Efektifitas Mekanisme Bonding Dividen dan Hutang untuk Mengurangi Masalah Agensi pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Jakarta
By investigating the same sample of listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange in 1996 and in 2000, this research discovers that in 1996, the debt bonding mechanism is not effective to reduce an agency problem but it increases the agency problem instead. In 2000, the debt bonding mechanism is still not effective but it does not increase the agency problem anymore. Meanwhile, the dividend bonding mechanism is effective to reduce the agency problem both in 1996 and in 2000. However, the dividend bonding mechanism is avoided by the companies that have a family ownership that closed to a minimum portion of majority or domination.
Kata Kunci: Agency Problem, Bonding, Hutang, Dividen, Kepemilikan Keluarga
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