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Abstract
Paper ini memuat desain penentuan premi asuransi deposito dengan mempertimbangkan pinalti bagi perilaku moral hazard dan memberikan sanggahan teoritis terhadap pendapat yang meragukan kebaikan asuransi deposito. Sanggahan ini didasarkan pada desain premi jika mempertimbangkan pinalti bagi perilaku moral hazard. Sanggahan ini merujuk pada manfaat asuransi berupa penurunan penarikan serta laba bank yang positip dan manfaat sosial yang diperoleh pemerintah.
Key Word: asuransi deposito, incentive compatible plan, moral hazard, camel rating, Option Theory-Jump Process, Benefit Sosial Pemerintah
Key Word: asuransi deposito, incentive compatible plan, moral hazard, camel rating, Option Theory-Jump Process, Benefit Sosial Pemerintah
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How to Cite
Asnawi, S. K. (2009). Desain Premi dan Manfaat Asuransi Deposito. Jurnal Siasat Bisnis, 11(1). Retrieved from https://journal.uii.ac.id/JSB/article/view/411