

Islam and Prosper Indonesia: Contestation and Fragmentation of Contemporary Islamic Thought

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Abstract

The following article examines Islamic thought and changes in state structure in Indonesia since the reform era from 1998 to the present. The fundamental change of state order in Indonesia is marked by the amendment of the 1945 Constitution and the wide space open for the people to participate in the life of the country. In this situation, progressive Islam, mainstream Islam, and political Islamist thought emerged. The main problem in this article is how Islamic thought is transformed by three variants of Indonesian Muslims in changing state order in the reformation era of Indonesia. The basic theoretical framework that is used to explain Islamic thought and changes of state order above, in addition to using the people's approach as full citizens before the state, also uses a socio-historical approach, political economy. Then the analysis used in this article is political philosophy. The main sources used are the official publications and decisions of each figure and organization related to changes in state order during the reformation era in Indonesia from 1998 to the present. The results of the study can be concluded that three variants of Islamic thought in Indonesia that are very prominent in responding to and directing the changes in state order in Indonesia become a just and welfare state.

Keywords: Contemporary Islamic Thought; Mainstream Islam; Political Islam; Progressive Islam; Welfare State

INTRODUCTION

After the fall of the New Order regime (1998), the development of Islamic thought in Indonesia found a new medium to express it. Massive liberalization in this country makes almost no obstacles to expressing the thoughts of citizens. In this context, there are thoughts and movements of various Islamic communities. There are those who try to continue the ideas of Islamic figures and organizations that have become mainstream before the reformation. In addition, new movements that carry different ideas have emerged, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).

This article is driven by anxiety about scientific segregation. There is a separation between Islamic studies, especially studies on the level of thought on the one hand, with studies on political change and dynamics on the other. Obviously, there are researchers who depart from Islamic studies, depart from the internal situation of Muslims with their own theological reference culture, assuming that the thoughts of Islamic leaders and communities are isolated from political dynamics. At the same time, political and government analysts view Muslims only as citizens/people with distinctive attributes, as if they are not inspired by the religious teachings and values they believe in.

The link between the two study traditions above will be clearly seen if a historical-sociological perspective is used, thinking becomes an important explanatory force. Here, Islamic thought, including in the political field, is easily understood in relation to its social environment. Especially if these developing Islamic thoughts are understood to be related to changes in the national and international social environment that continue to be symptomatic. However, the relationship between thought and the ongoing political dynamics is not easy to show considering the nature of religious

teachings. Moreover, the doctrines of Islam itself are poly interpretable.

To bridge the gap between the studies above, this study addresses that, even if the formulation of these teachings in the state thought also varies, there is still dominant Islamic thought that significantly determines the direction or type of change (Watt, 1964; Effendy, 1998, p. 5). Especially if it considers the position of Muslims, as the majority component of Indonesian citizens. Awareness of this role and political position is strongly framed by the ideas adopted (Jurdi, 2008, pp. xi-xii; Kuntowijoyo & Priyono, 2008, p. 379). The problem is not only whether the ongoing awareness process contributes to the pattern of an increasingly democratic state order. An issue that is no less important to be studied is the content of the thoughts that have been rolling so far, which have been followed by changes in the life order of the country.

Even though the necessity above is simple, it has fundamental implications because it is in the context of finding solutions to the direction and future of state life in Indonesia, especially in the context of emerging people-state relations. In this regard, it is still rare to find studies by both Indonesian political scientists and researchers or Islamic studies in Indonesia, especially those that discuss the importance of the role and contribution of Islam as a religion embraced by the majority of the Indonesian people. However, this necessity has been neglected in the study of Islamic thought in Indonesia. This, because is the Islamic thought studies that have been developed so far are very obsessed with characterizing and in turn portraying exoticism more or less.

Most studies on Islamic political thought have so far stopped at characterizing the nature of thought. As shown, there are not many studies dedicated to revealing how to respond to the dynamics of society through the outpouring of thinking capacity. Riddell's (2019)

study on the prospects of Islam in responding to democratization is a good example, by grouping reform-era Islamic thought into (1) *The Neo-Modernists*, (2) *The Modernists*, (3) *The Traditionalists*, and (4) *The Radical Islamists*. Meanwhile, Woodward (2001) classifies it into (1) *indigenized* (indigenous) Islam, (2) traditional Islam, (3) modernist Islam, (4) Islamism or Islamist, and (5) Islamic neo-modernism.

The study of Islamic thought using the above typology predominantly uses two approaches: *cultural and security*. The cultural approach emphasizes the traditions inherent in Indonesian Islam. In the process, this approach looks at and places more emphasis on how individual interpretations or interpretations of Islamic community organizations on the holy verses and their impact in influencing political behavior. It can even be said that this approach is most dominantly used in studying Islam in Indonesia (Hadiz, 2011a, 2011b). The security approach is mostly carried out by researchers who lack an understanding of Islamic teachings (Voll, 1982, pp. 2–4).

Understanding of Islamic thought by using the two approaches above causes the emergence of unclear indicators of Islamic thought. The two approaches above have given birth to a *good and bad* Muslim perspective, or in Indonesia, it is better known as moderate Islam and radical Islam (Hadiz, 2011a, 2011b). The implication of these two approaches is that there has been a simplification and reduction of the problems of Islamic thought when the problems are so complex (Bayah, 2007, pp. 39–42).

To understand the dynamics of Islamic thought after the collapse of the New Order, it is necessary to place it in the context of the complexity of the problems it faces. Starting from the explanation above and to develop a study of Islamic thought in the context of changes in the state order, especially the people-state relations in Indonesia during the reform era. This study, in addition to

considering the internal-cultural-theological and political perspectives as mentioned above, needs to be taken into account. The *historical sociology approach* and the *political economy approach* are also used. In addition, the political philosophy is also used as a basic perspective in viewing and explaining the concept of state goals put forward by the figures of progressive muslim, mainstream Islamic organizations, and political Islamists organizations in the reformation era of Indonesia.

The main problem that is the focus of this article: how is Islamic thought articulated and implemented by the figures of progressive muslim, mainstream Islamic organizations, and political Islamists organizations in the reformation era of Indonesia in changing of state order in the reformation era of Indonesia? How is Islamic thought transformed by three variants muslim thought in Indonesia's state from the perspective of Islamic political philosophy?

Theoretical Framework

In the context of democracy, the Indonesian people should be positioned as real citizens. Of course, this position is different from that of the *little people (kawula)*. The position as a subject shows that the people have no role or rights in the life of the state. Therefore, the state dominates people's lives (Kuntowijoyo & Priyono, 2008, p. 379). This reality is reflected in the people-state relations in the pre-independence period.

The position of the people as poor people explains that the people have rights and roles in the life of the state, although they are very limited. In this position as the *wang cilik*, the state recognizes the position, the rights, and the role of the people in the life of the state even though it is still limited. Therefore, the position of the state remains more dominant (Kuntowijoyo & Priyono, 2008, p. 370). This reality can be understood from the reality of people-state relations in Indonesia, especially in the era of the New Order.

Furthermore, the position of the people as citizens. In this regard, the state fully positions the people as having rights and roles in the modern sense related to the people-state relationship. This position as a citizen has implications for the form (pattern) of the people-state relationship (Kuntowijoyo & Priyono, 2008, p. 375). The latter people-state relations like this were voiced by Muslims in the reformation era of Indonesia.

To get to the people-state relationship that is aspired in Indonesia in the reform era, *first*, the willingness of the state as represented by the political elite and the government to position the people as subjects, not just objects. The *second* prerequisite is to put the ruling elite state as a servant of the people (Mul Khan, 2009, p. 204). *Third*, the people are free from any form of state intervention that controls all public discourse in the form of a constitution and the hegemony of the ruling elite, which tends to be treated as a class that is always right under the protection of the state which tends to be sacred.

The ideal condition of the people's relationship with the state is precisely a form of social life in which the people are the main actors with the state and law, and the elite in it actually function as servants of the people (Mul Khan, 2009, p. 206). In this connection, it can be said that if the position of the state as a servant of the people goes well, it means that the goals of the state will also be realized, namely justice, welfare, and prosperity (Yusdani, 2020). As stated by al-Gazali that in managing the government system it is necessary to be based on the teachings of justice because fairness is the wisdom of Allah SWT. In addition, the just act of the ruler is something that is coveted by all the people. Therefore, morally and religiously, the legitimacy of power is determined by actions to create justice for the leader. Thus it is clear that without the establishment of justice, morally, the validity of power does not exist (Ġazzālī, 1988, p. 181). On this basis, it can be emphasized that the government may impose various policies to

regulate its people as long as it is done for reasons of benefit (welfare) for the people (Madaniy & Halim, 2010, p. 75; YUSDANI, 2021, p. 320).

The various explanations above indicate that the relationship between the people and the state is in a strong position. A strong state in sense of being able to carry out its function of providing security protection, ensuring economic prosperity, creating social order, and maintaining territorial integration, strong people can be interpreted as having the ability to exercise control over the state that leads to authoritarian practices or *abuse of power* are also needed (YUSDANI et al., 2021). That way, it will create a relationship between the people and the state that always has as quoted by Manan (Manan, 2005, pp. 261–262) by borrowing the term from Giddens (1982) as *dialectic of control* or a form of relationship between the people and the state which is referred to by Stepan (2000) as *positive-sum*, namely a form of relationship between the people and the state which each has a balanced power capacity and does not negate each other.

METHOD

This research traces the response of Islamic thought to changes in people-state relations as a result of changes in the concept of the state that emerged in the reformation era of Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic thinkers who are the subjects of this research are Nurcholish Madjid (Shihab, 1998, p. 41; Tim Penulis Paramadina, 2004, pp. 208, 238–241) and Abdurrahman Wahid (Wahid, 1984). The determination of these two figures considerations that the thoughts of these two figures have been widely published in Indonesia, the thoughts of these two figures are closely related and even these two figures are involved with state issues in the reformation era of Indonesia. In addition, the thoughts of these two figures even come from the Islamic tradition, but their thoughts in many ways exceed the existing Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

Islamic thoughts that are socio-religious organizations are Muhammadiyah (Noer, 1980, p. xi; Wijaya, 2015, pp. 134, 138), Nahdlatul Ulama (hereinafter referred to as NU (Wijaya, 2015, pp. 134, 138, 144-149). Muhammadiyah and NU in contemporary Indonesia are now more popularly referred to as mainstream Islam (Jurdi, 2008, p. 6). the Islamic Defenders Front (hereinafter referred to as FPI) (Syihab, 2011, pp. 185-186). Hereinafter referred to as MMI) (Jurdi, 2008, p. 411) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (hereinafter referred to as HTI) (Nashir, 2007, p. 421). These three Islamic organizations in this study are called political islamistts (Singh & Qodir, 2015, pp. 6-7).

The basis of consideration for the determination of Muhammadiyah and NU in this study is because these two largest organizations are mainstream Islamic organizations in Indonesia. These two mass organizations were present before the independence of Indonesia, have many followers, and have contributed to building the direction of development and future of the Indonesian nation and state. While the basis for establishing the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), in this study, the three Indonesian Islamic organizations represent various Islamic organizations born in the reform era. In addition, these three political islamists organizations have followers and views on state and Islamic issues that are unique to Indonesia by offering an Islamic state and the formalization of sharia as a solution.

Data Sources

Sources or reference materials for studying Islamic thinkers as individuals and progressive muslims Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid are the various written works of two figures in the form of books, articles, or published interviews. These sources or references can be grouped into primary sources and secondary sources. Primary sources are various references written by relevant

figures related to Islam and the relationship between the people and the state in Indonesia which have been published since 1998. While secondary literature sources are sources of literature written by this figure before the reformation. Including secondary sources are the writings of researchers who examine the thoughts of both figures and thoughts of Indonesian Islamic organizations about the change of state order in the reformation era of Indonesia.

Data or information on the response of Islamic thought to changes in the state order during the reformation era of Indonesia apart from the primary and secondary sources mentioned above is also supported by the results of interviews with: Ahmad Syafii Maarif (representing the Central Leadership of Muhammadiyah), Dr. KHA Malik Madaniy, MA (Katibul Am Syuriyah PBNU), Habib Muhammad Rizieq (Chairman of the Islamic Defenders Front), Irfan S. Awwas (Chairman of Tanfiziyah Indonesian Mujahideen Council), Mohammad Rozi (Head of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia).

Research Approach

The approach used in this study is a historical approach. The historical approach chosen in this study is the historical *challenge and response* approach (Sullivan, 1970, p. 33; Toynbee, 1955, pp. 2, 23, 271). With a historical approach like this, it can be explained that the emergence of Islamic thought in the context of changes in the state order, especially the people-state relations in reformation era of Indonesia is the answer to Islam and its people for the challenges they face.

Analysis Technique

The analytical technique used to understand the response of Islamic thought proposed by Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama is the sociology of knowledge, explaining the dialectic between Muslim thinkers or

Muslim social organizations with the context and reality of changing state structure in reformation era of Indonesia (Fanani, 2008, p. 54). This dialectic takes place in the process of three momentums (stages) simultaneously, namely *internalization*, *objectification*, and *externalization* (Berger et al., 1990, pp. 4-6; Kuntowijoyo, 1997, pp. 82-83, 90, 2001, pp. 139-140, 337; Najjar, 1995, pp. 22, 90, 125).

To understand the thoughts of political Islamists FPI, MMI, and HTI used *discursive strategies* (Hasan, 2012, pp. xiv-xv). They put the thought response as a result of the interaction between the long-term dynamics of political Islam in the face of state authoritarianism, with the existing political, social, and economic systems considered to have failed to save Indonesian Muslims from the ongoing crisis (Hasan, 2008, pp. 2, 322).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The response of Islamic thought to changes in the state order in the reformation era of Indonesia, especially changes in the relations between the people and the state, shows that all Islamic thinkers, both progressive figures (Cak Nur and Gus Dur), mainstream Islamic organizations (Muhammadiyah and NU) and political Islamist (FPI, MMI, and HTI) are of the opinion of the urgency of the role of the state in the lives of the Indonesian people, who are predominantly Muslim. Therefore, the role of the state in people's lives is not merely as a *passive nachtwachterstaat*, that is, the state only acts and is present when the people's basic rights are violated or order and security are disturbed and in socio-economic problems. the *laissez faire* rule is used. Thus, the state must play an active role in building the welfare of its people (Anwar, 1987; Mawardi, 2003, p. 139).

To realize the prosperous state or people mentioned above, the two variants of Islamic thought mentioned above differ in how they are taken. For mainstream Islamic thought, it is argued that realizing

the ideals of a prosperous state is done by integrating Islamic ethics in the state with the state system that has been applied in Indonesia. As for Islamic thought, it is not mainstream to achieve the ideals of a prosperous state and society even if it considers the complexity of the problems and factors that affect the life of the state in the contemporary era but by offering Islam formally in the state order with all its derivations.

State thinking of progressive Islam (Cak Nur and Gus Dur), mainstream Islamic organizations (Muhammadiyah and NU), and political Islamists (FPI, MMI, and HTI) above can be said to realize the concept of the *welfare state* (Ġazzālī, 1988, p. 181) or *social service state*, namely the state is responsible for the welfare of the people (Siregar, 2021, pp. 116–130) and therefore must actively intervene in social and economic life through a system that controls economic forces and tries to minimize social and economic differences, especially differences arising from the unequal distribution of wealth (Budiarjo, 1987, pp. 53, 58–59).

From the point of view of theory or State Science, the response of the Islamic thinkers above is in accordance with the theoretical approach or state science developed by the world today, which requires the active role of the state in economic planning. Thus, this view shows a view that the position of the Indonesian state is other than as an economic instrument as well as a legal instrument to realize social justice or welfare for all Indonesian people.

The description of the importance and strategic position of the state for the lives of the people above, Muslim thinkers then offered a strong current of Islamic thought to look for patterns of people-state relations as new alternatives and solutions that could perpetuate the unity and integrity of the nation within the unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, based on the responses and thoughts above, it can be emphasized in the view of Cak Nur (Majid,

2004, pp. 134–135; 145), Gus Dur (Manan, 2005, p. 38), Muhammadiyah (Redaksi Suara Muhammadiyah, 2012, p. 4) and NU (Lailatul, 2012) that in the reform era, in addition to a strong state, the people must also be strong.

The pattern of strong people's relations (Kuntowijoyo, 1997, pp. 26–27) and the strong state is a pattern of relations that positions the people and the state in a position of *check and balance* relationship, in the sense that no party is more dominant over the other party. The state is strong because the state has strong constitutional legitimacy and a broad support base from the people (Hiariej, 1998, p. 10; Manan, 2005, pp. 34, 39). A strong state is also in the sense of being able to carry out its function of providing security protection, ensuring economic prosperity, creating social order, and maintaining its territorial integration (Manan, 2005, pp. 261–262). While the people are strong because of the people's political awareness that is getting better, the courage of high resistance to state power, and the very free space for the press to exercise social control (Hiariej, 1998, p. 10; Manan, 2005, pp. 34, 39).

Furthermore, it can also be argued that strong people can be interpreted as having the ability to exercise control over the state which leads to authoritarian practices or *abuse of power* (Manan, 2005, pp. 261–262). The relatively parallel form of the relationship above can reduce the emergence of the tendency of domination by one party over another (Hiariej, 1998, p. 10; Manan, 2005, pp. 34, 39). The equal position of the relationship makes it difficult for each party to impose the interests and desires of the other party, except by ignoring all objections and protests raised by one of the parties. However, such abandonment is not without risk. Because, if the state does it, it will easily be suspected that it will begin to show signs of being unresponsive to the voice of the people, and this means the initial symptoms of authoritarianism. As a result, abundant popular support

for the state will gradually shrink. Meanwhile, if the people do it, then it shows people have tended to become anarchists. If anarchism occurs in the people, it can invite the state to act repressively (Manan, 2005, p. 39).

The position of equal people-state relations above indicates the application of democratic principles which require that the relationship between the state and the people is equally strong, which is useful for preventing the establishment of authoritarianism in power and mass anarchism. The assumption of democracy regarding people-state relations is that if the people *vis--vis* the state is relatively strong, then democracy will take place, otherwise, if the state is strong and the people are weak then democracy will not work. This means that democracy will run and be well maintained if the balance of the position of the people-state relationship is equally strong (Budiman, 1990, p. 3).

Departing from the position of the strong people and the strong state above, it will create a relationship between the people - the state that always has - to borrow the term of Giddens (1982) as a *dialectic of control*. This is the form of people-state relations which Stepan (2000) as having the *positive-sum* character *in*, namely the form of people-state relations, each of which has a balanced capacity and does not negate each other (Manan, 2005, pp. 261-262).

The views of Cak Nur, Gus Dur, Muhammadiyah, and NU regarding the position of a strong people and a strong state in the reform era of Indonesia, can be explained that the arrangement of the system of government or state, as explained by al-Gazali that power should rest on very basic Islamic ethics, namely the realization of justice. for all the people (the strong people) because justice, besides being wisdom from God, is also an act that is coveted by all the people. That way, morally and religiously, the legitimacy of the strength of the state or government is determined by actions to create

justice for its people. In this regard, it can be emphasized that without justice, there is no moral validity of power, on the contrary, there is tyranny (Ġazzālī, 1988, pp. 43–44, 173, 181).

Based on the explanation above, it can be stated that the people's obedience to the state or government is because it can realize justice or welfare for all its people (Siregar, 2021, p. 130). This explanation essentially emphasizes that the affairs of the people are completely in the hands of the people in accordance with the goal of achieving the welfare/justice they want. In fact, it is the people who are the source of state or government power (Khallaf, 1977, p. 29). This is in accordance with the basic principle of “*tasarruf al-imam ala ar-ra'iyah manutun bil maslahah* (Suyuti, 1983, p. 83) or *at-tasarruf ala ar-ra'iyah manutun bil maslahah* (Zarqa, 1989, p. 309).

The description above confirms a universal law that justice or welfare is a trait that must always be attached to every government or state if you want the continuity of government or state power to continue. Every government or state will always get demands to be able to represent the interests of all its people to realize prosperity (Ġazzālī, 1988, pp. 173, 181). If the government or the state is able to realize the dream of the welfare of all its people, the people will always obey and submit to the state or government, in this situation the state or government has a strong position. Therefore, every government or state power must be able to implement a system of regulating its people that adheres to the principles of justice or welfare (Yusdani, 2021, pp. 345, 397). On the other hand, if a government or state actually runs an order that makes the majority of its people unfairly, it is certain that the order of the government or the state will not last long. This situation is called the strong people and the weak state.

The situation above illustrates that when an order of government no longer gains the trust of its people, it means that it no longer has a legitimate basis for governing. Such a situation will cause a

government to meet various disobedience from its people. In other words, it can be explained that *a just state will survive, even if it is an infidel state. On the other hand, an unjust state will be destroyed even if it is an Islamic state.*

Meanwhile, the idea of revitalizing the caliphate, dawlah Islamiyah or Islamic state and shari'a is part of the discourse strategy in the context of power relations, especially power relations between the people and the state which are unbalanced and manipulative. In addition, these ideas become one of the few discourse options in welcoming a more prospective change (Hasan, 2012, pp. xiv-xv). That way, the response of non-mainstream Islamic thought can be read as an effort and awareness to get a better and dignified life in the context of state order system changing. In addition, this response can also be understood as part of the dynamic movement of Indonesian Muslim society which is changing at a time when the roots of democracy are starting to stick firmly (Hasan, 2012, pp. xiv-xv).

Variants of thinking of political Islamists are the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). This variant of thinking in responding to changes in the state system in the reformation era of Indonesia focuses more on strengthening the role of the state. This is based on the reality of state life during the New Order era and in the reform era how strong and dominant the influence of the market economy was, which had a very serious impact on the life of the state and people in various aspects.

The variants of Islamic thought are not mainstream even though they focus more on strengthening the role of the state in the reformation era of Indonesia, but it cannot be concluded that they do not strengthen the role of the people because in the view of this variant of thinking the relations between the people and the state are based on

Islamic Sharia, the people's rights are automatically fulfilled. Thus the position of the people will also be strong.

This variant of Islamic thought is political Islamist (Hasan, 2012, p. 157) even though it is "reactive" or "conspirative" in responding to changes in the pattern of people-state relations, especially the three levels of problems above, local, national, and global but religious (Islam). they use as a frame, meaning that the state system they offer must be based on an Islamic system. Therefore, to realize prosperity, prosperity, and justice, these three non-mainstream Islamic organizations reject their basis on the *nation-state system*, democracy, human rights, the nation-state, civil society, and various systems that do not originate from Islam.

The reasons for the refusal of the three political Islamists to change state structure in the reformation era of Indonesia are based on these various systems because these systems originate from the West, are secular and of course, contradict Islam. Therefore, according to them, the system of state life for Muslims, including in regulating and directing changes of the state system in the reformation era of Indonesia must be based on an Islamic system because Islam is a universal religion and is also a complete system for regulating people-state relations. country.

In addition to the argument that Islam is a complete teaching and has a standard system of state and government, including in regulating people-state relations, Muslims as the majority of Indonesian citizens. The emergence of this alternative thought can also be read as criticism and critical attitude of non-mainstream Islamic organizations towards the reality of the people-state relationship in the state and government system in Indonesia, both before the reform and in the reform era, which tends to be corrupt and manipulative. In addition, the reality is that the state system adopted

from the West secular has failed to realize justice and the welfare of the people (Hasan, 2012, p. 157).

Furthermore, it can be explained that in the view of political Islamists, the above state system whose application rejects its foundation on democracy, human rights, civil society, and the nation-state in regulating people-state relations in Indonesia, they understand is a system of "kufr" because it is an extension of the hands of capitalist countries or the global economy. Because of this, the regulation of change of state system by using a state and government system imported from the West has failed to prosper and prosper the people and even these systems are also used by capital-owning countries as a tool to control and exploit wealth and resources. nature owned by Indonesia (Wibowo, 2010, p. 6).

Based on the above perspective, Political Islamists initiated a change in the pattern of people-state relations in Indonesia in the reform era that needed to be replaced with an Islamic state system with formal and total enforcement of sharia. That's why Islam, is not the mainstream, the regulation of changes in people-state relations must return to the Islamic system because Islam is perfect teaching and comes from God (Hasan, 2010, p. 23). In this context, it can be understood the emergence of the thought of the people-state relation in the reformation era of Indonesia based on the concept or system of *the International Khilafah State* promoted by HTI, *the Archipelago Khilafah State* as discoursed by MMI and *the Indonesian Islamic State Kaffah* initiated by the FPI.

From the idea of the people-state relation based on Islam which is aspired by the three political Islamists above, it can also be read as their resistance and critical attitude towards the macro phenomenon of the failure of the secular political/state system implemented in Muslim countries including Indonesia to prosper. The people, even those systems have made the people miserable. In addition, these non-

mainstream Islamic organizations also fight the swift currents of unfair global political economy influence both at the national level of each Muslim country and at the global level (Hasan, 2010, p. 23).

On that basis, the above thought can be understood as part of the dynamic movement of Indonesian Muslim society which is facing a swift current of social change due to the pace of modernization and globalization (Hasan, 2010, pp. 3–5, 2012, pp. xii–xiii). It can even be added that the response developed both micro (locally and nationally such as culture, nation-state systems) and macro (modernization and globalization with all their associated values, such as the free market) as an impetus for the spirit of resistance against corrupt regimes ruling the world. Muslims fulfill their desire for power and hoard luxuries for themselves and their cronies. For non-mainstream Islamic organizations, the absence of divine intervention as the absolute ruler in the secular state and government system implies that the system is prone to be manipulated and abused by the ruling regimes. As a result, it is the people who suffer and are helplessly oppressed to face the arbitrariness of the ruler (Hasan, 2010, p. 6).

Starting from various issues related to people-state relations in the life of the Indonesian state, both in the economic, political, social, cultural, legal and ideological, and religious fields, it is clearly seen in the view of political Islamists that the government and the state both before the era both reforms and the reformation era failed to improve the welfare of the Indonesian people, protect the morality of the Indonesian people, eradicate corruption and the legal mafia, protect the creed of the people, and lead the Indonesian people to the path that Allah has blessed.

Progressive Islam Perspective

Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid's thoughts on changes in the structure of the state in Indonesia are based on the main principle that the people must be sovereign. The power possessed by

the state is a mandate from the people. It is based on the principle of trust that consequences arise: the state is obliged to protect, fulfill the will of the people, and realize justice in the field of social life. The creation of social justice by the state for the people, for these two thinkers, at least provides a decent standard of living for people in various fields of life. In efforts to achieve social justice for the people, according to these two figures, the role of the state is still needed.

These two figures not only articulate the status of the people as holders of sovereignty. The people, according to both of them, must have a bargaining position with the state. The people need to be empowered so that they know and are aware of their rights as citizens. That way, people can claim their rights in the life of the state. With the strength of the people, they can exercise control over the state if the state violates and neglects its duties and obligations to the people.

Mainstream Islam Perspective

Based on the description above, on the one hand, Muhammadiyah, NU, NU offers to reorganize the change of state order in the reformation era of Indonesia offering a pattern of state structure that strong state and strong people. This pattern of relations is offered to realize the welfare, prosperity, and justice of the people starting from the existing (state) system. Meanwhile, on the other hand, represented by FPI, MMI, and HTI, there are also ideas to regulate the relations between the people and the state with the idea that the state must be strong by completely replacing the Indonesian state system with an Islamic system. The two variants of Islamic thought with their respective offers of solutions regarding the pattern of relations between the people and the state explain the differences in the methods taken.

The choice of way of thinking from the first group of thinkers can be understood that the vision of Islamic thought in directing changes in the pattern of people-state relations in the reformation era of

Indonesia can be explained through the analysis of Kuntowijoyo's Prophetic Social Sciences (Kuntowijoyo, 2004, p. 33; Santoso, 2011). The formulation of the concept of social transformation in the Prophetic Social Sciences can be translated into the following four steps (Kuntowijoyo, 2004, p. 33; Santoso, 2011).

With the logic of thinking as mentioned above, it can be understood that in directing changes of state order in Islamic thought presented by Cak Nur, Gus Dur, Muhammadiyah, and NU, it is impossible to think from the basis of Islamic norms directly to bring about changes of state structure instantly. In the view of Cak Nur, Gus Dur, Muhammadiyah, and NU to arrive at the expected changes, there needs to be a careful reading of the macro and philosophical aspects of critical reading of social reality related to the complexity of the problems of changing state structure in the reformation era of Indonesia in various social, economic, cultural fields, politics, and the global market. In other words, it is necessary to consider the macro and micro sides.

After the micro and macro readings are carried out, further efforts are needed to formulate theories and concrete applications of these micro and macro readings. In this connection, of course, it is necessary to understand and consider the reality related to the change of state order. Therefore, the strategy towards changing of state structure as designed by many contemporary Islamic movements in the view of the above variants tends to forget the formulation of social theory. Sometimes they are too absorbed in discussing the theological-normative level but forget about the *methodological* design, to the stage of *formulating social theory*, and then to the *agenda (action) of changing people-state relations*.

Based on the explanation above, these Muslim thinkers, on the one hand, bring substantial religious teachings as an integral part of social analysis for the future of the Indonesian state and nation. In this

connection, it can be emphasized that these thinkers, on the other hand, do not use the textual-normative approach of Islam because in the view of the first variant it will not result in a state change in Indonesia. The offer of Islamic thought that

The first variant of thinking above has been carried out and applied objectification. What is called objectification is the translation of Islamic subjective values into objective categories that can be understood and accepted by everyone without the need to understand and agree on the original values (religion-Islam). Thus, objectification is a method to present religion in a more substantive and prophetic manner (Kuntowijoyo, 1997, 2001, p. 373).

By using the way of objectification which is defined as the transformation of the values of Islam that have been absorbed into the structure of the internal consciousness into forms that objective is Islam originally are the values that are subjective, with the objectification transformed into the values objective, regardless of the nature of their subjective. Thus, the objectification of a process to make the values of internal objective. In even more detail, it can be explained that objectification is a rational act of values that is manifested into rational actions so that outsiders can agree and enjoy without having to agree with the original values.

The estuary of all of this is with transcendental values, to direct changes of state order in Indonesia in a transformative manner. This kind of transformative character is not determined by technical skills but is determined by his commitment to realizing the new reality of the life of the state and nation in order to realize welfare which is the goal of the state and nation.

Political Islamist Perspective

In contrast to the thoughts and strategies put forward by the two figures and the two mainstream mass organizations above, Islamic movements and thoughts are not mainstream in responding to

changes in Indonesian state order in the reformation era of Indonesia, which can be understood in the that starting from Islamic doctrine to agenda or action (Hasan, 2010).

Based on this explanation, it can be emphasized that the discourse and response of Islamic thought to changes in the state order, especially changes of state structure in the reformation era of Indonesia carried out by leaders, progressive Islam, mainstream Islamic organizations, and political Islamists above can be read as an effort and awareness to get a better and dignified life in the context of changing state structure in the reformation era of Indonesia. That way, this discourse, and response can also be understood as part of the dynamic movement of Indonesian Muslim society which is changing at a time when the roots of democracy are starting to stick firmly (Hasan, 2012, pp. xiv-xv).

Starting from the explanation above, clearly shows that the response of the thoughts of two figures, mainstream Islamic organizations, and political Islamists to changes of state order including the pattern of people-state relations, departed from Islamic teachings as a holistic and comprehensive teaching that has *multiple* capabilities to do continuous re-interpretation in the face of changing times, including changes in governance and state governance. Islam has thus been developed by Cak Nur, Gus Dur, Muhammadiyah, NU, FPI, MMI, and HTI in responding to political challenges such as the question of nationality and statehood.

From the overall map and response dynamics as well as the thought transformation strategy presented above, it can be emphasized that the strong current of Islamic thought is to build a just Indonesia based on state ethics in Islam whose actualization considers the reality of all aspects of the life of the Indonesian nation. In this way, it is hoped that a just, prosperous, dignified, and civilized life will be realized for all people.

CONCLUSION

The response of Islamic thought to changes in the state order in the reformation era of Indonesia can be understood as part of the dynamic movement of the Indonesian Muslim community which is changing and realizing their rights as citizens at a time when the roots of democracy are firmly planted. Thoughts put forward by Islamic figures, mainstream Islamic organizations, and political Islamist thoughts are contributions and creative endeavors made by Islamic thinkers to create a better and dignified life in the context of the new state order, especially changes in the pattern of people-state relations in the reformation era of Indonesia. Islamic thought put forward by Islamic leaders and mass organizations in the reformation era of Indonesia related to changes in the state structure, especially in re-patterning people-state relations in the reform era, is a contributive and proactive response to Islam in the democratization process in Indonesia, and at the same time provides direction. democracy in Indonesia which is based on the ideals of realizing the life of the people and a prosperous state.

It can also be emphasized that the contribution of Islamic thought to the change in people-state relations in the reformation era of Indonesia that was put forward by prominent figures, mainstream Islamic organizations, and political Islamist organizations is the actualization of religious thought inherently in Islam, that the power possessed by the state is a mandate, and the mandate must be accounted for in the interests of the people. That way, all policies carried out by the state must refer to the welfare of the people. On that basis, in a state like this, besides the people being able to demand the responsibility of the state, the people can also carry out their urgency to the state to fulfill their rights if the state neglects or violates them. This thinking shows that in addition to carrying out a rational

function, the state must also carry out its ethical responsibilities to the people.

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