty Collection, Indonesia has not yet ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This reflects Indonesia's current legal stance regarding international obligations under the Genocide Convention.

⁶¹ Ratu Prani Pertikaswari and Shabirah Gusmadi, "Keterkaitan antara Dukungan Palestina dan Ratifikasi Konvensi Genosida: Perspektif Hukum dan Politik Indonesia," *Jurnal Mediasosian: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Administrasi Negara* 8, no. 2 (2024): 295, <https://doi.org/10.30737/mediasosian.v8i2.6245>.

Africa's lawsuit against Israel at the ICJ, Indonesia is currently unable to pursue a similar course of action to that of South Africa and Nicaragua.⁶²

c. Indonesia's Non-Recognition of Israel's Statehood: Some Drawbacks?

Since Indonesia's independence, the country has consistently provided full support to Palestine, both materially and non-materially.⁶³ Palestine has become the heart of Indonesia's foreign policy, and every breath of Indonesia's diplomacy carries the struggle for Palestine.⁶⁴ The first and fourth paragraphs of the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945) serve as the guiding principles for Indonesia's foreign policy actions and decision-making.⁶⁵ One of the key provisions in the constitution is the prohibition of Indonesia from establishing relations with colonial powers. When linked to Indonesia's relationship with Israel, this provision highlights Indonesia's commitment to the cause of Palestinian independence.⁶⁶

Indonesia's steadfast commitment to defending Palestine is manifested in its refusal to recognize Israel as a subject of international law or a state until Israel recognizes Palestinian independence.⁶⁷ Indonesia has taken actions to affirm this stance. Some of these actions include its refusal to allow Israel's to participate in the U-20 World Cup, which ultimately led FIFA to cancel the tournament in Indonesia.⁶⁸ Additionally, Indonesia declined to sign the Abraham Accords, a series of agreements aimed at establishing peace between

⁶² Pertikaswari and Gusmadi, "Keterkaitan antara Dukungan Palestina."

⁶³ Adettia Gama, "Sikap Indonesia dalam Penyelesaian Konflik Perpindahan Ibu Kota Israel Dari Tel Aviv ke Yerusalem di PBB (2014-2019)," *Kaganga: Jurnal Pendidikan Sejarah dan Riset Sosial Humaniora* 6, no. 1 (2023): 43–60, <https://doi.org/10.31539/kaganga.v6i1.5497>.

⁶⁴ Retno L. P. Marsudi, "Keterangan Pers Mengenai Capaian Tiga Tahun Politik luar Negeri Kabinet Kerja," Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, Disampaikan di Jakarta, Oktober 24, 2019, accessed October 27, 2024.

⁶⁵ Annisa Dea Kusuma, "Analisis Penolakan Indonesia terhadap Proposal Abraham Accord dalam Membangun Hubungan Diplomatik dengan Israel Tahun 2022" (Undergraduate Thesis, Program Studi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2023), <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/74340>.

⁶⁶ Kusuma, "Analisis Penolakan Indonesia terhadap Proposal Abraham Accord."

⁶⁷ See: Shofaa Qurrota Ayun et al., "Indonesia's Diplomatic Actions in the Israel-Palestine Conflict," *Jurnal Pertahanan: Media Informasi Tentang Kajian dan Strategi Pertahanan Yang Mengedepankan Identity, Nasionalism dan Integrity* 10, no. 2 (2024): 329–41, <https://doi.org/10.33172/jp.v10i2.19605>.

⁶⁸ Koya Jibiki, "Indonesia U-20 World Cup Cancellation Sparks Political Backlash," *Nikkei Asia*, Nikkei Asia, April 11, 2023, <https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/indonesia-u-20-world-cup-cancellation-sparks-political-backlash>.

Israel and several other countries.⁶⁹ The signing of the Abraham Accords would have led to the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel, something Indonesia strongly opposes.⁷⁰

Indonesia's consistent refusal to recognize Israel as a state date back to the era of its first president, Soekarno. He firmly stated that Indonesia would not acknowledge Israel as a legitimate state, embodying the nation's stance against imperialism.⁷¹ Despite the succession of leaders over the decades, the ideological consistency of Indonesia's stance has remained intact and deeply ingrained in its national identity.⁷² This steadfast position continues to be evident in the actions and statements of Indonesian leaders, state representatives, and even its citizens, reflecting a unified commitment to opposing oppression and supporting Palestine.⁷³

In United Nations forums, Indonesia has consistently condemned Israel for its inhumane actions and extensive human rights violations. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Indonesia has openly expressed concern over the ongoing situation in Gaza, strongly condemning Israel's threats.⁷⁴ Additionally, in the General Assembly, Indonesia has fully supported the issuance of a declaration that formally designates Israel's occupation as illegal.⁷⁵ These actions underline Indonesia's unwavering stance in advocating for Palestinian rights and denouncing Israeli policies.

⁶⁹ Dian Septiari, "'Abraham Accords' Won't Change Indonesia's Position: Foreign Ministry," The Jakarta Post, The Jakarta Post, September 18, 2020, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/09/18/abraham-accords-wont-change-indonesias-position-foreign-ministry.html>.

⁷⁰ Kusuma, "Analisis Penolakan Indonesia Terhadap Proposal Abraham Accord dalam Membangun Hubungan Diplomatik dengan Israel Tahun 2022," 44.

⁷¹ Soekarno, *Djangan Sekali-Kali Meninggalkan Sedjarah!: Never Leave History! Pidato pada Hari Ulang-Tahun Ke-21 Republik Indonesia, 17 Agustus 1966, di Djakarta; Sesuai dengan Jang Diutjapkan* (Prapantja, 1966).

⁷² Gama, "Sikap Indonesia dalam Penyelesaian Konflik Perpindahan Ibu Kota Israel dari Tel Aviv ke Yerusalem Di PBB (2014-2019)," 46.

⁷³ Kusuma, "Analisis Penolakan Indonesia terhadap Proposal Abraham Accord dalam Membangun Hubungan Diplomatik dengan Israel Tahun 2022," 66.

⁷⁴ Teddy Tri Setio Berty, "Indonesia Kecam Israel di Pertemuan Badan Atom Internasional," liputan6.com, Liputan 6, August 6, 2024, <https://www.liputan6.com/global/read/5615150/indonesia-kecam-Israel-di-pertemuan-badan-atom-internasional>.

⁷⁵ Redaktur, "Indonesia Dukung Mahkamah Internasional, Israel Harus Akhiri Pendudukan Di Palestina," Tempo, July 22, 2024, <https://www.tempo.co/internasional/indonesia-dukung-mahkamah-internasional-Israel-harus-akhiri-pendudukan-di-palestina-37930>.

Indonesia's stance of not recognizing Israel as a state fundamentally impacts its Diplomacy Jihad efforts, particularly in the realm of legal action, such as bringing a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). While the lack of ratification of the Genocide Convention limits Indonesia's legal capacity at the ICJ, another significant obstacle is its principled refusal to acknowledge Israel as a state. According to the ICJ Statute, only states can be parties to proceedings at the ICJ.

Therefore, if Indonesia were to file a case against Israel at the ICJ, it would indirectly acknowledge Israel's statehood by engaging with it in a legal framework that inherently requires the recognition of state status. This situation presents a paradox: pursuing legal avenues to hold Israel accountable could undermine Indonesia's steadfast policy of not recognizing Israel as a state.⁷⁶ This tension highlights the intricate balance Indonesia must maintain between its diplomatic principles and its practical strategies to support Palestinian sovereignty and rights.

d. Indonesia's Insistence on the Two-State Solution

Countries around the world agree that the Two-State Solution is the best approach to resolving the ongoing conflict between Palestine and Israel. This consensus is evidenced by statements from European Union nations and other countries that attended a meeting in Brussels in February 2024.⁷⁷ Furthermore, in various forums, especially within the United Nations (UN), nations have firmly expressed their support for the Two-State Solution. For instance, in a UN forum in November 2023, when the ceasefire between Palestine and Israel reached its sixth day, the UN explicitly called on the international community to work towards the Two-State Solution.⁷⁸ Indonesia has also firmly and verbally expressed its agreement with this proposed solution. It is believed that

⁷⁶ Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) Art.34.

⁷⁷ Gervin Nathaniel Purba, "Solusi 2 Negara Opsi Tepat Bereskan Konflik Palestina-Israel," Metro TV, Brussels, 2024, <https://www.metrotvnews.com/play/NG9C3exQ-solusi-2-negara-opsi-tepat-bereskan-konflik-palestina-Israel>.

⁷⁸ Denis Balibouse, "PBB Serukan Tindakan Tegas Solusi 2 Negara Saat Berlangsung Gencatan Senjata Hamas-Israel," VOA Indonesia, Swiss, November 30, 2023, <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/pbb-serukan-tindakan-tegas-solusi-2-negara-saat-berlangsung-gencatan-senjata-hamas-Israel/7377205.html>.

this solution can provide a strong foundation for building Palestinian independence in the future.

The background for the significant support for the two-state solution lies in the belief that Indonesia should strive for some progress rather than doing nothing at all. This solution simply proposes a fair division, in accordance with international law, between the states of Palestine and Israel. All damages caused by the conflict would be addressed with liability assigned based on calculated losses. This solution is considered the best option when compared to the one-state solution, whose initial idea involves merging the states of Palestine and Israel. This renders the one-state solution unrealistic. However, the two-state solution may also create other issues, as it could cause Indonesia to contradict its stance of rejecting colonialism. Moreover, this solution is deemed just as unrealistic as the one-state solution.

The primary reason for questioning continued advocacy of the two-state solution is that it raises significant legal and moral concerns regarding its fairness, legality, and viability. There is a long list of literature elaborating how the supposed state of Israel was established through treacherous and racist scheming that involves systematic killing, genocide, expulsion, and then oppression of the Palestinian people for so many decades.⁷⁹ It has been a long-standing doctrine in international law that unlawfully annexed territory should not be recognized,⁸⁰ another example being the UN General Assembly declaring it unlawful⁸¹ to recognize Transkei as a 'state' established by South Africa upon apartheid. This can be found in both recent and older literature on

⁷⁹ See *inter alia*: Seth Anziska, "Special Document File: The Erasure of the Nakba in Israel's Archives," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 49, no. 1 (2019): 64–76, <https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2019.49.1.64>; Nur Masalha, "60 Years after the Nakba: Historical Truth, Collective Memory and Ethical Obligations," *Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies* 3, no. 1 (2009): 37–88; Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oneworld Publication, 2006); Ilan Pappé, *The Biggest Prison on Earth: A History of the Occupied Territories* (Oneworld Publications, 2017); Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948* (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).

⁸⁰ Agata Kleczkowska, *Threats of Force and International Law: Practice, Responses and Consequences* (Routledge, 2023), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003376026>; Ingrid Brunk and Monica Hakimi, "The Prohibition of Annexations and the Foundations of Modern International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 118, no. 3 (2024): 417–67, <https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2024.26>; Quincy Wright, "The Legal Foundation of the Stimson Doctrine," *Pacific Affairs* 8, no. 4 (1935): 439–46, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2751244>.

⁸¹ UN General Assembly Resolution (1976) No. A/RES/31/6 A .

contemporary international law.⁸² Even very recently, in 2024, the ICJ⁸³ and the UN General Assembly⁸⁴ have clearly pronounced the illegality of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and demanded that settlers be dismantled.

Be that as it may, our present research does not focus on what the UN is supposed to do. As J. E. Lawrence famously said: “It is what it is.”⁸⁵ Instead, we are discussing what Indonesia’s position should be. Considering that a two-state solution brings a pathway towards the recognition and ‘legalization’ of the unlawful establishment of the ‘state’ of Israel, Indonesia should not be part of such a thing. Indonesia’s stance towards colonialism generally and the current non-recognition of ‘Israel’ are strong and just positions to have but supporting the two-state solution stains it.

In its development, Indonesia has consistently expressed its support for the two-state solution as a means of resolving the conflict between Israel and Palestine. This endorsement is pursued through various diplomatic channels, including international forums. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has actively advocated for this solution during the Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly⁸⁶ and the Open Debate of the United Nations Security Council.⁸⁷ In his capacity as a political representative of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto has consistently affirmed support for the Two-State Solution at various United Nations multilateral forums in September 2025, including the 80th General Assembly. In these forums, he positioned this

⁸² Geoffrey E. Norman, “The Transkei: South Africa’s Illegitimate Child,” *New England Law Review* 12, (1976): 585-646.

⁸³ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, International Court of Justice, July 19, 2024.

⁸⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution No. A/ES-10/L.31/Rev.1.

⁸⁵ Kathy Lewis Sawyer, *Book of Iwii: It Is What It Is. Is It What It Is?* (Wheatmark, 2024).

⁸⁶ See: *Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem*, Republic of Indonesia, *Written Statement of the Republic of Indonesia on the Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem* The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, has actively advocated for Palestinian rights by submitting a written statement to the ICJ, reinforcing Indonesia’s commitment to supporting Palestine through legal and diplomatic channels.

⁸⁷ MoFA Indonesia, *Press Briefing Menlu RI: Open Debate UNSC on the Question of Palestine, 23 Januari 2024*, 06:16, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=60KGYIU8ans>.

framework as the sole viable solution for achieving genuine peace and a comprehensive resolution to the Palestinian conflict.⁸⁸

Prabowo's articulation of a conditional recognition policy, making Indonesian support for Israel contingent upon Israel's recognition of Palestinian independence, represents a nuanced and unprecedented diplomatic posture for the world's largest Muslim-majority nation,⁸⁹ consequently igniting domestic controversy as it is perceived as a compromise on the long-standing policy of unconditional support.⁹⁰ This policy diverges from the more conventional interpretation of the Two-State Solution, a stance which high-ranking government officials like President Joko Widodo,⁹¹ and Vice President Ma'ruf Amin⁹² had previously reiterated in multiple official engagements. Indonesia's support is rooted in its independent and active foreign policy principles, as well as its commitment to global peace, justice, and the protection of human rights.⁹³

Moreover, Indonesia's historical experience in resisting colonialism reinforces its solidarity with Palestine, which is perceived as facing analogous challenges.⁹⁴ Consequently, the two-state solution is regarded as the most

⁸⁸ President Prabowo explicitly stated, "The Only Solution Is a Two-State Solution" (TSS), for Genuine Peace: Prihatini Wahyuningtyas, "Apa Itu Two State Solution yang Disebut Prabowo di Pidato PBB?," *Tirto.id*, 2025, <https://tirto.id/apa-itu-two-state-solution-yang-disebut-prabowo-di-pidato-pbb-hifp>.

⁸⁹ Arlina Arshad, "Indonesia President Prabowo Shines at Gaza Peace Summit, Refutes Israel Visit Rumours," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), October 14, 2025, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/tough-man-prabowo-shines-at-gaza-peace-summit-refutes-israel-visit-rumours>.

⁹⁰ Indra Buana, *Revisiting Prabowo's Controversial UN Speech on Palestine – Binokular Media Utama*, September 29, 2025, <https://binokular.net/en/2025/09/29/revisiting-prabowos-controversial-un-speech-on-palestine/>.

⁹¹ Kementerian Sekretariat Negara, "Indonesia Tegaskan Komitmen Perdamaian Palestina Melalui Keikutsertaan dalam Board of Peace," 2026, https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/indonesia_tegaskan_komitmen_perdamaian_palestina_melalui_keikutsertaan_dalam_board_of_peace; Jokowi menyampaikan bahwa perdamaian berdasarkan keadilan hanya bisa diraih melalui two state solution dalam KTT ke-6 ASEAN-AS di Suntec Convention Centre, Singapura, Kamis, 15 November 2018 Fakhri Fakhri, "Presiden Jokowi Tegaskan Posisi Indonesia Sebagai Penggerak Perdamaian Global: Okezone News," <https://news.okezone.com/>, October 1, 2024, <https://news.okezone.com/read/2024/10/01/337/3069770/presiden-jokowi-tegaskan-posisi-indonesia-sebagai-penggerak-perdamaian-global> Dalam kunjungan Paus Fransiskus ke Indonesia baru-baru ini, Presiden Jokowi mengangkat pentingnya solusi dua negara (two-state solution) sebagai langkah konkret untuk menyelesaikan konflik Palestina.

⁹² Raden Putri, "Apa Itu Two State Solution Yang Digaungkan Indonesia untuk Konflik Israel dan Palestina?," *Tempo*, Oktober | 20.03 WIB 2023, <https://www.tempo.co/internasional/apa-itu-two-state-solution-yang-digaungkan-indonesia-untuk-konflik-israel-dan-palestina--126760>.

⁹³ Stenus Jacob Kartutu et al., "Indonesia's Active Free Politics in the Two-State Solution Hamas-Israel Conflict," *The Journal of Academic Science* 1, no. 4 (2024): 323–34, <https://doi.org/10.59613/p6013p91>.

⁹⁴ Kartutu et al., "Indonesia's Active Free Politics in the Two-State Solution Hamas-Israel Conflict."

equitable and pragmatic approach for Indonesia in contributing to the resolution of the protracted Israel-Palestine conflict.

However, in practice, the two-state solution cannot be regarded as a fair and viable resolution, as it primarily functions as a temporary peace measure.⁹⁵ This limitation is evident in the recurring application of two consistent patterns across all proposed peace agreements. First, every peace initiative invariably adopts two principal approaches: one agreement aimed at normalizing political relations between Israel and other nations, and another dedicated to addressing the Palestinian conflict. Second, all peace agreements adhere to a similar three-stage framework. The initial phase entails the cessation of armed conflict to establish "negative peace," meaning the direct cessation of violence, which does not automatically lead to sustainable peace because it does not address structural problems or root causes of conflict.⁹⁶ The "negative peace" will then be followed by a transitional period designed to foster mutual trust, and ultimately, a phase aimed at resolving fundamental issues, including territorial boundaries, sovereignty, refugee rights, the right of return, the status of Jerusalem, and the allocation of water resources.

The repetitive patterns in these agreements are evident in various peace accords, including the Camp David Accords (1978), the Oslo Accords, Camp David II, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and the Abraham Accords. Although each agreement was designed to achieve lasting peace, none succeeded in establishing a two-state solution. One significant attempt to implement the two-state solution was the Oslo Accords, which were signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and aimed to establish a framework for resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict through a two-state arrangement.⁹⁷ However, certain Palestinian factions, including Hamas and some PLO groups,

⁹⁵ Andrea Teti, "Israel, Gaza and the Politics of Palliative Peace: Colonialism, (de)Mobilization and Why the Two-State Solution Is Made to Fail," *Mediterranean Politics* 30, no. 4 (2025): 902–11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2024.2367331>.

⁹⁶ Sumit Mukerji, "From Negative to Positive Peace: Meeting of Two Seminal Minds," *Environment and Society* 3 (December 2021): 1–12.

⁹⁷ Husam Said Zomlot, "Building a Palestinian State Under Occupation: Reassessing the Oslo Process," In *The Failure of Two State Solution*, edited by Hani A. Faris, (New York: I.B TAURIS, 2013): 48 – 60.

perceived the Oslo Accords as inadequate in ensuring Palestinian sovereignty and fundamental rights. Meanwhile, Israel continued the expansion of illegal settlements, leading to the territorial fragmentation of Palestine, as reflected in the ongoing policies of settlement expansion, the construction of a separation barrier, and sustained blockades.⁹⁸

Furthermore, the protracted efforts spanning several decades to establish a two-state solution, including the Camp David negotiations, the Annapolis Conference, the Obama Proposal, and the Arab Peace Initiative, have ultimately failed due to a prevailing bias in favor of Israel.⁹⁹ The United States, as the principal mediator, has frequently acted as an advocate for Israel rather than an impartial facilitator, thereby hindering the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement between the parties.¹⁰⁰

The parties to the conflict, particularly Israel, have consistently rejected peace proposals, even those that would provide them with strategic advantages, such as land-for-peace agreements or partial withdrawals from occupied territories.¹⁰¹ Conversely, other parties, particularly the Palestinian people, have also resisted these peace proposals, perceiving them as a manifestation of modern apartheid. This perception arises from the fact that the Palestinian people are compelled to acknowledge the legitimacy of the State of Israel, which was founded on their ancestral lands, without receiving full recognition of their fundamental rights, including the right to return to their homeland.¹⁰²

Moreover, the current reality under the Netanyahu-led government in Israel, which is composed of religious extremists and nationalists, reflects a vision of establishing Israel as an exclusive state for the Jewish people.¹⁰³ This

⁹⁸ Naseer H. Aruri, "Is the Two-State Settlement Still Viable? An Overall Assessment of the Present Situation," in *The Failure of the Two State Solution: The Prospects of One State in the Israel-Palestinian Conflict*, ed. Hani A. Faris (I.B. Tauris, 2013), 70.

⁹⁹ Aruri, "Is the Two-State Settlement Still Viable?" 74–76.

¹⁰⁰ Aruri, "Is the Two-State Settlement Still Viable?" 72.

¹⁰¹ Aruri, "Is the Two-State Settlement Still Viable?" 65

¹⁰² Michael Barnett et al., *The One State Reality: What Is Israel/Palestine?*, March 15, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501768392.001.0001>.

¹⁰³ Michael Barnett et al., "Israel's One-State Reality," *Foreign Affairs*, April 14, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/Israel-palestine-one-state-solution>.

administration has demonstrated a clear willingness to implement discriminatory policies against non-Jews. Such a vision further entrenches Israel's rejection of the two-state solution.¹⁰⁴

This rejection has been acknowledged and widely recognized by the majority of the population residing in Israel and the territories it controls. The idealistic concept of a two-state solution is increasingly detached from the prevailing realities of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Palestine is not merely a state awaiting recognition, and Israel is not a democratic state that merely occupies Palestinian territories by happenstance.

Furthermore, the implementation of the two-state solution indirectly justifies the colonialist ambitions pursued by Israel. Reflecting on the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia firmly opposes colonial practices. By applying the two-state solution, the separation of Israel as an independent state would inevitably be legitimized, thus justifying Israel's colonial endeavors. Additionally, the two-state solution has already been rejected by the conflicting parties, namely Palestine and Israel. Many Palestinians and even some segments of the Israeli peace camp have increasingly lost faith in the viability of the two-state solution. This skepticism stems from Israel's continued policy of settlement expansion and de facto annexation in the West Bank. The two-state formula is still employed primarily because 'no alternative seems apparent.'¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile, for Israel, implementing the two-state solution is equivalent to "national suicide."¹⁰⁶

Ultimately, the main reason why the two-state solution is increasingly contested is that it raises serious legal and moral concerns regarding its fairness, legality, and viability. Furthermore, the "fantastical vision" of a two-state solution is no longer relevant to the reality on the ground between Israel and Palestine.¹⁰⁷ Palestine is not merely a state waiting passively, and Israel is not a

¹⁰⁴ Barnett et al., "Israel's One-State Reality."

¹⁰⁵ Yoav Shemer-Kunz, "Annexation, Normalization and the Two-State Solution in Israel-Palestine," *Frontiers in Political Science* 5 (April 2023): 981237, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.981237>.

¹⁰⁶ Shemer-Kunz, "Annexation, Normalization and the Two-State Solution in Israel-Palestine."

¹⁰⁷ Barnett et al., *The One State Reality*, 133.

democratic state that happens to occupy Palestinian territories.¹⁰⁸ One might wonder if the two-state solution is at least a pragmatic solution, seen to be a 'lesser evil' to end violence. After all, Indonesia has experience with ceding parts of its territory to the Netherlands (re-)occupation during the post-independence wars, via the Linggadjati Agreement in 1946, as a bitter but necessary measure at the time.¹⁰⁹ However, as history reveals, Indonesia's struggles did not end there, and she eventually succeeded in freeing herself entirely from colonial (re-)occupation.

Be that as it may, our present research does not focus on what the UN is supposed to do. As J. E. Lawrence famously said: "it is what it is."¹¹⁰ Instead, we are discussing what Indonesia's position should be. Considering that a two-state solution brings a pathway towards the recognition and 'legalization' of the unlawful establishment of the 'state' of Israel, Indonesia should not be part of such a thing. Indonesia's stance towards colonialism generally and the current non-recognition of 'Israel' are strong and just positions to have, but supporting the two-state solution stains it.

e. **The Blunder of 2026: Donald Trump's "Board of Peace"**

After Donald Trump, as President of the United States, issued a twenty-point Gaza peace plan,¹¹¹ the UN Security Council issued Resolution No. S/RES/2803 in November 2025, which happens to endorse some parts of that peace plan. There are two parts of Trump's twenty-point Gaza peace plan endorsed by the UN Security Council that we need to emphasize:

- The Establishment of a BoP to coordinate peace efforts, and
- The deployment of an "International Stabilization Force" (ISF) with a mission to *inter alia* disarm "terror infrastructure."

¹⁰⁸ Barnett et al., *The One State Reality*, 134–35.

¹⁰⁹ Merle Calvin Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200* (Stanford University Press, 2001), 261–62

¹¹⁰ Sawyer, *Book of Iivii*.

¹¹¹ "Donald Trump's 20-Point Gaza Peace Plan in Full," BBC News, BBC, October 9, 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70155nked7o>.

Indonesia, under President Prabowo in 2026, has expressed support for both: joining the BoP and, at the time of writing, preparing up to 8,000 soldiers to be part of the ISF.¹¹² This is very problematic for the following reasons.

First, the BoP is structured in such a way that perpetuates the United States' hegemony and practically places Indonesia formally under it. The BoP Charter, that Indonesia has agreed, regulates that the "Chairman" (i.e. President Donald Trump) has authority to: determine which state is invited as member (Art. 2.1); establish or dissolve Sub-Committees and Subsidiary Entities (Arts 3.4 and 3.2b); approve and break ties in BoP decision making (Art 3.1e); issue Resolutions and Directives (Arti. 9); and choose members and dissolve the Executive Board (Art. 4.1).

The above provisions show how the United States, through President Donald Trump, holds almost absolute control. Crucially, Article 1 of the BoP Charter emphasizes that the BoP's mission applies to "...areas affected or threatened by conflict." Meaning, the BoP is not limited to the Palestine conflict only and, as per Article 1 of the BoP Charter, will also "...promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace..." which, awfully, sounds like a justification for intervention. Indonesia's agreement to this not only weakens its own sovereignty and decision-making agency within the BoP but also further erodes its position on the Palestine issue relative to the United States.

In addition, the ISF mission that includes disarming "terror infrastructure" appears to be a clear nod to disarming the Palestinian Resistance. The term "terrorism" has been arbitrarily misused to unjustly delegitimize the Palestinian resistance (HAMAS) and also many resistance groups across the

¹¹² Presiden Republik Indonesia, "Indonesia Siapkan Pengiriman Hingga 8.000 Pasukan ISF, Menlu: Fokus Perlindungan Sipil dan Misi Kemanusiaan," *presidenri.go.id*, February 21, 2026, <https://presidenri.go.id/berita-lainnya/indonesia-siapkan-pengiriman-hingga-8-000-pasukan-isf-menlu-fokus-perlindungan-sipil-dan-misi-kemanusiaan/>

globe over the decades.¹¹³ On the other hand, there is no disarmament of the Israeli forces who had committed genocide in Palestine all this time.

The Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sugiono claimed that Indonesian forces will not take part in disarming the Palestinian resistance.¹¹⁴ However, at the same time, President Prabowo affirms Trump's twenty-point plan,¹¹⁵ which contains an ISF mandate to disarm the "terror infrastructure." This apparent contradiction is very unhelpful, giving nothing but bad possibilities: the Indonesian force would either personally disarm the Palestinian resistance or watch it being done by other state forces in the ISF.

CONCLUSION

Diplomacy Jihad carried out by Indonesia at the UN signifies Indonesia's relentless efforts through diplomatic channels to defend Palestine, which, at least until late-2025, has led to significant changes with varying degrees of impact, albeit some obstacles. These efforts are certainly rooted in the historical ties that form the foundation of Indonesia's Diplomacy Jihad process in support of Palestine.

However, a big blunder came in 2026 when Indonesia joined the BoP and has signaled to participate in the ISF. After all her history with her own colonialism and pro-Palestine diplomacy jihad, Indonesia appears to now be set to take part in perpetuating colonialism over Palestine.

Indonesia must pursue concrete strategies to strengthen its Diplomacy Jihad, and there are many ways: ratifying the 1948 Genocide Convention, re-applying for a non-

¹¹³ Victor Kattan and Rémi Fuhrmann, "The Return of the 'Savage': Gaza and the Dark Side of International Humanitarian Law," *Human: An International Journal of Human Rights* 15, no. 3 (2024); Jaan S. Islam, "The Portrayal of Jihadi-Salafism: The Role of Knowledge Production in Fabricating a Global Enemy," in *Disentangling Jihad, Political Violence and Media*, ed. Simone Pfeifer et al. (Edinburgh University Press, 2023), <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781399523813-006>; Joseph R. Slaughter, "Hijacking Human Rights: Neoliberalism, the New Historiography, and the End of the Third World," *Human Rights Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (2018): 735–75, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26795047>.

¹¹⁴ Sultan Abdurrahman, "Menlu: Pasukan Indonesia Tidak Akan Melucuti Senjata di Gaza," *Tempo*, *Tempo.id*, February 21, 2026, <https://www.tempo.co/politik/menlu-pasukan-indonesia-tidak-akan-melucuti-senjata-di-gaza-2116728>.

¹¹⁵ Maria Cicilia Galuh Prayudhia, "Di Hadapan Donald Trump, Prabowo Nyatakan Indonesia Dukung Penuh Rencana 20 Poin Dewan Perdamaian," *Antara News*, *AntaraBengkulu*, February 20, 2026, <https://bengkulu.antarane.ws.com/berita/459402/di-hadapan-donald-trump-prabowo-nyatakan-indonesia-dukung-penuh-rencana-20-poin-dewan-perdamaian>.

permanent seat on the UN Security Council, rejecting the two-state solution, and many others. However, most urgently, Indonesia must reverse its biggest blunder by immediately pulling out of both the BoP and ISF.

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